A nexus of information, policy,
and resilience
in Eurasia and beyond

Nearly two-thirds of Russians (64%) support starting peace talks, according to the independent Levada Center’s September poll. Support for negotiations rose by 5 p.p. from August. The share of respondents who favor continuing the fighting fell by 4 p.p., from 31% to 27%. The gender gap is pronounced: 36% of men support continuing the war, compared with just 20% of women. The age gap is equally clear. Among respondents ages 18–24, only 12% favor continuing the war, while 76% support opening peace talks. The pattern is similar among those ages 25–39: 18% favor continuing the war and 73% support negotiations. Moscow remains the most pro-war city, with 46% favoring continued fighting and only 45% supporting negotiations. In other communities, support for continuing the war ranges from 22% to 27%, while support for negotiations ranges from 62% to 69%, depending on population size. Levada also repeated a survey experiment that it has conducted periodically since May 2023. Respondents were randomly assigned to two equal groups and asked whether they would support a decision by the president to end the military conflict immediately. For the first group, the question included no additional conditions. For the second, ending the conflict was conditional on Russia returning the territories it had seized. Demand for peace is evident in both scenarios. Support for a decision by Putin to end the war reached its highest level since the experiment began: 81% would support such a decision without additional conditions, while only 12% would oppose it; 35% would support it even if Russia had to return the occupied territories, while 51% would oppose it. Support for ending the war without additional conditions has risen steadily since May 2023, increasing by 19 p.p. over that period. Support for ending the war even if Russia returns the occupied territories has also grown, from 28% in February 2025 to 35% in September 2026. Opposition to ending the war on condition that Russia returns Ukraine’s territory is at its lowest level since the experiment began: 51% would oppose such a decision, down from a peak of 64% in February 2025.

Putin oncee again claimed that Russia had been forced to “defend itself with weapons in hand” and warned that “the likelihood that conflicts around the world will continue is, unfortunately, very high.” Svarshchiki, a Telegram channel linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), reposted a statement from Condotierro, a pro-war Telegram channel run by an anonymous Wagner Group veteran: “I like everything about Putin’s speech, from the first word to the last. [...] There’s only one thing I don’t like: the pace of decision-making. I’m dying to see the Euro-Satanists get totally fucked today. Right now. No waiting until 2029 or 2030. We need to fuck those animals up right here. Here and now.” In the preceding post, Svarshchiki noted that the authorities’ rhetoric had become markedly more hard-line: “In recent months, Peskov has grown ‘tougher’ than Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev]. Guys, where have you been all this time? You’re making us happy.” Alexander Kots, a war correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda, titled his post about Putin’s speech “What if we strike? We definitely will.” Official propagandists adopted a similar line. Leonid Slutsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, likened the address to Putin’s “historic 2007 Munich speech” and said, “Vladimir Putin directly warned the West about the risk of a global catastrophe and about the responsibility it bears for the future.” Propagandist Vladimir Solovyov posted a video in which Kremlin hawk Sergei Karaganov said, “The fact that Putin and Lavrov have both recently begun saying that any war between Russia and Europe, which would of course be initiated by Europe, would be very short is a step in the right direction. It means we have brought nuclear weapons into play at the political level.” Another propagandist, Artyom Sheinin, declared that “miscalculations come at a high price.” He identified Putin’s central argument as follows: “We must recognize that the point beyond which nothing can be changed could be reached very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. We may simply find that the logic of increasingly harsh reciprocal responses leads to a fatal and irreversible outcome.”

Following the State Duma elections, approval ratings for the Russian authorities resumed their familiar downward trend. Putin’s job approval remains stable. However, the tightening of fiscal and tax policy immediately after the elections has clearly weighed on public assessments of both the Russian government and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, while also contributing to greater anxiety among Russians. The Kremlin-controlled Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) recorded a 4.1 p.p. drop in positive assessments of the Russian government’s performance during the week of September 21–27, while the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) reported a 5 p.p. decline. VTsIOM also recorded a 3.2 p.p. drop in Mishustin’s approval rating. That same week, FOM found that anxious respondents once again outnumbered calm respondents, at 47% and 46%, respectively. Two weeks earlier, the balance had been reversed for the first time since spring 2026: 47% reported feeling calm, compared with 45% who reported feeling anxious. This brief easing of public anxiety was driven primarily by an intensive propaganda campaign ahead of the State Duma elections. Since then, sentiment has reverted to its previous pattern.