A nexus of information, policy,
and resilience
in Eurasia and beyond

Putin oncee again claimed that Russia had been forced to “defend itself with weapons in hand” and warned that “the likelihood that conflicts around the world will continue is, unfortunately, very high.” Svarshchiki, a Telegram channel linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), reposted a statement from Condotierro, a pro-war Telegram channel run by an anonymous Wagner Group veteran: “I like everything about Putin’s speech, from the first word to the last. [...] There’s only one thing I don’t like: the pace of decision-making. I’m dying to see the Euro-Satanists get totally fucked today. Right now. No waiting until 2029 or 2030. We need to fuck those animals up right here. Here and now.” In the preceding post, Svarshchiki noted that the authorities’ rhetoric had become markedly more hard-line: “In recent months, Peskov has grown ‘tougher’ than Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev]. Guys, where have you been all this time? You’re making us happy.” Alexander Kots, a war correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda, titled his post about Putin’s speech “What if we strike? We definitely will.” Official propagandists adopted a similar line. Leonid Slutsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, likened the address to Putin’s “historic 2007 Munich speech” and said, “Vladimir Putin directly warned the West about the risk of a global catastrophe and about the responsibility it bears for the future.” Propagandist Vladimir Solovyov posted a video in which Kremlin hawk Sergei Karaganov said, “The fact that Putin and Lavrov have both recently begun saying that any war between Russia and Europe, which would of course be initiated by Europe, would be very short is a step in the right direction. It means we have brought nuclear weapons into play at the political level.” Another propagandist, Artyom Sheinin, declared that “miscalculations come at a high price.” He identified Putin’s central argument as follows: “We must recognize that the point beyond which nothing can be changed could be reached very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. We may simply find that the logic of increasingly harsh reciprocal responses leads to a fatal and irreversible outcome.”

Following the State Duma elections, approval ratings for the Russian authorities resumed their familiar downward trend. Putin’s job approval remains stable. However, the tightening of fiscal and tax policy immediately after the elections has clearly weighed on public assessments of both the Russian government and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, while also contributing to greater anxiety among Russians. The Kremlin-controlled Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) recorded a 4.1 p.p. drop in positive assessments of the Russian government’s performance during the week of September 21–27, while the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) reported a 5 p.p. decline. VTsIOM also recorded a 3.2 p.p. drop in Mishustin’s approval rating. That same week, FOM found that anxious respondents once again outnumbered calm respondents, at 47% and 46%, respectively. Two weeks earlier, the balance had been reversed for the first time since spring 2026: 47% reported feeling calm, compared with 45% who reported feeling anxious. This brief easing of public anxiety was driven primarily by an intensive propaganda campaign ahead of the State Duma elections. Since then, sentiment has reverted to its previous pattern.

Kremlin FIMI actors denied Russian involvement in the August 15 Milrem Robotics arson while suggesting that attacks on European arms suppliers to Ukraine could be justified. After Estonia attributed the attack to Russian intelligence on September 29, the messaging shifted to discrediting the investigation and questioning Estonian statehood. The coverage combined accusations against Estonia, attempts to discredit allegations of Russian sabotage, and arguments justifying attacks on European defense manufacturers.