Exposing
the Kremlin
30.10.2026
🚨Kremlin FIMI networks are intervening in the information environment ahead of the November 3 US midterms
Russia-aligned information activity is visible across several mechanisms:
– The Matryoshka/Operation Overload network distributed fabricated celebrity and news-format attacks on Democratic candidates;
– Storm-1516 circulated apparently AI-generated false misconduct allegations;
– Doppelgänger deployed imitation news sites and automated quote-posting;
– multilingual Pravda network republished domestic US partisan messages.
Russian state media and FIMI channels concurrently advanced divergent interpretations of Trump’s electoral position, pressure on Ukraine and potential confrontation over Iran.
25.10.2026
🚨Moscow retains the funding, media infrastructure and personnel to sustain FIMI campaigns targeting Estonia from abroad.
Estonia has disrupted several established Russian influence networks, but Moscow retains the funding, media infrastructure and personnel to sustain campaigns from abroad. EK Stratcom’s research identifies no successor structure with comparable coordinating capacity inside Estonia.
The remaining activity combines Russia-based institutions, online distribution, former local activists and the recruitment of individuals for intelligence collection and sabotage.
23.10.2026
🚨Ratings for the Russian authorities continue to edge lower.
Polls released today show that approval ratings for the Russian authorities remain relatively stable but continue to edge lower. Putin and other Russian officials have seen gradual declines in their ratings. Tighter fiscal and tariff policy triggered a sharp drop in support for United Russia after the State Duma elections; the party's rating has since stabilized.