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German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Sergey Lavrov in New York on Saturday, in the first talks between the countries’ foreign ministers since before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Wadephul urged Moscow to abandon its “dangerous path of escalation” against Germany, Europe and NATO. The Leipzig/Halle drone incident, which Berlin has attributed to Russia, was among the issues raised. Lavrov rejected Germany’s accusations. But Germany is also targeted by an extensive German-language Kremlin FIMI ecosystem, and for months its messaging has closely mirrored the political framing coming from Moscow. → First, reverse who started the escalation. After Leipzig/Halle, InfraRot Medien, linked to the InfoDefense network through cross-posting, promoted the incident as a possible “false flag” and a pretext for measures Berlin supposedly already intended to take. It then amplified claims that Germany was waging an “undeclared war against Russia” and preparing a “long-planned war against Russia.” → Then, remove Russia as the source of the threat. Ostnews Faktencheck questioned whether Russian responsibility had been established at all. Informationskanal für die Neue Zeit, affiliated with the InfoDefense network, amplified claims that Friedrich Merz was leading Germany “ever closer to a war with Russia.” → Finally, turn Moscow’s official framing into a message for German audiences. After Sergey Lavrov portrayed Germany as returning to militarism and effectively having “declared war” on Russia, Analytik & News and Politische Nachrichten amplified his statements. Meine D-News distributed Russian Ambassador Sergei Nechaev’s insistence that Russia “does not want a war with Germany.” Kachelkanal condensed the inversion into a message aimed directly at Germans: “We are not afraid of Putin. We are afraid of you.” 🔎 This is why official Russian rhetoric and Kremlin FIMI activity should not be viewed separately. At the diplomatic level, Moscow advances a political framing: Germany is escalating, militarizing and moving toward confrontation; Russia seeks peace. In the German information space, FIMI actors localize and distribute the same framing, connecting it to German politicians, elections and domestic grievances.

Even before the declaration was published, presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov set the tone by contrasting a ceasefire with “a lasting peace, peace forever.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov then ruled out any pause in the war for negotiations in any format, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov equated a ceasefire with “a respite for Ukraine, which is under severe pressure,” and State Duma International Affairs Committee Chair Leonid Slutsky again demanded the “complete elimination of the root causes of the conflict.” State media simultaneously pushed the claim that “only one-third” of UN member states had backed the “anti-Russian” declaration, portraying support for Ukraine as a global “minority” position. Particular emphasis was placed on the absence of the United States among the signatories, a point actively promoted by presidential special envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Television propaganda went further, contrasting the declaration with a 2022 resolution that it claimed had been signed by “nearly 150 countries.”

- Dividends, bank interest, property sales and securities could shift from the current 13–15% rates to the 13–22% progressive income tax scale; - Foreign online purchases would face a 22% VAT from 2027; - Foreign parcels could be subject to a new ₽100 customs fee; - International flight tickets could carry a new fee of up to ₽2,000 to finance purchases of Russian-made aircraft; - Taxes for some full-time self-employed couriers and drivers could rise from 4–6% to 13%; - Electricity prices are projected to increase by 14.4% in 2027. The Kremlin continues to look for new ways to finance the war.