Exposing
the Kremlin

“If you do not defend your victory tomorrow, Sandu will jail the entire opposition and turn Moldova into a second Ukraine” — an explicit warning meant to stoke fear of being dragged into war with Russia. Despite the sheer scale of this campaign, its impact so far has been limited when set against the firm actions of Moldovan authorities. The real test will come with the announced protests. Yet it already seems that the government’s policy of extremely tough measures is proving effective. In the current circumstances, Moldova has little alternative.

The narratives pushed by Kremlin disinformation networks after elections are painfully predictable. According to them, the elections were rigged, the opposition actually won, President Maia Sandu is terrified, ballots were stuffed, and tomorrow those who want to “live in Moldova — and not in another Ukraine” must take to the streets at Igor Dodon’s call. It is rare to witness such a coordinated effort across all Kremlin-linked ecosystems. Propaganda networks tied to the Russian Ministry of Defence, security services, and the presidential administration — along with Kremlin disinformation channels inside Moldova and local Telegram and TikTok networks — are amplifying the same narratives, often word-for-word, recycling a single text as the basis for dozens of others.

On the ground, the Kremlin is preparing for what happens on election day itself. EK Stratcom’s monitoring points to planned provocations at polling stations: staged ballot sabotage, planted “discoveries” of invalid votes, orchestrated clashes between agitators and police, and the rapid spread of fake results hours before the official count. These aren’t improvisations; they are pre-planned scripts designed to delegitimize the vote no matter the outcome.

Overall, military needs — including security agencies, intelligence services, state defense orders, and other related areas — account for 41% of the entire Russian federal budget. The prioritization of military spending is directly reflected in industrial production. By the end of the first half of 2025, against the backdrop of stagnation or even decline in “civilian sectors,” the three main military industries recorded rapid growth: production of “other transport equipment and machinery” increased by 35%, output of “finished metal products” rose by 14%, and the production of computers, electronics, and optical devices grew by 14–15%.

The three-year budget law for 2025–2027 provides for a 25% increase in military spending. Under the “National Defense” category, 13.5 trillion rubles (6.31% of GDP) have been allocated for 2025, with plans for 2026 and 2027 at roughly the same levels: 12.8 and 13.1 trillion rubles (≈ 154.2 and 157.8 billion USD).

Through its propaganda channels, the Kremlin increasingly speaks of losing influence in the South Caucasus, explaining this by claiming that “Russia’s enemies” are taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on the “Special Military Operation” and declaring the need to mobilize and take corresponding measures. Notably, the narrative of “enemies exploiting Russia’s distraction with the war,” which the Kremlin uses to justify harsh statements from regional leaders and such image-damaging events as meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House, in fact only reinforces the distancing of regional countries from Moscow.

Despite the economy’s glaring problems, the Kremlin is eager to demonstrate “resilience” and control of the economy. Vladimir Putin and top officials are focused on “beautifying” reality and showcasing “achievements” — reduced inflation, a stable budget, Russia’s global economic position. The Kremlin seeks to negotiate from a “position of strength” and to project the ability to “continue the Special Military Operation as long as necessary.” Yet beneath this faсade lie accumulated vulnerabilities: reliance on military spending and the constant need to increase payouts to contract soldiers — which have risen by almost 2 million rubles over the past year, now reaching one-time bonuses of 3 million rubles ($38,400) per recruit; the decline of civilian production; and growing public discontent. Another major risk factor is sanctions pressure. Despite the regime’s key narrative that sanctions “only benefit” Russia, the country has reached a point of serious vulnerability: the economy increasingly depends on gray import schemes, a limited number of partners, and constant budget infusions.

The social sphere is reacting painfully. According to polls by state agencies FOM and VTsIOM, inflation expectations among the population have risen to 13.5%. Russians now say they need an income of 227,000 rubles ($2,827) to feel “happy” — twice as much as eight years ago, and nearly three times higher than current average wages (about 30% of employed citizens in Russia earn an average salary of around $1,000/monthly). At the same time, 22% of Russians report a worsening of their financial situation, while only 9% note improvements. Officially, 11.9 million people live below the poverty line, accounting for 8.1% of the population. This figure has been declining for the second year in a row, most likely because many of those signing military contracts come from impoverished regions and families. They initially receive signing bonuses, and later — their families receive payouts after the soldiers are killed at the front. Dissatisfaction with the economic situation is increasingly breaking into the public sphere, leaving the Kremlin fewer opportunities to suppress debate about the war’s economic consequences.

After observing the White House’s conciliatory tone, the Kremlin tested its limits: praising the U.S., attacking the EU, and striking Ukrainian cities. It has now returned to targeting the Trump administration domestically, while flattering Washington externally — a dual-track strategy of pressure and manipulation, including fake gestures like the “kind” May 9 ceasefire offer, timed to welcome Putin’s superior, Xi, in Moscow.

While Kremlin propaganda long focused on “Ukrainian Nazis,” it now frames “euronazism” as a shared threat to Moscow and Washington. A recent publication by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service advanced this line, aiming to fracture Western unity. On May 11, Putin referred to European countries supporting Ukraine as former allies of Hitler. As the Kremlin portrays its war as a fight against fascism, this return to “European Nazism” in official messaging is a dangerous shift — and a possible prelude to further aggression.

Kremlin loyalists like Solovyov praise Putin for rejecting a ceasefire, hoping he’s just stalling. More independent Z-voices show radicalism: Pavel Gubarev urged soldiers to resist disarmament, calling the government “criminal.” Though small, the Z-base is radical and dangerous if backed by parts of the military. This risk earlier prompted crackdowns on figures like Strelkov and “Thirteenth,” as the Kremlin moved to silence pro-war opinion makers — feeling emboldened after Prigozhin’s assassination and the passivity of his supporters.

A stable 61% support ending the war, while 30% favor continuing it, according to an April Levada Center poll. The gap grew by 7% in a month, a trend confirmed by both state-run and independent polls. While protests are rare and isolated, the Kremlin can’t fully ignore public opinion — especially amid rising prices and utility bills. That’s why Russian officials now try to shift blame for failed talks from Putin to Ukraine, pushing a domestic narrative that paints the Kremlin as a willing but misunderstood peace-seeker.

For over half a year, Russians have cited rising prices — not the war — as their top concern, with record numbers reporting 30%+ inflation. Many now directly link the war to the economic crisis. Public demand for peace is growing. The Kremlin also faces a labor shortage, a 11.9% hike in utility costs, and a 3.2 trillion-ruble budget deficit in Q1 2025. Putin needs sanctions relief to inject cash and regroup his army. The West must now decide: allow another war — or turn Kremlin weakness into lasting peace.