Exposing the Kremlin

Polls released today show that approval ratings for the Russian authorities remain relatively stable but continue to edge lower. Putin and other Russian officials have seen gradual declines in their ratings. Tighter fiscal and tariff policy triggered a sharp drop in support for United Russia after the State Duma elections; the party's rating has since stabilized.

As in previous rounds of Ukrainian attacks on new categories of Russian infrastructure, most commentators in the pro-war Z community criticized the political leadership and military command for failing to anticipate the target list could expand.

Kremlin-aligned FIMI channels exploited the October 2026 protest wave across five European countries, amplifying both genuine grievances and unsubstantiated claims about the unrest. Their coverage ranged from support for demonstrators to accusations of migrant violence and government-orchestrated chaos.

The October 9 US–Russia diesel agreement became a pretext for FIMI actors to challenge Ukraine’s sovereignty, European sanctions, and Western support for Kyiv. The US decision to temporarily authorize transactions involving Russian diesel was presented as evidence that Washington could pursue its interests with Moscow at Ukraine’s expense. Narratives portrayed Ukrainian resistance as a liability for Washington.

Kremlin FIMI networks rapidly absorbed Spain’s snap election into an existing multilingual influence ecosystem. Rather than developing a single election narrative, different actors routed the same political crisis through established themes, including housing, migration, Ukraine, sovereignty, and distrust of electoral institutions.

The events following initial news reports that a laboratory worker in Irkutsk had died of “pneumonic plague” on the night of October 1–2 once again expose a crisis in Russian authorities’ public communications. The Kremlin’s initial silence, followed by persistent denials and the dismissal of all reports as “fake,” has deepened distrust among Russian citizens and foreign governments alike.

Although a death from plague has not been publicly confirmed, the suppression and deletion of news reports, together with subsequent personnel and public health measures, point to a much more serious situation than the official account suggests.

Events earlier this year have only reinforced suspicions that the Kremlin is concealing a death from plague. In February and March 2026, the authorities forcibly culled livestock on a large scale in Siberia and the Volga region while denying a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak and claiming it was pasteurellosis instead. Even China later officially acknowledged that a new strain of foot-and-mouth disease had entered through its northwestern border, part of which it shares with Russia.

Tax and fee increases announced after the elections could raise up to ₽1.5 tn ($17.7 bn), while defense accounts for 35% of the draft 2027 budget. Public discontent is growing, even among pro-war supporters.

Funding for propaganda is set at ₽146 bn ($1.72 bn), up from the previously planned ₽100 bn ($1.18 bn), while spending on social policy, education, health care, and the economy has been cut by 6–7.4%.

Budget structure points to preparations for a potentially larger military confrontation as well as a commitment to sustained high military spending.

Nearly two-thirds of Russians (64%) support starting peace talks, according to the independent Levada Center’s September poll. Support for negotiations rose by 5 p.p. from August. The share of respondents who favor continuing the fighting fell by 4 p.p., from 31% to 27%.

The gender gap is pronounced: 36% of men support continuing the war, compared with just 20% of women. The age gap is equally clear. Among respondents ages 18–24, only 12% favor continuing the war, while 76% support opening peace talks. The pattern is similar among those ages 25–39: 18% favor continuing the war and 73% support negotiations.

Moscow remains the most pro-war city, with 46% favoring continued fighting and only 45% supporting negotiations. In other communities, support for continuing the war ranges from 22% to 27%, while support for negotiations ranges from 62% to 69%, depending on population size.

Levada also repeated a survey experiment that it has conducted periodically since May 2023. Respondents were randomly assigned to two equal groups and asked whether they would support a decision by the president to end the military conflict immediately. For the first group, the question included no additional conditions. For the second, ending the conflict was conditional on Russia returning the territories it had seized.

Demand for peace is evident in both scenarios. Support for a decision by Putin to end the war reached its highest level since the experiment began: 81% would support such a decision without additional conditions, while only 12% would oppose it; 35% would support it even if Russia had to return the occupied territories, while 51% would oppose it.

Support for ending the war without additional conditions has risen steadily since May 2023, increasing by 19 p.p. over that period.

Support for ending the war even if Russia returns the occupied territories has also grown, from 28% in February 2025 to 35% in September 2026. Opposition to ending the war on condition that Russia returns Ukraine’s territory is at its lowest level since the experiment began: 51% would oppose such a decision, down from a peak of 64% in February 2025.

Putin oncee again claimed that Russia had been forced to “defend itself with weapons in hand” and warned that “the likelihood that conflicts around the world will continue is, unfortunately, very high.”

Svarshchiki, a Telegram channel linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), reposted a statement from Condotierro, a pro-war Telegram channel run by an anonymous Wagner Group veteran: “I like everything about Putin’s speech, from the first word to the last. [...] There’s only one thing I don’t like: the pace of decision-making. I’m dying to see the Euro-Satanists get totally fucked today. Right now. No waiting until 2029 or 2030. We need to fuck those animals up right here. Here and now.”

In the preceding post, Svarshchiki noted that the authorities’ rhetoric had become markedly more hard-line: “In recent months, Peskov has grown ‘tougher’ than Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev]. Guys, where have you been all this time? You’re making us happy.” Alexander Kots, a war correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda, titled his post about Putin’s speech “What if we strike? We definitely will.”

Official propagandists adopted a similar line. Leonid Slutsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, likened the address to Putin’s “historic 2007 Munich speech” and said, “Vladimir Putin directly warned the West about the risk of a global catastrophe and about the responsibility it bears for the future.”

Propagandist Vladimir Solovyov posted a video in which Kremlin hawk Sergei Karaganov said, “The fact that Putin and Lavrov have both recently begun saying that any war between Russia and Europe, which would of course be initiated by Europe, would be very short is a step in the right direction. It means we have brought nuclear weapons into play at the political level.”

Another propagandist, Artyom Sheinin, declared that “miscalculations come at a high price.” He identified Putin’s central argument as follows: “We must recognize that the point beyond which nothing can be changed could be reached very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. We may simply find that the logic of increasingly harsh reciprocal responses leads to a fatal and irreversible outcome.”

Following the State Duma elections, approval ratings for the Russian authorities resumed their familiar downward trend. Putin’s job approval remains stable. However, the tightening of fiscal and tax policy immediately after the elections has clearly weighed on public assessments of both the Russian government and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, while also contributing to greater anxiety among Russians.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) recorded a 4.1 p.p. drop in positive assessments of the Russian government’s performance during the week of September 21–27, while the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) reported a 5 p.p. decline. VTsIOM also recorded a 3.2 p.p. drop in Mishustin’s approval rating.

That same week, FOM found that anxious respondents once again outnumbered calm respondents, at 47% and 46%, respectively. Two weeks earlier, the balance had been reversed for the first time since spring 2026: 47% reported feeling calm, compared with 45% who reported feeling anxious.

This brief easing of public anxiety was driven primarily by an intensive propaganda campaign ahead of the State Duma elections. Since then, sentiment has reverted to its previous pattern.

Kremlin FIMI actors denied Russian involvement in the August 15 Milrem Robotics arson while suggesting that attacks on European arms suppliers to Ukraine could be justified. After Estonia attributed the attack to Russian intelligence on September 29, the messaging shifted to discrediting the investigation and questioning Estonian statehood.

The coverage combined accusations against Estonia, attempts to discredit allegations of Russian sabotage, and arguments justifying attacks on European defense manufacturers.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Sergey Lavrov in New York on Saturday, in the first talks between the countries’ foreign ministers since before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Wadephul urged Moscow to abandon its “dangerous path of escalation” against Germany, Europe and NATO. The Leipzig/Halle drone incident, which Berlin has attributed to Russia, was among the issues raised. Lavrov rejected Germany’s accusations.

But Germany is also targeted by an extensive German-language Kremlin FIMI ecosystem, and for months its messaging has closely mirrored the political framing coming from Moscow.

→ First, reverse who started the escalation.

After Leipzig/Halle, InfraRot Medien, linked to the InfoDefense network through cross-posting, promoted the incident as a possible “false flag” and a pretext for measures Berlin supposedly already intended to take. It then amplified claims that Germany was waging an “undeclared war against Russia” and preparing a “long-planned war against Russia.”

→ Then, remove Russia as the source of the threat.

Ostnews Faktencheck questioned whether Russian responsibility had been established at all. Informationskanal für die Neue Zeit, affiliated with the InfoDefense network, amplified claims that Friedrich Merz was leading Germany “ever closer to a war with Russia.”

→ Finally, turn Moscow’s official framing into a message for German audiences.

After Sergey Lavrov portrayed Germany as returning to militarism and effectively having “declared war” on Russia, Analytik & News and Politische Nachrichten amplified his statements. Meine D-News distributed Russian Ambassador Sergei Nechaev’s insistence that Russia “does not want a war with Germany.” Kachelkanal condensed the inversion into a message aimed directly at Germans:

“We are not afraid of Putin. We are afraid of you.”

🔎 This is why official Russian rhetoric and Kremlin FIMI activity should not be viewed separately.

At the diplomatic level, Moscow advances a political framing: Germany is escalating, militarizing and moving toward confrontation; Russia seeks peace.

In the German information space, FIMI actors localize and distribute the same framing, connecting it to German politicians, elections and domestic grievances.

Even before the declaration was published, presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov set the tone by contrasting a ceasefire with “a lasting peace, peace forever.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov then ruled out any pause in the war for negotiations in any format, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov equated a ceasefire with “a respite for Ukraine, which is under severe pressure,” and State Duma International Affairs Committee Chair Leonid Slutsky again demanded the “complete elimination of the root causes of the conflict.”

State media simultaneously pushed the claim that “only one-third” of UN member states had backed the “anti-Russian” declaration, portraying support for Ukraine as a global “minority” position. Particular emphasis was placed on the absence of the United States among the signatories, a point actively promoted by presidential special envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Television propaganda went further, contrasting the declaration with a 2022 resolution that it claimed had been signed by “nearly 150 countries.”

- Dividends, bank interest, property sales and securities could shift from the current 13–15% rates to the 13–22% progressive income tax scale; - Foreign online purchases would face a 22% VAT from 2027; - Foreign parcels could be subject to a new ₽100 customs fee; - International flight tickets could carry a new fee of up to ₽2,000 to finance purchases of Russian-made aircraft; - Taxes for some full-time self-employed couriers and drivers could rise from 4–6% to 13%; - Electricity prices are projected to increase by 14.4% in 2027.

The Kremlin continues to look for new ways to finance the war.

Commenting on the State Duma "election" results for the first time, Vladimir Putin said the 59.3% turnout showed Russians support the country’s armed forces and the government’s course.

Addressing Russian soldiers directly, he said: “This vote is for you. People believe in you, believe in our victory.”

The 2027–2029 plan projects deficits of around 2% of GDP every year, while tax hikes on investment income, property sales and bank deposits could affect 4 million people. Defense and security are explicitly designated a “strategic priority.” The 2026 deficit is already approaching 3% – nearly twice the original target.

The Kremlin is putting its economy on a longer-term war footing, asking households and businesses to absorb more of the cost while planning for sustained military spending through at least 2029.

The gap between independent polling and the official result is enormous. A week before voting, ExtremeScan found United Russia at 35.6% among decided voters in a ballot without Yabloko. The official result: 57.83%. The election took place after the exclusion of the only registered anti-war party, extensive restrictions on opposition candidates and administrative mobilisation of voters. The result gives the Kremlin another constitutional majority.

“Participation in the elections is our common contribution to Russia’s victory,” said Putin ahead of the election. He called voting a “common response” to those seeking to “weaken Russia” and deprive it of its sovereignty.

After the vote, the same framing dominated official reactions.

“They had an opportunity to speak on the sidelines — work matters”. Kremlin propaganda consistently emphasizes the focus on economic issues and the purported efforts of the Kremlin and the Russian government to address them.

Key February topics in Russian social media include a sharp increase in housing-and-utilities (communal services) costs — which even the authorities were forced to acknowledge, calling it a “price adjustment” (7) — as well as a steep rise in cucumber prices as a symbol of broader cost-of-living increases.

A January poll by the independent Levada Center (6) recorded a deterioration in socio-economic assessments: the share of respondents who consider the economic situation bad rose by 7 percentage points from September 2025 to 22%, while the share of positive assessments fell by 9 points from May 2025 to 19%.

Russia's pro-war milieu is openly criticizing the military leadership for fabricating battlefield progress. DeepState data shows Russian advances collapsed from 445 sq km in December to 245 sq km in January—nearly half. CSIS confirms Russia controls only 0.6% of Ukraine's territory gained in 2024 (3,604 sq km) at cost of 35,000+ casualties monthly.

February 4: Ukraine/SpaceX enable "whitelist" mode, disabling unverified terminals Russians acquired through gray-market schemes (purchased abroad, activated, resold to units via Z-volunteers). Z-channel Belarusian Silovik: "Almost 90% of units I support have no internet right now."

Impact immediate: Politico sources report Russian advance pace "noticeably slowed" within 48 hours; Ukraine's General Staff source says "in some sectors, assaults stopped altogether"—Russian troops like "blind kittens." Z-space consensus: no viable alternatives exist. Voennyi Osvedomitel mocks: "Fighting NATO while relying on NATO satellite internet—and not developing alternatives—is a so-so idea." Drone developer Chadaev blames "Collective Leadership" being "repulsed by horizontal ties." Z-authors recall generals imprisoned for theft in military communications projects.

February 6: Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev (GRU First Deputy Chief, reports to Admiral Kostyukov who leads Russia's negotiation delegation) targeted in Moscow—fourth rear-area assassination attempt on general since invasion began. Lavrov blames "Zelensky regime," but Ukraine didn't claim responsibility and Washington Post reports Western intelligence doubts Kyiv involvement.

“If you do not defend your victory tomorrow, Sandu will jail the entire opposition and turn Moldova into a second Ukraine” — an explicit warning meant to stoke fear of being dragged into war with Russia.

Despite the sheer scale of this campaign, its impact so far has been limited when set against the firm actions of Moldovan authorities. The real test will come with the announced protests. Yet it already seems that the government’s policy of extremely tough measures is proving effective. In the current circumstances, Moldova has little alternative.

The narratives pushed by Kremlin disinformation networks after elections are painfully predictable. According to them, the elections were rigged, the opposition actually won, President Maia Sandu is terrified, ballots were stuffed, and tomorrow those who want to “live in Moldova — and not in another Ukraine” must take to the streets at Igor Dodon’s call.

It is rare to witness such a coordinated effort across all Kremlin-linked ecosystems. Propaganda networks tied to the Russian Ministry of Defence, security services, and the presidential administration — along with Kremlin disinformation channels inside Moldova and local Telegram and TikTok networks — are amplifying the same narratives, often word-for-word, recycling a single text as the basis for dozens of others.

On the ground, the Kremlin is preparing for what happens on election day itself. EK Stratcom’s monitoring points to planned provocations at polling stations: staged ballot sabotage, planted “discoveries” of invalid votes, orchestrated clashes between agitators and police, and the rapid spread of fake results hours before the official count. These aren’t improvisations; they are pre-planned scripts designed to delegitimize the vote no matter the outcome.

Overall, military needs — including security agencies, intelligence services, state defense orders, and other related areas — account for 41% of the entire Russian federal budget.

The prioritization of military spending is directly reflected in industrial production. By the end of the first half of 2025, against the backdrop of stagnation or even decline in “civilian sectors,” the three main military industries recorded rapid growth: production of “other transport equipment and machinery” increased by 35%, output of “finished metal products” rose by 14%, and the production of computers, electronics, and optical devices grew by 14–15%.

The three-year budget law for 2025–2027 provides for a 25% increase in military spending. Under the “National Defense” category, 13.5 trillion rubles (6.31% of GDP) have been allocated for 2025, with plans for 2026 and 2027 at roughly the same levels: 12.8 and 13.1 trillion rubles (≈ 154.2 and 157.8 billion USD).

Through its propaganda channels, the Kremlin increasingly speaks of losing influence in the South Caucasus, explaining this by claiming that “Russia’s enemies” are taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on the “Special Military Operation” and declaring the need to mobilize and take corresponding measures.

Notably, the narrative of “enemies exploiting Russia’s distraction with the war,” which the Kremlin uses to justify harsh statements from regional leaders and such image-damaging events as meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House, in fact only reinforces the distancing of regional countries from Moscow.

Despite the economy’s glaring problems, the Kremlin is eager to demonstrate “resilience” and control of the economy. Vladimir Putin and top officials are focused on “beautifying” reality and showcasing “achievements” — reduced inflation, a stable budget, Russia’s global economic position. The Kremlin seeks to negotiate from a “position of strength” and to project the ability to “continue the Special Military Operation as long as necessary.”

Yet beneath this faсade lie accumulated vulnerabilities: reliance on military spending and the constant need to increase payouts to contract soldiers — which have risen by almost 2 million rubles over the past year, now reaching one-time bonuses of 3 million rubles ($38,400) per recruit; the decline of civilian production; and growing public discontent. Another major risk factor is sanctions pressure. Despite the regime’s key narrative that sanctions “only benefit” Russia, the country has reached a point of serious vulnerability: the economy increasingly depends on gray import schemes, a limited number of partners, and constant budget infusions.

The social sphere is reacting painfully. According to polls by state agencies FOM and VTsIOM, inflation expectations among the population have risen to 13.5%. Russians now say they need an income of 227,000 rubles ($2,827) to feel “happy” — twice as much as eight years ago, and nearly three times higher than current average wages (about 30% of employed citizens in Russia earn an average salary of around $1,000/monthly).

At the same time, 22% of Russians report a worsening of their financial situation, while only 9% note improvements. Officially, 11.9 million people live below the poverty line, accounting for 8.1% of the population. This figure has been declining for the second year in a row, most likely because many of those signing military contracts come from impoverished regions and families. They initially receive signing bonuses, and later — their families receive payouts after the soldiers are killed at the front.

Dissatisfaction with the economic situation is increasingly breaking into the public sphere, leaving the Kremlin fewer opportunities to suppress debate about the war’s economic consequences.

After observing the White House’s conciliatory tone, the Kremlin tested its limits: praising the U.S., attacking the EU, and striking Ukrainian cities.

It has now returned to targeting the Trump administration domestically, while flattering Washington externally — a dual-track strategy of pressure and manipulation, including fake gestures like the “kind” May 9 ceasefire offer, timed to welcome Putin’s superior, Xi, in Moscow.

While Kremlin propaganda long focused on “Ukrainian Nazis,” it now frames “euronazism” as a shared threat to Moscow and Washington. A recent publication by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service advanced this line, aiming to fracture Western unity.

On May 11, Putin referred to European countries supporting Ukraine as former allies of Hitler. As the Kremlin portrays its war as a fight against fascism, this return to “European Nazism” in official messaging is a dangerous shift — and a possible prelude to further aggression.

Kremlin loyalists like Solovyov praise Putin for rejecting a ceasefire, hoping he’s just stalling. More independent Z-voices show radicalism: Pavel Gubarev urged soldiers to resist disarmament, calling the government “criminal.”

Though small, the Z-base is radical and dangerous if backed by parts of the military. This risk earlier prompted crackdowns on figures like Strelkov and “Thirteenth,” as the Kremlin moved to silence pro-war opinion makers — feeling emboldened after Prigozhin’s assassination and the passivity of his supporters.

A stable 61% support ending the war, while 30% favor continuing it, according to an April Levada Center poll. The gap grew by 7% in a month, a trend confirmed by both state-run and independent polls.

While protests are rare and isolated, the Kremlin can’t fully ignore public opinion — especially amid rising prices and utility bills. That’s why Russian officials now try to shift blame for failed talks from Putin to Ukraine, pushing a domestic narrative that paints the Kremlin as a willing but misunderstood peace-seeker.

For over half a year, Russians have cited rising prices — not the war — as their top concern, with record numbers reporting 30%+ inflation. Many now directly link the war to the economic crisis. Public demand for peace is growing.

The Kremlin also faces a labor shortage, a 11.9% hike in utility costs, and a 3.2 trillion-ruble budget deficit in Q1 2025. Putin needs sanctions relief to inject cash and regroup his army. The West must now decide: allow another war — or turn Kremlin weakness into lasting peace.