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“If you do not defend your victory tomorrow, Sandu will jail the entire opposition and turn Moldova into a second Ukraine” — an explicit warning meant to stoke fear of being dragged into war with Russia. Despite the sheer scale of this campaign, its impact so far has been limited when set against the firm actions of Moldovan authorities. The real test will come with the announced protests. Yet it already seems that the government’s policy of extremely tough measures is proving effective. In the current circumstances, Moldova has little alternative.

The narratives pushed by Kremlin disinformation networks after elections are painfully predictable. According to them, the elections were rigged, the opposition actually won, President Maia Sandu is terrified, ballots were stuffed, and tomorrow those who want to “live in Moldova — and not in another Ukraine” must take to the streets at Igor Dodon’s call. It is rare to witness such a coordinated effort across all Kremlin-linked ecosystems. Propaganda networks tied to the Russian Ministry of Defence, security services, and the presidential administration — along with Kremlin disinformation channels inside Moldova and local Telegram and TikTok networks — are amplifying the same narratives, often word-for-word, recycling a single text as the basis for dozens of others.

On the ground, the Kremlin is preparing for what happens on election day itself. EK Stratcom’s monitoring points to planned provocations at polling stations: staged ballot sabotage, planted “discoveries” of invalid votes, orchestrated clashes between agitators and police, and the rapid spread of fake results hours before the official count. These aren’t improvisations; they are pre-planned scripts designed to delegitimize the vote no matter the outcome.