Executive Summary
The Kremlin's campaign in Armenia's summer 2026 elections draws on the full standard playbook: direct propaganda and disinformation through Russian state media and Telegram channels; the seeding of fabricated stories and planted articles in Armenian outlets; the organisation of provocations and protest activity inside Armenia; and direct coordination with Armenian political parties, journalists, bloggers, civil society figures, and activists operating under Kremlin control.
The campaign’s primary objective is political destabilization as a means of reducing Western engagement with the country, reactivating pro-Russian networks, and returning Moscow to Armenian politics. The aim is less a formal electoral victory by direct allies than a managed crisis, societal polarisation, and the incremental weakening of the state.
Where the Kremlin previously relied on keeping the Karabakh conflict in a state of managed passivity, the occupation of Georgia, and the presence of Russian military forces at various points in time across all three South Caucasus states, the current focus has shifted squarely to destabilisation — as a factor designed to deter the West from drawing closer to a country the Kremlin labels "neighbouring Russia."
The secondary objective of the Kremlin's Armenia campaign is an attempt at regime change in favour of a fully controlled government — as was planned in 2018, when Moscow backed the revolution against Serzh Sargsyan's regime in the expectation of seeing its own preferred figure, Karen Karapetyan, installed as prime minister, rather than Pashinyan, who came to power on the back of broad popular support.
The theoretical possibility of a joint pro-Kremlin candidate emerging from a unified bloc of pro-Kremlin parties in the summer 2026 elections cannot be ruled out, but the strategy of destabilisation and the deliberate erosion of Armenia's appeal to Western partners as a country within "Russia's sphere of interest" is objectively the more promising avenue.
Both objectives are pursued through attempts to consolidate Armenian citizens and segments of the Armenian diaspora against Pashinyan's pro-democratic government, by driving a wedge between the current authorities and the Armenian Church, religion, and national identity more broadly, as well as by stoking security anxieties — playing on revanchist sentiment and framing Turkey and Azerbaijan as threats while presenting Russia as the guarantor of sovereignty, when in reality it represents the principal threat to it — and by promoting the narrative that Pashinyan has been compromised, including through fabricated content targeting the prime minister's family.
Among the hundreds of posts, AI-generated items, comments, Telegram drops, and other tools of discrediting the Armenian authorities, one online project stands out: armtribunal, which publishes a large volume of search-engine-indexed content in Armenian, English, and Russian, focused on equating former President Serzh Sargsyan with Prime Minister Pashinyan — portraying both as criminals deserving prosecution.
The project's goal is to blur the distinction between the previous and current governments among an electorate where a large share remains undecided — both inside Armenia and in the diaspora.
According to verified information held by EK Strategic Communications Center, coordination of Russia's interference in Armenian politics is conducted under the parallel patronage of Putin's aide Yuri Ushakov by Sergei Kirienko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.
Operational implementation runs through Andrei Yarin, Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate; his deputy Denis Stepanyuk; Alexander Kharichev, Head of the Presidential Directorate for Monitoring and Analysis of Social Processes; the recently appointed Vadim Titov, Head of the Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation; and Sofia Zakharova, a department head within the Presidential Directorate for the Development of Information and Communication Technology and Communication Infrastructure.
Titov, as a recent appointee, continues to coordinate his activities with Kharichev, within whose circle he had operated at the state corporation Rosatom before joining the Presidential Administration.
The principal operational vehicle for the Kremlin's campaign in Armenia is the Russian NGO ANO Eurasia, where the transfer of expertise from earlier hybrid operations conducted in Moldova is handled by businessman Ilan Shor, while direct coordination for Armenia is carried out by blogger and ANO Eurasia board member Mikael Badalyan.
Badalyan is also deeply embedded in the Kremlin's propaganda campaign in Armenia through Telegram channel networks.
The ANO Eurasia board is chaired by State Duma Speaker Volodin; its membership includes, among others, Russia Today editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan and Pyotr Fradkov — son of former SVR director Mikhail Fradkov and head of Promsvyazbank — the institution through which campaign financing was channelled during the Moldovan election interference operation.
In essence, the entire structure assembled ahead of Moldova's elections in autumn 2025 was immediately redeployed against Armenia, with only the narratives, local partners, and coordinators changed.
The campaign runs in parallel through the Armenian diaspora, both in Russia and in the West.
In Russia, where the campaign directed at diaspora audiences focuses on the so-called "defence of the Armenian Apostolic Church" from pressure by Pashinyan's government, the effort is considerably easier to mount and the pool of speakers and active participants is extensive, led by Margarita Simonyan, Ara Abramyan (president of the Union of Armenians of Russia), Konstantin Zatulin (one of the founders of the Lazarevsky Club), and many others.
In Europe, the role of Kremlin influence operator targeting the Armenian diaspora is actively played by Ashot Grigoryan, co-founder of PANAP – Vienna Club and head of the Forum of Armenian Associations of Europe, whose pro-Kremlin activities in tandem with Ján Čarnogurský extend across European countries as well as states neighbouring Russia.
Armenia 2026: the Kremlin's key battle in the region
Armenia's parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 2026, will serve as a key indicator of whether the Kremlin's influence in the South Caucasus and the post-Soviet space is strengthening or weakening. Over recent years, following the defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Moscow's absorption in its protracted war against Ukraine, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has steadily rolled back the space for Russian influence in a country that until recently was regarded as one of those most firmly under Moscow's control. The absence of a shared border with Russia, Armenia's role as a hub for the re-export of European goods and sanction circumvention, and the interest of both Azerbaijan and Turkey in opening cooperation with Yerevan following the resolution of the Karabakh conflict have allowed the Armenian leadership to achieve a notable pivot away from asymmetric dependence on Russia and begin a transition toward a more diversified foreign policy. The strategic partnership agreement signed with the United States, followed by Donald Trump's personal involvement in the Yerevan–Baku peace process, has further strengthened Armenia's position. Against this backdrop — with Russia losing ground region by region — it has become a matter of principle for the Kremlin to preserve whatever remaining levers of control it retains over its neighbours. Moscow effectively holds Georgia under its influence through intimidation: Russian military bases on occupied Georgian territory and other factors have produced a tragic degree of Georgian dependency on the Kremlin, at least for as long as Russia does not suffer defeat in the war against Ukraine, a defeat that might diminish the fear of Georgian authorities who are convinced they must comply with all of the Kremlin's demands, having converted the entire Russian state system to a wartime footing. Were Armenia to move further out of Moscow's orbit, the Kremlin risks losing not only a recalcitrant partner but a critical logistics hub for re-exports, and — should new transport corridors open without Kremlin participation — control over a substantial slice of trade extending well beyond the immediate region, where the United States is running an active campaign under the so-called "Trump Route" project, TRIPP.
In the run-up to the elections, virtually the entire spectrum of organised opposition in Armenia can be characterised as Kremlin influence operators of varying degrees. Samvel Karapetyan is presented as a "new alternative," yet his business success in Russia dates to the 1990s and is tied to Gazprom; in more recent years, Karapetyan was among the co-investors in the anti-Pashinyan Lazarevsky Club, founded in Russia by opponents of the 2018 revolution drawn from the former Armenian government and their Kremlin allies. Karapetyan also contributed to the bail posted to secure the release from prison of Putin's friend, former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan. In Georgia, the incorporation of former Russian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili into the governing structure took many years and ultimately succeeded by capitalising on Georgian citizens' disenchantment with Mikhail Saakashvili's party in the 2012 elections. In Armenia, the integration of Kremlin-aligned figures into domestic politics has gone through many failed phases: unlike in the Georgian case, it was precisely Pashinyan who came to power as the people's choice, replacing the Kremlin-loyal regime of Sargsyan and its designated successor Karen Karapetyan. Moscow's first attempt to weaken Armenia and pull the country back fully into the Kremlin's orbit was to build a strong opposition bloc around the old elites of Serzh Sargsyan's Republican Party and Robert Kocharyan himself — but the degree of public rejection this grouping attracted was too great to mount a credible opposition force or engineer the kind of managed crisis that might have deterred the West and demonstrated that Moscow controlled the country. The next attempt involved introducing a new figure through one of the most emotionally resonant issues: Karabakh. The Kremlin lobbied for the appointment of prominent Armenian-Russian businessman Ruben Vardanyan to the region, intending to leverage Karabakh as a launchpad into broader Armenian politics. However, Azerbaijan's and Turkey's active efforts to push Russia out of the region, the resolution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, and Vardanyan's arrest in Baku buried the plan. The Kremlin's next "saviour" candidate, presented as Armenia's defender against a Western threat, was billionaire Samvel Karapetyan — promoted as an alternative supposedly untainted by the Sargsyan and Kocharyan regimes. In reality, Karapetyan belongs to the same system, is closely tied to Kocharyan, and above all to the structures of Russia's Gazprom, on whose contracts his business was built.
According to a poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted in February 2026,(1) Pashinyan's ruling party Civil Contract remains the leader in electoral preferences but is polling at only around 24–29% depending on the turnout scenario, while Samvel Karapetyan's Strong Armenia party receives around 9–11%, with all other forces polling in the low single digits. Approximately 30% of voters say they have not yet made up their minds, with an additional 8–13% either not planning to vote or intending to spoil their ballots — a finding corroborated by independent polling organisations recording a record-high share of undecided voters. The absence of more substantial support for the pro-democratic candidate — whatever the drawbacks of that choice compared with the risk of Kremlin-backed figures taking power — points, along with other indicators, to a baseline scenario in which it is far more advantageous for the Kremlin to promote managed chaos and pressure through street mobilisation in Armenia than to rely on a single "own" prime minister.
Today, both the Kremlin's agenda as promoted through Russian state propaganda and the politics of pro-Russian or directly Kremlin-controlled political forces in Armenia — Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Samvel Karapetyan (currently in pre-trial detention), businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, and others — revolve around several consistent lines: promoting the narrative that Pashinyan "sold" Karabakh and Armenia to Azerbaijan and Turkey; the systematic discrediting of the prime minister himself and his family (with particular attention paid to Pashinyan's son, around whom disinformation circulates claiming he has renounced Armenian citizenship and obtained "Turkish documents"); and stoking the conflict between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. This last theme is given particular emphasis, as Armenia remains a deeply religious country: according to data from three independent polling centres, public trust in the Church ranges between 58% and 78%. The prevailing narrative holds that the current Armenian authorities are leading the country toward a loss of identity, humiliation, and capitulation. The elections are framed within a civilisational-choice narrative between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia), in which the European vector is depicted as a path toward external governance, cultural destruction, and socioeconomic crisis. At a meeting with Pashinyan in early April 2026, Putin himself raised this topic directly, framing Armenia's cooperation with the EU and with Russia as mutually exclusive, and asking the Armenian prime minister to allow all pro-Kremlin politicians — including those currently imprisoned, with Samvel Karapetyan explicitly in mind — to participate in the elections. Nevertheless, the central pre-election theme of the Kremlin's campaign is the confrontation between Pashinyan and the pro-Russian wing of the Armenian Apostolic Church, which in propaganda narratives is elevated into a symbol of "authentic Armenia," set against the "anti-national" government. Yerevan's peace-oriented and sovereignty-protecting policy is discredited as weakness, while a harder, revanchist, and pro-Russian course is presented as the only realistic survival strategy. These talking points are amplified through media, expert, religious, and quasi-civil-society channels, and function not only to mobilise voters but to fracture society along identity lines.
One of the Kremlin's central scenarios is the mobilisation of disaffected groups around the main opposition forces, which publicly present themselves as independent actors but are in practice coordinated by a single centre. This mobilisation is planned to draw in participants in the church dispute, veterans of the Karabakh wars, and diaspora members arriving from Russia to Armenia with Armenian passports (with activists from the Armenian community in Georgia available as reinforcements if needed, given that Kremlin propaganda is particularly effective in certain Georgian regions). Should the pro-Kremlin opposition fail — because of its high public rejection — to accumulate enough votes to field a unified candidate, the Kremlin intends to deploy the network of activists and structures it has assembled and organically attracted to pursue further destabilisation in the post-election period.
The Moscow church-and-diaspora axis carries its own additional weight. Konstantin Zatulin — chair of the organising committee for the aforementioned Lazarevsky Club, deputy chair of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots, and director of the Institute of CIS Countries — has publicly called for Pashinyan's political defeat in the upcoming Armenian elections, and has used the church issue as a moral-legitimising frame for anti-government mobilisation. Ara Abramyan, president of the Union of Armenians of Russia, has openly stated his intention to leverage diaspora resources to consolidate forces opposed to Pashinyan ahead of the 2026 elections. Taken together, this points to the formation of a pressure axis in which ecclesiastical legitimation, the Moscow diaspora, and pro-Russian political intermediaries work toward a shared outcome: deepening the crisis of confidence in the incumbent government and creating conditions for post-election unrest. Samvel Karapetyan is not only one of the Lazarevsky Club's sponsors but a member of the organisation's board.
Also notable is the fact that the Kremlin's European influence operator, PANAP – Vienna Club, under the leadership of Ashot Grigoryan and Ján Čarnogurský, has also joined the campaign of pitting the Pashinyan government against the Armenian Church.(2) On 5 December 2025, the presidium of the Forum of Armenian Associations of Europe — headed by Grigoryan, whose organisation's genuine representation of Armenian interests is doubtful — convened to establish an initiative group "for the defence of the Armenian Apostolic Church and Christianity in Armenia." Among those joining the initiative were Ján Čarnogurský and Konstantin Zatulin — Grigoryan's longstanding partners and handlers in pro-Kremlin activity — as well as figures they had drawn in from Germany, the United Kingdom, Czechia, France, Italy, and, of course, Slovakia. This grouping links the Armenian elections not only to the Kremlin's Moldova election interference operation, but also to its interference in the Czech elections, which took place in autumn 2025. It was precisely PANAP — the organisation under Grigoryan's and Čarnogurský's control, which actively cooperates with the Russian centre NIIRK under FSB officer Gasumyanov — that for several years ran a joint campaign with the founders of the Czech movement Spolek "Svatopluk," effectively organising support for one of the key Czech parties. Grigoryan and Čarnogurský regularly participate in Kremlin-format events such as the Valdai Club and the Lazarevsky Club, maintain ongoing cooperation with Zatulin, and their incorporation into the agenda of Armenia's 2026 elections is an entirely logical component of Moscow's broader European campaign.
According to EK Stratcom analysis, also noteworthy is an event that took place in the Russian city of Krasnodar in December 2025, when a rally was held under the same "defence of the Armenian Apostolic Church" narrative. Speakers included(3): the founder and leader of the "Crusading Liberation Movement" Artur Asatryan; the head of the "Heirs of Noah" movement and deputy commander of the international "Wild Division of Donbas" brigade, Andrei Arakelyan; and former Armenian MP and head of the Alliance party Tigran Urikhanyan, who also called for the release of political prisoner Samvel Karapetyan from an Armenian prison.
What is significant here is not only the way all of these events fit into the Kremlin's overarching campaign of pitting the Church against the Armenian authorities, but also the specific figure of one of the participants: Tigran Urikhanyan, a pro-Kremlin politician who fled Armenia and has ties to the former government as well as to Armenian pro-Russian businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, alongside whom Urikhanyan ran in the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Facebook pages "Maria Grigoryan"(4) and "Stella Arzumanyan"(5) — which actively promote the disgraced politician Urikhanyan — are the primary and sometimes sole distributors on social media of material from the portal (6), which publishes highly aggressive accusatory content targeting Pashinyan, his government, members of his party, and associated individuals in Russian, Armenian, and English, accusing them of selling Karabakh, a range of crimes, and, of course, attacking the Armenian Church.
The armtribunal portal does not directly promote any pro-Kremlin candidates; rather, it is aimed at producing and adapting large volumes of content for the purpose of discrediting Armenia's current government, having significantly intensified its activity since 2025 in preparation for the elections. The portal's central narrative is a relatively effective one: it discredits Pashinyan by equating him with former President Serzh Sargsyan, who carries an extremely negative public image in Armenia. The portal moves beyond political criticism into direct criminal accusations — demands that the guilty be brought to trial. Notably, the portal's content is actively indexed and surfaces across search engines in multiple languages, and anti-government, pro-Kremlin speakers distribute its materials. It is worth underscoring that beyond the technical connection to Urikhanyan — who is embedded in the pro-Kremlin ecosystem of Armenian politics — through the presumed administrators of the armtribunal Facebook page, and beyond the coincident actions of Urikhanyan and Ashot Grigoryan around the "defence of the Armenian Church" narrative in December 2025, the statements and public appearances of both Ashot Grigoryan and Urikhanyan are featured on the portal in its section presenting evidence of crimes by the Pashinyan government.
Kremlin propaganda narratives in Armenia's 2026 elections: Pashinyan vs. the Church
— "Pashinyan has launched his attack on the church precisely now in order to tear Armenia away from the Russian-speaking world. The Church is the symbol of tradition — and he is an agent of the West." — "What is happening looks more like a manoeuvre designed to distract the public from the real challenges, existential threats, and problems that the Armenian government should actually be dealing with." — "With each passing day, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan inflicts ever greater damage on the Armenian Apostolic Church and Armenia's reputation in the world as the first Christian state. His actions constitute a gross violation of the country's constitution." — "We categorically condemn the anti-national, blasphemous, and sacrilegious policy of Nikol Pashinyan toward the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. This is a question of preserving our national identity. This is not about one clergyman or one party — it concerns all of us!" — "Everyone is against the destructive, dishonest, and hypocritical actions of Nikol Pashinyan and his team, aimed at dismantling the fundamental spiritual foundations of the Armenian people, Armenia, and Artsakh." — "Efendi Pashinyan, who pretends to be the devoted guardian of all Armenians, has arrested the real guardian of all Armenians, Samvel Karapetyan — for the crime of meeting with the spiritual leader of the Armenians, Catholicos Karekin II. Watch yourself, or you might end up with something very unpleasant in your mouth."
Kremlin propaganda narratives: revanche in Karabakh
— "Artsakh has only been lost temporarily — it must be reclaimed at any price." This thesis draws on polling data and is framed as the mainstream public mood — one that the current government has allegedly "betrayed" in favour of the West. — "Only a return to Russia's protection will open the path to reclaiming what was lost." The peace agreement with Baku is described as "capitulation," while rapprochement with Moscow is presented as the only chance to recover Armenia's lost position. — "Pashinyan's government is finally surrendering Armenia's statehood and Artsakh." Pro-Russian politicians and affiliated structures are building their campaign around accusations of an "anti-national policy" and demands for a change of power as a precondition for revanchism. — "Society is ready for revanche, but is being deceived by 'pro-Western elites'." Russian state media and the Re:public of Artsakh channel network (operated from Russia) systematically circulate materials about "widespread sentiment for retribution" and protest activity, constructing an image of broad public demand for revisionism that Pashinyan is allegedly suppressing under Western pressure.
Kremlin propaganda narratives: between Russia and the EU
— "Armenia cannot simultaneously be a member of the EAEU and the EU." — "Armenia's security and development are only possible in alliance with Russia." — "Stability can only be guaranteed by Russian troops." — "Gas and electricity at a discount." — "Russia is the largest export market." — "Stability and security with Russia, or the Western trap." — "Brussels and the Moldovan scenario in Armenia."
Telegram Channels Within the ANO Eurasia Campaign Networks
The following channels orbit around the figure of Mikael Badalyan:
SisMasis @sisumasis — 24,298 subscribers. Narratives: "Under Pashinyan, everything will go to Turkey"; "The country is occupied by Pashinyan." Mika Badalyan @mikayelbad — 33,627 subscribers. Leader of the #AZATGRUM movement; primary operational coordinator of ANO Eurasia. Armenia Sensations @armsens — 3,807 subscribers. Created in Russia. Anti-Western, anti-Pashinyan narratives. Girl with a Rifle @leontinakoen — channel close to RT. Supports Robert Kocharyan. Created in Russia. Arman Abovyan @abovyanarman — 3,814 subscribers. Aniv Armenia @anivarmenia — 32,161 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia/Armenia. Anti-Western, anti-Pashinyan narratives. Sputnik Armenia @SputnikARM — 32,904 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia/Armenia. MY ARMENIA @Im_Hayastan — 1,594 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia. Based on its reposting patterns, closely aligned with the Rybar milblogger network. Chronicles of Armenia @ArmAgr — 7,980 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia. Actively promotes support for the Armenian Catholicos. Eurasia Armenia @evraziaarm — 6,500 subscribers. Official channel of NGO Eurasia. Yerevan Today RUS @rusyerevantoday — 8,358 subscribers. Presents itself as an independent news agency. Narrative focus on the upcoming elections; attack pieces and compromising dossiers targeting Pashinyan. AZATGRUM @azatagrum — 2,000 subscribers. Created and operated from Russia. Mirrors the messaging of Mika Badalyan and the Telegram channel networks associated with Rybar, a Russian milblogger with ties to the Russian Ministry of Defence. Parallel Z @parallel95 — 10,083 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia. The channel bridges Russian Ministry of Defence messaging and Sputnik narratives. Mina_Z @MinaKhachatryanOfficial — 6,494 subscribers. Pro-Russian activist based in Moscow; embedded in the network of disinformation. News of Armenia @novosti24armenia — 20,000 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia. Diaspora-oriented. Armenian Vendetta @ArmenianVendetta — 30,518 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia. Diaspora-oriented. Artsakh Info @arcaxinfo — 3,700 subscribers. Geolocation: Russia.
Example of AI use in video content
Although the Kremlin began its interference campaign in Armenia's elections at least as early as 2025, one of the TikTok AI-driven channels is particularly notable. Its most-viewed pinned video, with more than 600,000 views, depicts alleged U.S. strikes on Iran and shows an AI-generated wave of refugees supposedly moving toward the Armenian border. What is striking is that this video was posted on January 22, 2026, while the strikes themselves only began on February 28: https://www.tiktok.com/@tokio0374/video/7598300820471385351
Example of AI videos on channels linked to the ANO Eurasia network: https://t.me/ArmenianVendetta/45568 Examples of Pro-Kremlin Accounts Discrediting the Armenian Authorities:
https://www.tiktok.com/@armemes_yvn/video/7611958805273840913 Inauthentic account mixing political content with entertainment; coordinated with an Instagram account Government inaction during the war
https://www.tiktok.com/@tokio0374/video/7598300820471385351 Fictitious-persona account AI-generated disinformation about the Iran border / "thousands of Iranians crossing into Armenia" — over 600,000 views
https://www.tiktok.com/@hayastani.haylin AI-enabled inauthentic account; Pashinyan-focused Demonising depictions of Pashinyan https://www.tiktok.com/@xleshroyale AI-enabled inauthentic account; Pashinyan-focused Demonising depictions of Pashinyan
https://www.tiktok.com/@news360officialchannel https://www.youtube.com/@news360officialchannel https://t.me/News360channel Media impersonation account Delegitimising depictions of Pashinyan and the cabinet
https://www.tiktok.com/@creativecontent011 AI and content account Manipulated depictions of Pashinyan
https://www.tiktok.com/@zornoq?lang=ru-RU AI and content account Manipulated depictions of Pashinyan and Aliyev
https://www.tiktok.com/@lapka_arapka/video/7590816776921926934?lang=ru-RU AI and content account Manipulated depictions of Pashinyan
https://www.tiktok.com/@smotryashiy_ararat/video/7553223523083291911?lang=ru-RU Anonymous account deploying AI-generated content and infographics
https://www.instagram.com/p/DTeWxrHkUA-/?img_index=1 Anonymous amplifier account; produces and seeds original disinformation Pashinyan portrayed as corrupt
https://www.instagram.com/armeniadecides/ Anonymous account promoting voter mobilisation; seeds disinformation about Pashinyan Mobilisation messaging on election day
https://www.instagram.com/lia_sargsyan_journalist/ Journalist Lia Sargsyan. Deploys AI-generated forged documents, fabricated video content, and fabricated exclusives: raids, scandals, the church, the opposition Delegitimising Pashinyan. Example: "6.35 billion dollars in military procurement has gone missing"
https://www.instagram.com/p/DOkHI5wjDB7/ Inauthentic seeding account for video content and narratives Delegitimising Pashinyan's supporters
https://www.instagram.com/thearmosphere/ US-based account Fabricated narratives targeting the government https://www.instagram.com/armenian.media.live/ Official media impersonation account Delegitimising official government narratives https://www.tiktok.com/@alyonka_simonova/video/7612255898857147669 Impersonates opposition figure Hayk Manasyan Amplifying disinformation targeting government statements