EK Strategic Communications Center

Country-Level Report November 2026

The Kremlin's Influence Ecosystem in Spain

Pre-Election Activity, Networks, and Narratives

Anton Mikhalchuk, Evgenii Liamin, Sasha Starost, Egor Kuroptev

ekstrategies.org

EK Strategic Communications Center

EK Stratcom is a nexus of information, policy, and resilience in Eurasia and beyond. We provide expertise in strategic communications, analyze and shape key narratives, and support vulnerable societies.

Drawing on 20+ years of experience in media, GR, and PR, and over 12 years in analysis and strategic communications, EK Stratcom is built around a core team of exiled Russian professionals.

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EK Stratcom has served as a key mechanism for real-time disinformation monitoring, analytical reporting, and targeted messaging — reaching millions inside Russia and advising Western governments on Kremlin FIMI operations.

ekstrategies.org

About authors



Anton Mikhalchuk

Projects Director

Project manager with over 10 years of experience in media, education, political, and human rights initiatives. Specializing in the development and implementation of educational programs, accelerators, international campaigns, and media projects with measurable social impact.





Evgenii Liamin

Senior Analyst

Political analyst, project manager and anti-war activist with a background in political science, civic education and humanitarian assistance.





Sasha Starost

Analyst & Briefings Specialist

Political activist and interpreter forced to flee Russia in 2022. Since joining Egor Kuroptev's team in 2022, she has monitored Kremlin narratives in Western and European media, as well as disinformation targeting women and children in Russia.





Egor Kuroptev

Director & Chief Strategist

Russian exiled media manager and political expert with over 20 years of experience in communications, democratic development, and countering disinformation.



Table of contents

Executive Summary 5

Election Context 8

Russian FIMI and Public-Diplomacy Infrastructure 9

Domestic Political Networks and Russian-Linked Interests 14

Narratives and Influence Activity During the Election Campaign 21

Strategic Assessment and Risks 27

Annex 1. Spanish-Language FIMI Actors 28

Annex 2. FIMI Telegram Actors Promoting @desdemoscubot 32

Annex 3. General and Elections-Focused Narratives 34

Sources 35

Executive Summary

Spain votes on November 29 after a campaign shaped by housing protests, migration tensions and anger over deadly rail accidents. Russian influence networks are exploiting these crises to deepen distrust of Spanish institutions and weaken support for Ukraine and the EU.

> EK Stratcom's investigation traces the infrastructure carrying this campaign — from Russian state media and Spanish political intermediaries to community organisations and Telegram channels recruiting Spaniards for Russian operations.

Ahead of the vote, pro-Kremlin FIMI channels portray Spain as controlled by Washington and Brussels, sacrificing citizens' welfare to fund Ukraine, enabling a migration crisis and repressing nationalists. They present elections as meaningless and cooperation with Russia as the path to sovereignty and peace.

Some FIMI channels back the housing strike, accusing Madrid of putting Ukraine first; others portray it as an electoral operation serving Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Matryoshka, a Russian media-impersonation operation, spreads these narratives through fabricated reports bearing the branding of established Western media outlets.

Spanish lawyer and pro-Kremlin commentator Rubén Gisbert, who has over 70,000 subscribers on Telegram and over 730,000 on YouTube, is calling on supporters to rally outside Congress on election night and reject the political system regardless of the result.

On the left, Russia directly cooperates with communist and socialist organisations that have promoted or participated in mass protests in Spain, France and Germany. These relationships run through Russian party forums and SOVINTERN, an international socialist network whose organising

committee is chaired by Russian parliamentary deputy speaker Alexander Babakov.

Spain's Soberanía y Trabajo, a socialist party represented in SOVINTERN, backed housing mobilisation and the general strike. France's Pole of Communist Revival (PRCF) called supporters to the October 17 protests, while the German Communist Party (DKP) participated in the October 3 demonstrations. Their campaigning connects housing, education and social protection with opposition to spending on Ukraine, rearmament and NATO.

On the far right, Spanish parties Democracia Nacional and Falange Española de las JONS participated in the founding of Paladins, an international sovereigntist league associated with Russian far-right billionaire Konstantin Malofeev. Both promoted protests over Ceuta, portraying migration as an invasion and accusing Sánchez's government of abandoning Spanish sovereignty.

Democracia Nacional also backed the October 3 counterdemonstration against Madrid's housing encampment alongside Núcleo Nacional, a Spanish neo-Nazi association with personnel links to the party. On November 6, police arrested 14 Núcleo members in an investigation into alleged incitement to hatred, unlawful association and illegal weapons possession, triggered by reported attacks on students in Gijón. Democracia Nacional offered legal assistance.

From Russia, Spanish fugitive Enrique Arias Gil uses his Spanish-language Telegram channel Desinformador Ruso to advertise Russian military contracts with a $25,000 signing bonus and solicit confidential information about Spanish officials through a Telegram bot. Twenty other channels, with 267,800 combined subscriptions, have republished his material, including recruitment appeals. In November, Spanish police in Burgos arrested a suspected recruiter for the pro-Russian cyberattack group NoName057(16), seizing firearms and more than 5,000 rounds of ammunition. Investigators suspect Arias Gil recruited him.

The supporting infrastructure remains active between elections. Russian state outlets RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo supply material that automated Pravda websites and Telegram channels redistribute. Community organisations maintain local access through schools, cultural programmes and professional services. Leaked reports to Pravfond, a sanctioned Russian state-backed foundation, document Russian-funded anti-NATO campaigning and the cultivation of Spanish intermediaries.

> Alongside this political influence, recruitment channels solicit confidential information and draw Spaniards into Russian military and cyber operations, creating a direct national-security threat that persists after election day.

Election Context

On October 5, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced an early general election for November 29, seeking "a much broader, progressive majority" in Parliament.[1] Three days earlier, Congress had rejected two emergency housing decrees after Junts, the Catalan party whose parliamentary support had helped keep Sánchez in office, voted against them alongside the center-right People's Party (PP) and far-right Vox.[2] The defeat came amid housing protests galvanized by the September 23 eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from her Madrid home. Her death on October 7 prompted further demonstrations.[3]

The official campaign runs from November 13 through November 27. Housing led public concerns in the November 23 survey by the Center for Sociological Research (CIS), with 59.5% naming it among Spain's three main problems.[4] The Ceuta crisis[5] and renewed Canary Islands arrivals intensified disputes over border controls and migrant children's relocation;[6] the government declared a migration emergency in the archipelago on November 10.[7] The October 28 collision near Urda, Toledo, killed 69 people, following fatal rail accidents in Adamuz and Gelida earlier that year.

Russian FIMI and Public-Diplomacy Infrastructure

Telegram Distribution, Recruitment, and Operational Activity

On November 20, the Interior Ministry of Spain announced the arrest in Burgos of a suspected recruiter for the pro-Russian cyberattack group NoName057(16). He allegedly distributed recruitment stickers in eight Spanish cities; police seized firearms and over 5,000 rounds of ammunition.[8] EFE reported investigators' suspicion that Arias Gil had recruited him.[9] Released under precautionary measures, he remains under investigation for alleged terrorist organization membership, glorification of terrorism, and weapons offenses.[10]

> The case points to a mechanism through which digital networks attract local intermediaries who spread propaganda and recruit additional participants.

Telegram connects Russian content producers with Spanish-language audiences through reposting and cross-promotion. Golden Owl's monitoring from October 20 to November 5, 2026, recorded approximately 350,000 combined subscriptions and 8.5 million cumulative post views across the pro-Russian core of the network it examined.[11] EK Stratcom's broader monitoring covers at least 77 actors in the Spanish-language FIMI ecosystem (Annex 1).

Within this infrastructure, the Desinformador Ruso channel[12] combines content distribution with recruitment and requests for confidential information. Managed from Russia by Spanish national Enrique Arias Gil, who is subject to an international arrest warrant over alleged sabotage with terrorist intent,[13] the channel had more than 14,650 subscribers in mid-November.

EK Stratcom identified 20 other Spanish-language channels republishing its content, including recruitment appeals and invitations to cooperate with Russian security services, with approximately 267.8k combined subscriptions (Annex 2).

Between October 21 and November 3, Desinformador Ruso published nine Russian military recruitment advertisements offering monthly salaries of $2,500–$3,000 and a $25,000 signing bonus, three appeals for confidential information about Spanish officials, and an invitation to participate in paid cyberattacks through DDoSia. It also exposed identifying information about an active-duty Spanish noncommissioned officer. Earlier posts had carried threats against Spanish journalists covering Russia.[14,15]

Its main channel and discussion chat direct potential contributors to the contact bot @desdemoscubot for private submissions. Pravda's Spanish-language sites have amplified these invitations since at least February 2025. Desinformador Ruso also translates and circulates cyberattack claims, including material shared by Z-Pentest and NoName057(16), connecting its Spanish-language audience with the wider pro-Russian cyberattack ecosystem.[16]

Russian State Media and the Pravda Digital Ecosystem

RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo produce Spanish-language news and political programming, while TASS and other Russian state agencies supply additional material for republication. Alternative domains, Telegram reposts, and third-party websites sustain distribution despite EU restrictions: RT directs readers to an alternative domain,[17] while Sputnik uses multiple mirrors.[18]

Pravda (Portal Kombat) aggregates and translates Russian media and Telegram content through Spanish News Pravda, Spain News Pravda, and Catalan, Basque, and Galician versions. A May 2025 investigation counted over 150,000 publications across these five sites in six months.[19] By November 2026, the regional-language versions published little content, while the two Spanish-language sites remained active.[20]

Pravda also incorporates domestic political material. Newtral examined 68,413 headlines and 667,778 Telegram messages from September 1 to November 8, 2026, documenting republication from Spanish far-right and conspiratorial channels.[20] An Alliance4Europe study of French protests and coverage abroad from October 11 to November 6 recorded 4,299 relevant articles across 55 Pravda sites in 17 languages.

> Approximately nine in ten identified cross-site copies appeared within five minutes, illustrating the network's rapid international distribution.[21]

Kremlin-Aligned Networks Within the Russian-Speaking Community

Reports submitted to Pravfond in Moscow by Aleksandr Chepurnoy, director of Casa de Rusia (Russian House) in Alicante, describe how Russian funding supported political campaigning inside Spain. He documented anti-NATO activities, mobilisation for the release of Russian spy Pablo González and pressure to cancel a Mariupol exhibition, involving Russian residents, Spanish activists, lawyers, journalists and pro-Kremlin commentators[22].

This campaigning draws on a wider infrastructure connecting the Russian Embassy, Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Pravfond — the Russian state-backed foundation for compatriots abroad — with Kremlin-aligned organisations within Spain's Russian-speaking community.

> Through funding, institutional contacts and joint events, these relationships connect community services with historical propaganda, political advocacy and support for Russia's war.

The Union of Organizations of Russian Compatriots in Spain and Andorra (SORS) links approximately 30 schools, children's centers, and associations identified by EK Stratcom to Russia's international compatriot coordination system. In September 2026,

it selected delegates for a Moscow conference.[23] Its October 7 birthday message praised Putin's defense of Russian history and "traditional values."[24]

Russian School No. 1 in Marbella, directed by Irina Chistyakova, held military-patriotic classes involving letters to Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine[25] and "Conversations about Important Things," a Russian state program of patriotic and ideological instruction.[26]

Madrid's Immortal Regiment march links historical remembrance with contemporary pro-Kremlin mobilization. Coordinator Viktoria Samoilova, president of the Association for the Development of Russian-Spanish Cooperation, received public praise from Putin in April 2025[27] and described delivering medical supplies to Russian troops that January.[28]

Her legal adviser, Juan Antonio Aguilar Santillana, heads the Instituto Español de Geopolítica and comes from the Falangist milieu, connecting the march's antifascist presentation with a Spanish radical-right intermediary.[29] Russkiy Mir's coverage portrayed Spanish participants in the 2026 march as protecting Russians from "Russophobia," turning participation into a claim of wider Spanish solidarity with Moscow.[30]

The Russian Orthodox Church in Spain provides another institutional connection. In November 2025, Metropolitan Mark met Russian Ambassador Yuri Klimenko to discuss cooperation with Russian organizations and community associations.[31] Mark previously headed the Ryazan diocese, whose clergy provided pastoral care and medical supplies to Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.[32]

EK Stratcom's research identified Samoilova and her associates as participants in the campaign against the anti-war Russian priest Andrei Kordochkin in Spain. Complaints accused him of refusing to pray for Russia and its soldiers.[33] Kordochkin was suspended from his service in 2023;[34] then Russian authorities designated him a "foreign agent" in August 2025.

The Union of Cossacks of the Kingdom of Spain, led by Alexander Vasilenko, organized a children's Zarnitsa military-

patriotic game in Tenerife in May 2025.[35] Its September 2024 conference, supported by the Russian Embassy, the Church, and Russian Cossack organizations, emphasized advancing Russian state interests.[36]

Vasilenko also represents the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad advertises recruitment in Russia for combat formations fighting in Ukraine.[37] El Español reported his past cooperation with the Federal Security Service (FSB).[38] EK Stratcom identified at least 13 associated companies and 25 properties in Spain linked to Vasilenko, his wife, and connected businesses.

Local media reinforce these connections. MADRIDRU.es owner Lyudmila Shibanova combines event publicity with offline organizing, including support for Samoilova's initiatives;[39] RusSpain also publicizes commemorations.[40] EK Stratcom identified[5] a Russian-language FIMI network around Madrid-based lawyer Oleg Gubarev, documenting his connections with the Russian Embassy, Pravfond, and Russian House and the redistribution of his posts through Telegram channels serving Russian-speaking communities in Alicante, Torrevieja, Marbella, and the Costa del Sol.

His main channel (@pravosp, 6,800 subscribers) combines practical advice with radical pro-Kremlin commentary. His Facebook page publishes pro-Kremlin AI-generated content in Russian, English and Spanish attacking the EU and Spanish government, drawing dozens and sometimes thousands of reactions per post.

> These overlapping roles give particular organizations and intermediaries sustained access to audiences through professional services, local information, and public events.

Domestic Political Networks and Russian-Linked Interests

SOVINTERN and the Spanish Sovereignist Left

Soberanía y Trabajo, a Spanish socialist and sovereignist party represented in SOVINTERN, used its election statements to connect domestic grievances with opposition to NATO, sanctions against Russia and military assistance to Ukraine. Its October 20 electoral declaration opposed NATO expansion and sanctions against Russia, supported housing protests and the November 11 general strike, and argued against allowing the right and far right into government.[41]

Soberanía y Trabajo chair Carlos Martínez, who identifies himself as a SOVINTERN member, reinforced this position in his November 5 article, "Russia Is Not Our Enemy."[42] A November 12 declaration portrayed military assistance to Ukraine and European rearmament as diverting resources from housing, healthcare, education, and pensions.[43]

On November 18, Soberanía y Trabajo joined six other organizations, including Partido Feminista de España, Izquierda Necesaria, and Socialismo XXI, in an electoral statement demanding disarmament and depicting the government as subordinate to Brussels and Washington.[44] The party had already applied this argument to the Ceuta crisis: an August 1 statement demanded the return of Spanish troops from NATO's eastern flank to defend Ceuta and Melilla and called for withdrawal from NATO and the EU.[45]

> Domestic economic and security concerns thus become arguments for dismantling Spain's existing international commitments.

SOVINTERN connects Russian political actors with Spain's sovereignist left. Founded in Moscow on April 27, 2026, by the

Kremlin-controlled parliamentary party A Just Russia, with State Duma Deputy Chairman Alexander Babakov among its organizers, it presents itself as an alternative to the Socialist International, which expelled the party in 2022.[46] Spanish participant Soberanía y Trabajo, a socialist and sovereignist party opposing NATO and EU membership, presented a provisional Spanish coordination group on September 7.[47]

Soberanía y Trabajo's communications connect this political activity with the wider Russian information ecosystem. EK Stratcom's research identified republication of material from SOVINTERN ES, Russian state news agency TASS, pro-Kremlin commentator Liu Sivaya, the Basque FIMI channel Herrien Arteko Adiskidetasuna, and the Spanish-language channel of the Strategic Culture Foundation. The latter is a Russian online publication that the U.S. Treasury identifies as controlled by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[48]

The party distributes statements, interviews, and outside material through its website, Telegram, YouTube, TikTok, and X. This creates a route through which Russian messaging and content from aligned intermediaries enter a Spanish political organization's own communications.

Content sharing connects SOVINTERN participants with the wider Spanish-language left media environment. On July 1, Soberanía y Trabajo republished a Canal Red Planeta interview with American Communist Party official Carlos L. Garrido, identifying him as a fellow SOVINTERN participant.[49]

The RED network, founded by former Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias and previously examined by EK Stratcom,[50] includes Canal Red and Diario Red. Former RT en Español presenter Inna Afinogenova is among its prominent contributors. Canal Red began broadcasting on Movistar Plus+ in August 2026, expanding its distribution beyond its online channels.[51]

The overlap between left-wing media and political activism was already visible in the 2024 #FreePablo campaign, when figures associated with Podemos, Canal Red, and Diario Red supported Pablo González, also known as Pavel Rubtsov, portraying his detention in Poland on espionage allegations

as political persecution. EK Stratcom's research recorded more than 5,500 Instagram posts associated with the campaign. González was transferred to Russia in the August 2024 prisoner exchange and welcomed by Vladimir Putin.[52]

> The campaign illustrates how overlapping political, media, and activist networks can mobilize support around a case involving Russian state interests.

SOVINTERN also draws on political activists and cultural intermediaries with local networks. Its May 26 list of supporters[53] of a statement on Starobelsk named Javi Madrazo and Roberto Laspita, respectively general coordinator and international-relations representative of the Basque left-wing organization Izquierda Verde.[54]

It also named Miguel Suárez del Cerro, founder and president of the Slavic Cultural Association of Pamplona and director of its Russian film cycle.[55] His projects have cooperated with the Russian House in Madrid, Russian community associations, and institutions in St. Petersburg; on September 18, he received a cultural-diplomacy award in Moscow.[56]

Galician-Argentine activist Lois Pérez Leira, executive secretary of the Anti-Imperialist International of Peoples, attended the founding forum and publicly endorsed Russia's war as a struggle against fascism.[46] These connections bring party organizing, cultural programming, and public support for Russian positions into overlapping networks.

Russian Connections in Spain's Far-Right Networks

During the Ceuta crisis, Spanish far-right groups called for street mobilisation over what they portrayed as a "migrant invasion." Falange Española de las JONS organised a rally outside the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid, attended by Democracia Nacional and the neo-Nazi association Núcleo Nacional. Paladins amplified the protest and warned that government

inaction would encourage nationalists to take matters into their own hands.[57]

The International Sovereigntist League, known as Paladins, connects Russian ultranationalist organizers with Spanish far-right parties through international conferences, shared political platforms, and public campaigning. Founded in St. Petersburg in September 2025, the league brought together networks associated with pro-Kremlin Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev and ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin.

Democracia Nacional, a Spanish far-right party, declared itself a founding member after vice president Gonzalo Martín attended at the invitation of two Russian nationalist organizations associated with Malofeev, the Brotherhood of Academists and Two-Headed Eagle.[58] Other Spanish participants included the fascist party Falange Española de las JONS and the far-right association Málaga 1487.[59] At a Madrid conference in November 2025, Martín interpreted for a Brotherhood representative who urged European nationalist unity against confrontation with Russia.[60]

Shared personnel link this environment to Núcleo Nacional, a neo-Nazi association whose messaging rejects NATO and EU membership, attacks both the governing left and PP and Vox, and portrays democratic politics as incapable of resolving Spain's problems.[61] Co-founder Enrique Lemus Sánchez, whose death was announced on November 18, previously served in Democracia Nacional's leadership.[62] In February 2026, he registered the political party Noviembre Nacional, using Núcleo's symbols and its Valladolid address.[63] Reporting on intercepted communications indicates that the party was intended as a fallback against a possible ban on the association.[64]

> This organizational continuity connects an established party with Russian contacts to a newer movement combining online propaganda, local premises, and street activity.

On November 6, police arrested 14 Núcleo Nacional members in an investigation into alleged incitement to hatred, unlawful association and illegal weapons possession, opened after reported

attacks on students in Gijón.[65] A court subsequently ordered the suspension of Núcleo Nacional's activities, closure of its premises, and blocking of its bank account and social-media content. Democracia Nacional offered legal assistance.[62] Implementation remained incomplete: Cadena SER reported on November 18 that police had sealed the premises, but the associations register had not received the notification needed to record the suspension, and social-media accounts remained active.[66]

Núcleo also provided platforms for commentators connected with Russian state institutions. Koldo Salazar López,[67] who lists work with RT and Sputnik and represents Russia's World Youth Festival in Spain, spoke at the opening of its Madrid headquarters. The festival is linked to Russia's federal youth agency, Rosmolodezh; Salazar received a commemorative medal at the Russian Embassy in Madrid in June 2026.[61]

According to Golden Owl, Carlos Paz, another recurring speaker and RT commentator, shared at least eight public platforms with Salazar from September 2025, including events presenting NATO as encircling Russia.[61] Support for Moscow also came from within the movement: co-founder Pedro Jesús Espada, a municipal councilor in Velilla de San Antonio, publicly opposed confrontation with Russia.[68]

These connections coexist with a pro-Ukrainian current. Núcleo president Iván Rico Olivares visited Ukraine, and some of its international partners support Kyiv. Russian media exploited these contacts: Ruptly circulated photographs of Rico in Kyiv, while Russian state television portrayed the case as evidence that Ukraine was training and arming neo-Nazis to operate in Spain.[69]

Golden Owl found that 92% of posts mentioning Núcleo across 38 pro-Kremlin Spanish-language Telegram channels, monitored from May through November 12, 2026, framed it as aligned with Kyiv or a product of Ukraine.[61] FIMI channel Líneas Rojas explicitly connected this narrative to Spanish policy, claiming that assistance to Ukraine financed the training of Spanish neo-Nazis for a coup against Sánchez.[70]

> The same extremist environment therefore supplies both sympathetic speakers and material for hostile narratives about Ukraine.

A separate connection to Russia runs through The Base, a transnational neo-Nazi organization promoting terrorist violence and racial war. In late 2025, Spanish police dismantled a three-person cell in Castellón whose members had conducted paramilitary training, accumulated weapons, and used social media for recruitment.[71] Police reported that its leader maintained direct contact with the organization's founder. Rinaldo Nazzaro lives in St. Petersburg[72] and, according to EK Stratcom's research, holds a valid Russian passport.

Russian-Linked Corporate and Property Interests

Spain is both a target of Russian influence and a destination for the wealth of Russia's political and business elite. Their property holdings and corporate investments create lasting interests in the country. Mapping those interests reveals the economic presence that accompanies Moscow's political and information networks beyond a single election campaign.

EK Stratcom's review of Spanish property records and related investigative reporting identified holdings associated with at least 24 members of Russia's political and business elite, concentrated along the Costa del Sol, Costa Blanca, and Costa Brava. These included assets linked to Vladimir Putin's former wife Lyudmila Ocheretnaya, senior Kremlin official Sergei Kiriyenko, Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova, defense-industry executives Alexander Mikheyev and Nikolai Kolesov, and businessmen Alisher Usmanov and Boris Rotenberg.

> The ownership structures frequently involve relatives and Spanish companies, separating the registered owner from the political figure associated with the assets.

These structures make tracing ownership and assessing restrictions a property-specific task. EK Stratcom identified holdings registered to relatives of pro-Kremlin filmmaker Nikita

Mikhalkov and companies connected to the family of Russian senator Valery Ponomarev. His daughter Zoya was linked through ownership or management roles to Xareni Development SL and Auto Pinos Costa Del Sol SL, which held a 1,828-square-meter villa in La Zagaleta, Benahavís, and a 202-square-meter duplex in Estepona, respectively.

At the time of EK Stratcom's August 2026 review, the villa was subject to a provisional seizure and prohibition on sale under an international judicial-assistance proceeding, while the duplex was not seized.

> The case illustrates how properties within the same family-linked corporate network can have different legal statuses, requiring ownership chains and restrictions to be traced separately for each asset.

Corporate investment provides another form of economic presence. Luxembourg-based investment group LetterOne held 77.7% of supermarket group DIA as of June 30, 2026, maintaining the majority position established through its 2019 takeover and subsequent capital injections.[73] LetterOne's shareholders include Mikhail Fridman, Petr Aven, and Andrei Kosogov, businessmen associated with Alfa Group.[74]

Fridman and Aven's voting rights as LetterOne shareholders have been frozen under sanctions arrangements, while the investment group retains its majority stake in DIA.[75]

> The case illustrates the persistence of Russian-linked capital in a major Spanish consumer business through an ownership and governance structure that separates sanctioned investors' economic interests from their ability to direct the company.

Narratives and Influence Activity During the Election Campaign

The following subsections trace how Russian state media and FIMI networks applied recurring narratives to Spain's election campaign, linking domestic grievances to foreign policy, exploiting specific crises, and circulating messages that challenged electoral legitimacy.

Western Alliances and National Sovereignty

Russian FIMI channels portrayed Spain's European and transatlantic commitments as subordination to Washington and European security policy as preparation for confrontation with Russia. A November 13 video published by Geopolítica Actual claimed that Europe followed Washington's instructions rather than pursuing an independent policy.[76] Nuevos Paradigmas subsequently shared it.[77]

On November 15, the Basque channel Herrien Arteko Adiskidetasuna linked multinational military exercises in Poland to earlier Western interventions in Yugoslavia and Iraq, concluding that the EU's "business is war."[78] Satélite Rojo[79] and Liu Sivaya[80] amplified the post.

Housing and the November 11 Strike

The housing debate already contained fabricated claims. Alliance4Europe recorded approximately 21,500 posts about Maricarmen Abascal between October 11 and November 6; by October 26, 250 posts had baselessly claimed she was "murdered" or "euthanised."[81]

Russian FIMI channels connected the November 11 strike to opposition to Ukraine assistance.[82] Satélite Rojo urged participation while accusing Madrid of prioritizing Ukraine

over Spanish tenants;[83] Herrien Arteko Adiskidetasuna[84] and Liu Sivaya[85] reposted the appeal. Líneas Rojas circulated a video contrasting military assistance with housing and public services: "Spaniards can wait. Ukraine comes first."[86] These messages linked domestic grievances to opposition to support for Kyiv.

Other channels portrayed the strike itself as political manipulation. Pravda España claimed it served Sánchez's electoral interests,[87] while Madrid lawyer Oleg Gubarev's Russian-language channel questioned its legality and called it part of the prime minister's election campaign.[88] Aquí la Voz de Europa suggested that a violent provocation could be staged and blamed on the far right.[89]

The opposing narratives offered different reasons to distrust the government: it was either sacrificing domestic needs to Ukraine or manipulating social grievances for electoral advantage. This allowed aligned outlets to exploit the same mobilization across left-wing and far-right political environments.

Migration and Territorial Sovereignty

FIMI channels framed migration as a threat to Spanish sovereignty enabled by the government and left unanswered by its Western allies. Following the late-July Ceuta crossings, RT and Telegram amplifiers portrayed arrivals as an "invasion," blamed government policy, and depicted European institutions as incapable of protecting borders.[5]

During the election period, Desinformador Ruso sharpened this framing into an accusation of concealment. On November 16, it accused Spain's National Intelligence Center of hiding Moroccan involvement after the agency reportedly found insufficient evidence of a coordinated operation, declaring: "Russia's enemies are also the enemies of Spanish citizens."[90] Espía del Telón redistributed the message.[91]

Desinformador Ruso also advocated a "privileged relationship with Moscow" to strengthen Spain's position on Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara.[92] Russia was presented

as an alternative partner for defending interests allegedly neglected by Spain's existing allies.

The messaging extended beyond Ceuta to migration pressures in the Canary Islands. On November 8, El Informador Global circulated Sputnik Mundo reporting that quoted regional president Fernando Clavijo's demand for greater assistance from Madrid and Europe;[93] ROKOT/TORMENTA amplified it.[94]

Aquí la Voz de Europa adopted a more accusatory framing, describing a "brutal immigrant invasion" facilitated by Sánchez's government and questioning whether the People's Party and Vox would pursue sufficiently restrictive policies.[95] Democracia Nacional reposted the message on November 15.[96]

> The coverage kept migration pressures in circulation across the network, while the more accusatory posts portrayed both the government and parliamentary opposition as incapable of defending national interests.

Railway Collision and Government Competence

The October 28 collision of two passenger trains near Urda, Toledo, which killed 69 people, became a focus for narratives about government incompetence and sabotage. RT en Español portrayed the disaster as a reversal of Sánchez's election strategy, linking it to earlier fatal rail accidents and arguing that distrust of railway services had become distrust of the authorities.[17]

Ucraniando attributed the collision to operational negligence and claimed that thousands of protesters were demanding the resignation of Sánchez and Transport Minister Óscar Puente.[97] Nuevos Paradigmas subsequently circulated Rubén Gisbert's video portraying Puente as having been used by the government before his departure.[98]

Alongside these claims of political responsibility, sabotage allegations circulated rapidly. El País, citing Golden Owl's monitoring, reported that the pro-Russian network began spreading such claims within 36 minutes of the collision,

with accounts posing as railway specialists or media outlets helping amplify them.[13] During the election campaign, the collision was used to attack the government's handling of public safety and spread unsubstantiated claims about what caused the crash.

Matryoshka and Media Impersonation

The Russian information operation Matryoshka used fabricated media content to present anti-EU and anti-Ukraine messages as independent reporting ahead of Spain's election. Counterfeit videos and newspaper covers imitated El País, Reuters, AFP, France 24, Libération, and La Croix.[99] A documented sample comprised 38 posts published on X and Tumblr between November 10 and 12 in Spanish, English, and French. Accounts tagged journalists and fact-checkers with verification requests, seeking additional circulation and diverting their resources.[100]

The fabrications portrayed Spain's housing crisis and Europe's economic difficulties as consequences of assistance to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, while arguing that elections would change nothing. A counterfeit La Croix cover claimed that one pro-Ukrainian political force would merely replace another. An AFP-branded video asserted, without sourcing, that 71% of Europeans believed elections could not improve their circumstances.

Other videos attributed calls for Catalan independence and Spain's EU withdrawal to economists Jordi Galí and Xavier Sala-i-Martin.[99] The proposed remedies combined ending sanctions, abandoning the EU, and fragmenting European states.[101]

> By borrowing the authority of recognizable publishers and experts, the campaign sought to turn economic frustration into electoral disengagement and opposition to European unity and support for Ukraine.

Electoral Legitimacy and Anti-System Mobilization

Foreign-managed pages provided an additional route for fabricated election stories to reach Spanish audiences. Golden Owl identified[11] a network of 12 Facebook pages with approximately 270,000 combined followers, with Vietnam-based administrators confirmed for nine. The researchers cautioned, however, that the pages were not necessarily part of a single operation.

The network used Spanish addresses and shared websites to present itself as local news and community pages. Paid advertising helped build its audience before it began publishing fabricated election-related stories on October 27. These included invented speeches and confrontations attributed to real politicians, turning an established commercial distribution network into a vehicle for electoral misinformation.

Claims of impending fraud circulated across a broader information environment. Golden Owl's monitoring of six platforms from August 20 through November 5 recorded 3,994 items alleging electoral fraud, including 1,021 concerning postal voting and 760 concerning deceased or fictitious voters on the electoral register. Another 1,075 items gave voting instructions inconsistent with official procedures. These figures cover the full monitoring corpus, encompassing distinct domestic and foreign-linked networks. Recurring messages discouraged postal voting and presented manipulation of the register or vote count as an explanation for an anticipated electoral defeat.

Calls for street mobilization also challenged the legitimacy of the political system. Golden Owl reported calls under the Blocus banner for actions in 12 cities on November 30.[11]

Separately, Rubén Gisbert, a Spanish lawyer and pro-Kremlin propagandist who visited Russian-controlled Donbas with Liu Sivaya in 2022 and appeared on RT,[102] promoted a rally outside Madrid's Congress of Deputies at 8:30 p.m. on election day, November 29. Gisbert's Telegram channel has more than 71,000 subscribers. His rally announcement received at least 19,500 views

and more than 500 positive reactions. Gisbert also posted the rally announcement on his YouTube channel, which has 737,000 subscribers. In 2025, he had attended a youth gathering in Russia and advocated closer relations with Moscow in an interview with Sputnik.[103]

Gisbert announced the rally on October 6[104] and renewed the appeal on November 4 with a poster declaring: "It is not Sánchez. It is not a party. It is the system." His accompanying message demanded systemic change and endorsed electoral nonparticipation.[105]

> The campaign framed election night as an opportunity to reject the political system regardless of the result, extending the challenge beyond allegations of electoral fraud.

Strategic Assessment and Risks

The immediate risk centres on election night and its aftermath. Claims about postal voting, manipulated electoral registers and a stolen result have already supplied grounds for rejecting an unfavourable outcome. Rubén Gisbert's November 29 rally outside Congress calls for rejection of the political system regardless of which party wins. Separately, Golden Owl documented Blocus calls for actions in 12 cities on November 30. Disputed counts, confrontations or isolated incidents will be used by Russian state media and FIMI channels to portray Spanish institutions as fraudulent or repressive before the circumstances are clarified.

This capacity extends beyond election day. Established audiences, local intermediaries and distribution networks allow Russian influence activity to continue through successive political crises. The recruitment documented in this report adds a direct security dimension: channels solicit confidential information about Spanish officials and strategic sectors, advertise Russian military contracts and invite participation in paid cyberattacks. These activities create continuing opportunities to recruit Spanish collaborators for Russian operations.

Moscow's broader objective is to make support for Ukraine and European defence more politically costly. By portraying these commitments as responsible for housing shortages, strained public services and insecurity, Kremlin-aligned actors give domestic grievances a foreign-policy target.

> Sustained campaigning can strengthen demands to reduce assistance to Ukraine, reverse defence commitments and distance Spain from its European partners.

Annex 1. Spanish-Language FIMI Actors

Name	URL	Audience
RT en Español	https://actualidad.rt.com/	4.8m visits, Oct 2026
Canal RED	https://www.diario-red.com/	904k visits, Aug 2026
Sputnik Mundo	https://noticiaslatam.lat/	768k visitors, Mar 2026
La Bandera	https://labandera.es/	~700k visits/month
SouthFront Es	https://southfront.press/	689k visits, Sep 2026
Strategic Culture Foundation	https://strategic-culture.su/category/espanol	73k/month
Geopolitika.ru	https://www.geopolitika.ru/es	59k/month
PIA Global	https://noticiaspia.com/	-
Geostrategia EU	https://www.geoestrategia.eu/	-
News Front Es	https://es.news-front.su/	-
Inna Afinogenova	https://www.youtube.com/@innaafinogenova	742k
Canal RED YouTube	https://www.youtube.com/@canalredtv	480k
Geopolitics Prime	https://t.me/geopolitics_prime	288k
Sin Línea YouTube	https://www.youtube.com/@SinLineaMx	175k
Liu Sivaya	https://t.me/liusivaya	127k
El Ojo Noticias	https://t.me/elOJOen	78k
Irina	https://t.me/Irinamar_Z	77k
Grandmasters of Geopolitics	https://t.me/geo_grandmasters	76k
TSA Noticias	https://t.me/TSANoticias	63k
RT Última Hora	https://t.me/RTultimahora	54k
Eureka News X	https://x.com/EurekaNews10	51k
El Mundo por Montera	https://www.youtube.com/@elmundopormontera	51k

Líneas Rojas	https://t.me/lineasrojas	50k
La Bandera X	https://x.com/labanderaes	46k
A Toda Potencia	https://t.me/atodapotencia	44k
RT Videos	https://t.me/RTVideosES	43k
Ucraniando	https://t.me/ucraniando	37k
TASS Spanish	https://t.me/tass_es	37k
RT Latinoamérica	https://t.me/rtlatam	37k
ÚLTIMA HORA	https://t.me/ULTIMA_HORA	37k
Los Sombreros Blancos	https://t.me/ophiucu	33k
InfoDefense Español	https://t.me/infodefSPAIN	31k
SouthFront Telegram	https://t.me/southfronteng	31k
El Informador Global	https://t.me/informador_global	29k
Geopolítica Actual YouTube	https://www.youtube.com/@geopoliticaactual	29k
Nuevo Orden Mundial	https://t.me/nuevo_orden_mundial_canal	24k
ROKOT | TORMENTA	https://t.me/surf_noise_sp	22k
RT en vivo	https://t.me/rtvivo	21k
RT Reporteros	https://t.me/rtreporteros	20k
Sputnik Mundo Visual	https://t.me/SputnikMundoVisual	20k
Geopolítica Actual Telegram	https://t.me/geopoliticaactual	20k
Guerras y Geopolítica	https://t.me/guerrasygeop	18k
Vamos a Russia	https://t.me/vamosarusia	18k
Alena Rusa	https://t.me/rusa_alena	17k
Líneas Invisibles	https://t.me/lineasinvisibles	16k
Canal RED Telegram	https://t.me/CanalRed_TV	16k
Nuevos Paradigmas	https://t.me/IHPSnuevosparadigmas	15k
Desinformador Ruso	https://t.me/musicarusaesp	15k
Albatrops	https://t.me/albatrops	15k

Vakulinchuk	https://t.me/vakulinchuk	14k
UKR LEAKS_esp	https://t.me/ukr_leaks_esp	14k
Russian Embassy in Spain	https://t.me/EmbajadaRusaEs	14k
Nuestra America	https://t.me/nuestraamerica	13k
PIA Global Instagram	https://www.instagram.com/pia.noticias/	12k
Eureka News Telegram	https://t.me/Eurekapress	12k
Rybar ES	https://t.me/rybaresp	12k
Democracia Nacional	https://t.me/DEMOCRACIA_NACIONAL	8k
El Espía Digital / Geoestrategia.eu	https://t.me/elespiadigital	8k
Satélite Rojo	https://t.me/sateliterojo	8k
Riviera de Rivera	https://t.me/rivieraderivera	8k
Aquí la Voz de Europa	https://t.me/aquilavozdeeuropa	7k
Oleg Gubarev / Europe Through a Lawyer's Eyes	https://t.me/pravosp	7k
ESPÍA del TELÓN	https://t.me/elespiadeltelon	6k
Falange Española de las JONS	https://t.me/fedelasjons	6k
Sin Línea Telegram	https://t.me/SINLINEAMXnoticias	5k
Herrien Arteko Adiskidetasuna	https://t.me/adiskidetasuna	4k
PIA Global X	https://x.com/PIAnoticias	3k
PIA Global Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/pianoticias	3k
Lyudmila Z Patriotas Rusos	https://t.me/Lyudmila_ZOV	3k
Geopolitika.ru Telegram	https://t.me/Geopolitika_es	3k
En Plena Luz	https://t.me/enplena_luz	3k
Eureka News YouTube	https://www.youtube.com/@Eureka_news_Geopol%C3%ADtica	2k
Pravda ES	https://t.me/pravdaescom	1k

Paladins	https://t.me/leagueofpaladins	1k
Strategic Culture Foundation Telegram	https://t.me/SCF_Spanish	1k
Katehon Europe	https://t.me/KatehonEuropa	380
Pravda España	https://t.me/pravdaspain	33
	TOTAL (channels)	**~3.18m**

Annex 2. FIMI Telegram Actors Promoting @desdemoscubot

Username	Name	Subscribers	Example
@ucraniando	Ucraniando	37,4k	https://t.me/ucraniando/60291
@ophiucu	Los Sombreros Blancos [Z]	32,8k	https://t.me/ophiucu/110559
@infodefSPAIN	InfoDefenseESPAÑOL	30,7k	https://t.me/infodefSPAIN/30069
@surf_noise_sp	ROKOT | TORMENTA	22k	https://t.me/surf_noise_sp/60050
@FrentedelEste	Frente del Este	20,6k	https://t.me/FrentedelEste/12001
@geopoliticaactual	Geopolítica actual	19,7k	https://t.me/geopoliticaactual/8013
@OPALpress	OPAL	16,8k	https://t.me/OPALpress/26512
@lineasinvisibles	Líneas invisibles	15,5k	https://t.me/lineasinvisibles/32180
@IHPSnuevosparadigmas	Nuevos Paradigmas	15,1k	https://t.me/IHPSnuevosparadigmas/21920
@nuestraamerica	Nuestra América	13,5k	https://t.me/nuestraamerica/31742
@mundomultipolarZOV	Mundo Multipolar	9,3k	https://t.me/mundomultipolarZOV/490395
@sateliterojo	Satélite Rojo	8,3k	https://t.me/sateliterojo/14318
@elespiadigital	GEOESTRATEGIA.EU	7,7k	https://t.me/elespiadigital/25027
@adiskidetasuna	Herrien arteko adiskidetasuna (Basque)	4,1k	https://t.me/adiskidetasuna/14651
@la_primicia	La Римися	3,7k	https://t.me/la_primicia/66857
@Lyudmila_ZOV	Lyudmila Z. Patriotas Rusos.	3,4k	https://t.me/Lyudmila_ZOV/65619
@enplena_luz	EN PLENA LUZ	2,9k	https://t.me/enplena_luz/3300

@ehdonbass	Euskal Herria-Donbass Elkartasun Komitea	1,9k	https://t.me/ehdonbass/25200
@pravdaescom	Pravda ES | Últimas noticias y vídeos	1,2k	https://t.me/pravdaescom/137423
@caterina_varesse	CATERINA	1,2k	https://t.me/caterina_varesse/37070
	TOTAL	**~ 267.8k**	

Annex 3. General and Elections-Focused Narratives

General Narratives

- Europe follows Washington's orders and lacks political independence.
- Cooperation with Russia would restore Spanish sovereignty.
- Spanish authorities conceal foreign threats and betray national interests.
- Spain finances Ukraine at the expense of its own citizens.
- European governments are preparing for war with Russia rather than pursuing peace.

Elections-Focused Narratives

- Sánchez neglects Spanish workers and public services to finance Ukraine.
- Spain's political establishment is corrupt and incapable of governing effectively.
- PSOE and Vox uphold the same political system, making elections meaningless.
- Ukraine trains Spanish extremists to destabilize the country.
- The government persecutes nationalist opposition movements.
- Immigration threatens Spain's national identity, while the government facilitates the crisis and opposition parties fail to stop it.

Sources

1. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2026/20261005-institutional-statement-speech.aspx
2. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20261002/junts-no-congreso-decretos-vivienda-gobiernos/17250372.shtml
3. https://www.reuters.com/world/evicted-spanish-octogenarian-maricarmen-abascal-heart-spains-housing-protests-2026-10-07/
4. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20261123/cis-estima-psoe-ganara-elecciones-con-casi-diez-puntos-ventaja-sobre-pp/17326226.shtml
5. https://ekstrategies.org/articles/russias-role-in-the-ceuta-panic-amplifier-not-proven-instigator
6. https://efe.com/canarias/2026-11-19/angel-victor-torres-pp-y-vox-buscan-en-canarias-aranar-votos-aprovechando-el-dolor-de-quienes-migran/
7. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2026/20261110-canary-islands-migration-emergency.aspx
8. https://www.interior.gob.es/opencms/gl/detalle/articulo/La-Policia-Nacional-frustra-la-implantacion-de-la-primera-celula-en-Espana-de-la-organizacion-ciberterrorista-NoName05716/
9. https://efe.com/espana/2026-11-22/prorruso-espanol-organizacion-ciberterrorista-noname057/
10. https://www.cronicabalear.es/mallorca/2026-11-22/libre-el-detenido-prorruso-en-burgos-con-un-arsenal-tras-llamar-a-tirotear-a-ucranianos/
11. https://goldenowl.ai/es/resources/research/The-Invisible-Arsenal-Hybrid-Threats-to-Spain-2026-Elections
12. https://t.me/musicarusaesp
13. https://elpais.com/espana/2026-11-07/un-profesor-buscado-por-la-audiencia-nacional-recluta-soldados-y-espias-espanoles-para-rusia.html
14. https://t.me/musicarusaesp/10507
15. https://t.me/musicarusaesp/11840
16. https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20261108/reclutamiento-espanoles-rusia-desinformador-ruso-2024/
17. https://actualidad-rt.com/actualidad/635001-choque-trenes-espana-vuelco-campana-electoral
18. https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20250710/telegram-pravda-channels/
19. https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20250530/pravda-news-spanish-spain/
20. https://www.newtral.es/pravda-replica-canales-ultras-espanoles-elecciones-29n/20261109/
21. https://alliance4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/EU_Unrest_Report_November_2026_full_A4E.pdf
22. https://www.occrp.org/en/news/leaked-files-tie-russian-cultural-center-in-spain-to-kremlin-influence-campaigns
23. https://sors-spain.org/index.php/anonsy-i-meropriyatiya/731-xx-vseispanskaya-tematicheskaya-konferentsiya-soyuza-organizatsij-rossijskikh-sootechestvennikov-ispanii-i-andorry
24. https://sors-spain.org/index.php/napravleniya-deyatelnosti/pravovaya-zashchita-materinstva-i-detstva/sekritariat/734-den-rozhdeniya-v-v-putina-pozdravlyaem
25. https://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2024/11/07/67237bcce4d4d8a62c8b45b5.html
26. https://vk.ru/russianschoolmarbella?w=wall-212684768_367
27. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/23829919
28. https://svirskie-ogni.ru/news/nasha-zemlyachka-viktoriya-samoylova-organizuet-bessmertnyy-polk

29. https://www.lne.es/internacional/2025/06/23/falangista-pasado-filonazi-asesor-marchas-pro-putin-madrid-victoria-urss-alemania-nazi-118943774.html
30. https://russkiymir.ru/publications/346900/
31. https://orthodoxspain.com/mitropolit-mark-provyol-rabochuyu-vstrechu-s-poslom-rossijskoj-federaczii-v-ispanii
32. https://ryazeparh.ru/novosti/new/1558-zavershilas-ocherednaya-poezdka-klirikov-ryazanskoj-eparkhii-k-voennosluzhashchim-ispolnyayushchim-svoj-dolg-v-zone-provedeniya-svo
33. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2022/11/15/19040095.shtml
34. https://www.svoboda.org/a/partizanyu-kak-mogu-svyaschenniki-protiv-voyny/32432967.html
35. https://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2025/06/25/68543c65fdddfff9658b4593.html
36. https://mid.ru/ru/maps/es/1974234/
37. https://skwrz.ru/news/priem_v_dobrovolcheskuju_kazachju_brigadu_don_i_drugie_kazachi_formirovanija/2025-05-29-3325
38. https://www.elespanol.com/reportajes/20250824/vasilenko-lider-cosacos-volga-agente-putin-marbella-delato-jefe-mafia-siberiana-utilizo/1003743887189_0.html
39. https://madridru.es/news/ru-jubilejnyj-bessmertnyj-polk-projdet-po-ulicam-madrida/
40. https://russpain.ru/novosti/nesmotrya-na-dozhd-sotni-uchastnikov-proshli-po-tsentru-madrida-s-portretami-i-rossiiskimi-flagami-31524/
41. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/declaracion-de-la-coordinadora-provisional-de-sovintern-ante-las-proximas-elcciones/
42. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/rusia-no-es-nuestro-enemigo-la-pinza-globalista-trumpista-y-la-urgencia-de-un-partido-de-la-clase-trabajadora/
43. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/declaracion-de-la-red-socialista-internacional-sovintern-estado-espanol-sobre-las-elecciones-en-bulgaria-los-comicios-de-medio-termino-en-estados-unidos-y-la-visita-de-zelenski/
44. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/ante-la-convocatoria-electoral-del-29-n-justicia-social-paz-desarme-y-soberania/
45. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/ante-la-agresion-marroqui-la-evidencia-de-que-la-otan-y-la-ue-nos-someten-pero-no-nos-defienden-y-la-existencia-de-un-gobierno-sumiso-al-imperialismo-y-una-oposicion-cipaya-tenemos-que-conquis/
46. https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/sovintern-alternativa-rusia-internacional-socialista-explota-divisiones-izquierda-europea_1_13176427.html
47. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/sovintern-estado-espanol-presentacion/
48. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0628
49. https://soberaniaytrabajo.org/entrevista-en-canal-red-planeta-a-carlos-garrido-comanero-de-syt-en-el-seno-de-sovintern-y-militante-maerxista-de-los-eeuu/
50. https://ekstrategies.org/articles/kremlin-malign-information-influence-in-latin-america-networks-narratives
51. https://www.diario-red.com/articulo/canal-red/partir-miercoles-5-agosto-canal-red-puede-ver-dial-150-movistar/20260804170600073943
52. https://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-putin-saluda-presos-liberados-llegada-aeropuerto-moscu-ellos-pablo-gonzalez-20240801222248.html
53. https://sovintern.org/es/news/0982041e-92c7-4260-9a67-3905d2381642
54. https://ezkerra.org/
55. https://public-diplomacy.org/en/leaders/miguel-suarez-del-cerro
56. https://asociacioneslavadepamplona.org/images/2026/Septiembre/Comun_29092026_Premio_Diplomacia_Cultural/Premio_diplomacia_cultural.pdf
57. https://t.me/leagueofpaladins/396
58. https://www.democracianacional.es/post/cr%C3%B3nica-cumbre-antiglobalista-en-san-petersburgo
59. https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2025/09/d52318

60. https://www.newtral.es/emisarios-putin-asisten-cumbre-ultraderecha-falange-madrid/20251124/
61. https://goldenowl.ai/es/resources/research/Extremism-as-a-Foreign-Asset-Russian-Influence-Nucleo-Nacional-European-Extremist-Networks
62. https://elpais.com/espana/2026-11-18/una-investigacion-independiente-concluye-que-la-actividad-de-nucleo-nacional-servia-a-los-intereses-de-rusia.html
63. https://www.huffingtonpost.es/politica/la-asociacion-neonazi-nucleo-nacional-partido-politico-dirigentes-registra-noviembre-nacional-f202602.html
64. https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2026/11/11/nucleo-nacional-creo-su-partido-noviembre-nacional-como-plan-b-ante-una-previsible-ilegalizacion-un-partido-politico-tiene-un-blindaje-de-la-hostia-cadena-ser/
65. https://efe.com/espana/2026-11-12/jueza-cese-total-actividad-nucleo-nacional/
66. https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2026/11/18/la-jueza-de-gijon-ni-suspende-de-actividades-a-nucleo-nacional-ni-bloquea-sus-cuentas-en-redes-sociales-cadena-ser/
67. https://otralectura.com/sobremi/
68. https://x.com/PJ_Espada/status/1769677386881134945
69. https://smotrim.ru/video/6204013
70. https://x.com/LineasRojasX/status/2120518435998216666
71. https://www.publico.es/politica/interior/policia-desmantela-celula-espana-organizacion-terrorista-neonazi-the-base.html
72. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/05/the-base-neo-nazi-russia-ukraine
73. https://diacorporate.tribecamedia.com/nuestra-accion/
74. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1468091/000146809126000010/vip-20251231.htm
75. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2062440/000121390025085122/ea0254768-01.htm
76. https://t.me/geopoliticaactual/8640
77. https://t.me/IHPSnuevosparadigmas/23044
78. https://t.me/adiskidetasuna/19220
79. https://t.me/sateliterojo/15892
80. https://t.me/liusivaya/18063
81. https://alliance4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/EU_Unrest_Report_November_2026_full_A4E.pdf#page=45
82. https://ekstrategies.org/articles/spains-general-strike-two-opposing-narratives
83. https://t.me/sateliterojo/15789
84. https://t.me/adiskidetasuna/19122
85. https://t.me/liusivaya/17958
86. https://t.me/lineasrojas/15615
87. https://t.me/pravdaspain/32950
88. https://t.me/pravosp/1704
89. https://t.me/aquilavozdeeuropa/12374
90. https://t.me/musicarusaesp/16534
91. https://t.me/elespiadeltelon/28445
92. https://t.me/musicarusaesp/16079
93. https://t.me/informador_global/84133
94. https://t.me/surf_noise_sp/64010
95. https://t.me/aquilavozdeeuropa/12385
96. https://t.me/DEMOCRACIA_NACIONAL/9378
97. https://t.me/ucraniando/64631
98. https://t.me/IHPSnuevosparadigmas/22968
99. https://www.theins.co/en/news/299427
100. https://www.newtral.es/rusa-operacion-elecciones-29n-matrioska/20261121/
101. https://maldita.es/investigaciones/20261113/russian-operation-matryoshka-campaign-interfere-elections-spain/

102. https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/europa/2022-04-10/rusia-putin-dombass-propaganda-liu-sivaya-ruben-gisbert_3405964/
103. https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2025/09/29/el-falangismo-espanol-se-alinea-con-los-propagandistas-rusos-contra-la-otan/
104. https://t.me/rubengisbertoficial/4830
105. https://t.me/rubengisbertoficial/4943

More from EK Stratcom

Explore more insights and analysis

Analytical reports on disinformation trends in Russia and Kremlin FIMI campaigns across Europe

ekstrategies.org/insights-and-analysis

Explore our projects

We create strategies to address geopolitical challenges, reach wide audiences, and support resilient communities

ekstrategies.org/projects

Contact us to explore collaboration

We support international organizations and national governments in navigating complex geopolitical realities, analyzing disinformation, developing and implementing communication strategies

partners@ekstrategies.org

Media enquiries

One address for all press requests: comment, interviews, background briefings and data questions

press@ekstrategies.org

Get our analysis by email

A weekly digest of EK Stratcom research: in-depth reports, Kremlin FIMI Weekly, Russia Watch, Kremlin Ratings Tracker, and more

ekstrategies.org/subscribe

Follow us on social media

x.com/EKStratcom
linkedin.com/company/ek-strategic-communications-center

EK Strategic Communications Center

ekstrategies.org