The Kremlin’s 2026 Election Campaign In Armenia

The Kremlin's Objectives In Armenia

The Kremlin's key objectives are to weaken the authorities' position, deepen internal divisions, and entrench Armenia in a state of permanent instability – sufficient to stall its European integration trajectory for years to come.

The principal objective of the Kremlin's campaign in Armenia was to preserve its influence in the country – influence that has contracted significantly in recent years as a result of Nikol Pashinyan's multi-vector policy, the loss of the lever provided by Armenia's simmering conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine. In these circumstances, the strategic task is to keep Armenia in a degree of dependency, managed instability, and social division sufficient to achieve several simultaneous objectives: (1) to erode Western governments' confidence in Yerevan and thereby counter Armenia's foreign policy diversification; (2) to prevent Armenia from becoming a significant Western trade corridor in the South Caucasus – whether through the Trump Route (TRIPP) project or other regional infrastructure and trade initiatives; (3) to preserve Armenia as a strategic logistics hub for Russia's own re-export operations and sanctions circumvention; and (4) to maintain the last remaining foothold of legitimate Russian military presence in the South Caucasus in the form of Military Base 102 in Gyumri.

In the autumn of 2025, the Kremlin launched a broad interference campaign whose tactical intensity compensates for its structural deficit of influence. The campaign's toolkit is extensive: disinformation operations in Russian and Armenian, intensified coordination of the Kremlin's own proxies – including politicians, journalists, and activists, alongside agents embedded in the structures of the Armenian Church – support for the revanchist opposition, targeted outreach to Armenian diaspora communities, diplomatic blackmail, and economic pressure on Yerevan. Within this broader campaign, the 7 June parliamentary elections constitute a single episode in the Kremlin's strategy of destabilising Armenia: the operation will continue irrespective of the final result, channelled through energy, the Church, the diaspora, NGOs, and media.

The operation was coordinated by Sergei Kirienko, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, with parallel oversight from Putin's foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov. Significant operational roles were also played by other senior PA officials: Andrei Yarin, Head of the Domestic Policy Directorate; his deputy Denis Stepanyuk; Alexander Kharichev, Head of the Social Processes Monitoring and Analysis Directorate; Vadim Titov, Head of the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Directorate; and Sofya Zakharova, Head of the Information Technology Management Department.

FIMI Methods Of The Kremlin In Armenia: Key Components

1. Mass Disinformation Operations

The disinformation campaign against Armenia is one of the largest FIMI operations on record – comparable in scale only to the 2025 Moldovan election campaign. Covert state interference operates through proxy structures and combines information operations, influence-for-hire, platform manipulation, and false-flag operations.

Operation 'Matryoshka' – AI-Powered Video Content Factory

The campaign centred on the mass production of AI-generated video and audio recordings of Armenian politicians, journalists, and Western officials – deepfakes. By early May 2026, journalists had verified 343 fabricated videos, while leaked data put the overall figure at a minimum of 1,300 items. The deepfakes are actively seeded across social media platforms with large Armenian audiences (Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, VKontakte, Telegram, Facebook), then amplified by relay channels – on Telegram: @rusyerevantoday, @ArmenianVendetta, @novosti24armenia; and @TsitsakBot (a bot aggregator for automated content amplification without editorial filtering).

Core operational narratives:

"The West is trying to draw Armenia into war." France is claimed to be backing Nikol Pashinyan in exchange for his readiness to draw Armenia into a war with Russia – in this framing, the Prime Minister has sold his country to the West. The same template was deployed in Moldova in 2025 (the Sandu–Brussels nexus) and in Georgia in 2024 with no material adaptation.

"Foreign Military Instructors." The Kremlin's base narrative of "the country is occupied by NATO" is localised through the claim that NATO instructors are physically present on Armenian territory. Previously deployed in Moldova and Georgia.

"The Corrupt West is Buying Off Pashinyan." Pashinyan is alleged to have transferred $11 million for his electoral campaign from EAEU funds with Western acquiescence.

"Nikol Pashinyan – Traitor to the Nation." "Pashinyan surrendered Karabakh on Western instruction." This is the most effective localisation of the base narrative "the leader betrays national interests," drawing on the national trauma of losing Karabakh in 2023 – which makes it substantially more resonant and harder to refute.

Storm-1516 – Kompromat And Fabricated Documents Network

A verified Russian propaganda network specialising in the production and dissemination of fabricated documents and staged "investigations." Storm-1516 campaigns operate by planting content in small media outlets and Telegram channels, before it is picked up by larger outlets. The aim is to maximise the reach of both the fabricated stories themselves and the subsequent denials – thereby deepening distrust of the operation's targets.

The published leaks provide the best-documented example of a campaign operation – the "Marseille" media case, which actively propagated a fabricated story that Nikol Pashinyan had purchased luxury property in Marseille using proceeds of corruption. The target audience was the Armenian diaspora in France (3.1 million) and the diaspora organisation CCAF. The operation simultaneously seeded the narrative across media and social networks and provoked official denial statements – responses that served to amplify the story's reach and reinforce the delegitimising effect. For internal reporting purposes, the final results were quantified as follows:

• Reach of initial publication (05.06.2025): 2,454,400 • Total reach of the wave: 6,318,600 • Reach via network of 381,000 accounts: 9,154,000 • Total documented reach: 10,684,200

The operation’s internal reporting also includes a screenshot of social media comments supporting the provocation:

Further examples of campaign operations:

Sexual scandals implicating Pashinyan's inner circle. Narrative: Armenia's Minister of Defence, Suren Papikyan, is claimed to head a criminal empire engaged in human trafficking, including the trafficking of minors.

"Documents" on secret negotiations with Baku over the cession of Armenian territories. Narrative: "The opposition finds it difficult to understand what framework agreement with Baku the Armenian Prime Minister is referring to" – framed as "secret arrangements" concealed from the public, with attribution to Armenia bloc MP Gegham Manukyan.

Political repression targeting the opposition. Narrative: "On Pashinyan's orders, people are being hunted down to force statements from them <...> Law enforcement agencies have been instructed to open a 'series' of criminal cases against other opposition members as quickly as possible.

Video threats against politicians – false-flag operations. Narrative: on 18 May 2026, a video was released showing armed, masked individuals claiming to be residents of Artsakh delivering threats against Pashinyan in Armenian. Campaign objective: to create an atmosphere of insecurity and instability around the possibility of politically motivated physical violence, and to convey the depth of opposition to Pashinyan's policies among residents of war-affected territories. The authorities' subsequent response is framed as political repression in order to delegitimise them: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/hfx1C-i6a8s

2. Reliance On The Revanchist Opposition

The Kremlin's principal political instrument is a fragmented pro-Russian camp that Moscow sought to assemble into a coalition against the authorities.

• The "Strong Armenia" bloc of Kremlin-linked billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian citizen and owner of the Tashir Group of Companies. His direct contacts with Putin's family are a matter of record; in May 2026 it became known that he had worked for the FSB. Karapetyan is a member of Senator Konstantin Zatulin's Lazarev Club – a Kremlin platform for coordinating between Moscow and the Armenian opposition. The club's activities are presented as public diplomacy but are in substance a political campaign directed against Armenia's current leadership and in support of maintaining Russian influence. According to independent journalists, Karapetyan is also a financial donor to a number of Kremlin operations, including the voter transportation operation.

• The Armenia bloc led by Robert Kocharyan – the vehicle of a hard revanchist line on Karabakh, drawing on veterans, security service networks, and parts of the diaspora. According to investigators, he features in Kremlin documents as one of the preferred actors for the post-electoral destabilisation scenario. He publicly supports maintaining EAEU and CSTO membership and opposes the course towards European integration.

• Prosperous Armenia led by Gagik Tsarukyan, whose business empire is anchored in Russian markets and partnerships, and who publicly avoids anti-Russian statements. The party draws on small and medium-sized business; its members have repeatedly voted in parliament against key government initiatives on European integration, and its networks allow rapid mobilisation of the party's voter base for street protest.

• The Wings of Unity movement led by Arman Tatoyan, a former ombudsman who in his public rhetoric distances himself from an openly pro-Russian position, speaking instead of "multi-vector" foreign policy and the need to reduce dependence on any single centre of power. This positioning makes him acceptable to part of the undecided electorate. His value to Moscow lies in his ability to convert protest and apolitical voters into votes against Pashinyan without alarming the electorate with images of the "old elite." In documents obtained by hackers, he features as a reserve option for the Kremlin – a fallback should Karapetyan and Kocharyan prove electorally insufficient.

According to Kremlin plans, the shared task of these actors is to maximise delegitimisation of the electoral result through the pre-emptive promotion of the "total falsification" and "Western interference" narrative; the mobilisation of street protest among supporters of Karapetyan, Kocharyan, Tsarukyan, and part of Tatoyan's camp; and the conversion of isolated protests into a protracted post-electoral crisis with demands for the government's resignation and a reversal of foreign policy direction. Domestic destabilisation is intended to stall the European integration process and negotiations with Azerbaijan for at least several years.

3. Agents Within The Church As An Instrument Of Interference

Trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church is consistently high: IRI (May 2026) – 67%¹, Gallup/MPG (April 2026) – 76.4%², CRRC Caucasus Barometer (2024) – 62%³. Amid the artificial conflict with the authorities, pollsters are recording a trend of further growth in trust in the Church. The Kremlin deliberately exploited this resource, positioning the Church as a bastion of "tradition" against a "pro-Western Pashinyan." To this end, the narrative "Pashinyan – delegitimiser of the Church," which frames the authorities' actions as an attack on a religious institution on the eve of elections and as "proof of the anti-Russian course," was actively promoted. It is important to emphasise, however, that the claim of a "Pashinyan–Church confrontation" is an element of a disinformation campaign, not a reflection of the government's actual religious policy. In practice, this is not a conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church as an institution but an attempt to neutralise Russian influence agents – long embedded within religious structures in various countries and using Church rhetoric as an instrument of political mobilisation. In the public domain, this work was deliberately framed as "persecution of the faith" and an "attack on the Church" – to legitimise pro-Russian influence networks, shield them from criticism, and portray any state measures against politicised clergy as a sacred struggle of the people against a godless authority.

The Church's involvement in the political confrontation came to the fore in 2025: in the summer, rallies were held in support of Samvel Karapetyan, arrested for publicly calling for the violent seizure of power. The rallies featured Ezras Nersisyan, Karapetyan's "spiritual mentor" and the brother of Catholicos Garegin II, with slogans including "The Church is not for repressions" and "Pashinyan is Satan." Anti-government protests were also led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan (taken into custody on 25 June 2025), who deployed the narrative "Nikol is a traitor to the Church." A second wave of Church-linked protests took place in the winter of 2025–26. Each event drew 7,000–10,000 participants. All these episodes formed a single chain of political mobilisation embedded in the pre-electoral calendar.

On 27 May 2026, Catholicos Garegin II lent indirect support to the campaign's narratives, calling on citizens to participate in the parliamentary elections guided by an awareness of the national interest and a vision of a worthy future – and reminding them that 7 June, the day of the vote, coincides with an important cultural and religious date: the feast of the Cathedral of Holy Etchmiadzin, built 1,725 years ago. The Church leader declared: "Regrettably, we mark this feast in circumstances where grave losses have disturbed the peace of our people, blows are being struck at the foundations of our identity, and our spiritual and national sacred things are being distorted."

4. Diaspora “Soft Power” Instruments

The Kremlin directed particular attention at the Armenian diaspora: while Armenia's own population stands at 3 million, approximately 7 million Armenians live outside the country, of whom around 1 million are in Russia. This makes the diaspora a critically important resource for Moscow. Ara Abramyan, President of the Union of Armenians of Russia and a figure with established Kremlin connections, openly stated his intention to use the diaspora's resources to unite forces opposing Pashinyan ahead of the 2026 elections. In addition to numerous diaspora organisations, Russia is home to the Russian-Armenian Lazarev Club – an informal anti-Pashinyan coordination platform between Moscow and the pro-Kremlin opposition in Armenia, run by Senator Konstantin Zatulin (Samvel Karapetyan is a club member and co-investor). The club's "Armenian" track operates through meetings and roundtables in Moscow with Armenian participants, events in Yerevan and online in conjunction with the branch of the CIS Countries Institute, and public statements and analytical materials on the situation in Armenia. The club's council comprises several dozen representatives of state structures, business, and media – among them the Chairman of Armenia's Democratic Party, Aram Sargsyan; the First Vice-President of the Union of Armenians of Russia, Lusik Gukasyan; and analyst and former Chairman of the Public Council of the Republic of Armenia, Vazgen Manukyan.

In Europe, the Kremlin's influence operators are the "PANAP Vienna Club" led by Ashot Grigoryan and Jan Carnogursky, and the "Forum of Armenian Unions of Europe," also headed by Grigoryan – both organisations are actively engaged in the campaign to drive a wedge between Pashinyan and the Armenian Church, and their Kremlin connections and involvement in other electoral interference operations – in the Czech Republic, for example – have previously been confirmed. Rossotrudnichestvo / the Russian House in Yerevan, meanwhile, conducts systematic outreach to young people: seminars and summer camps where the narrative "Armenia's future is only with Russia" is actively promoted. In parallel, the Kremlin is implementing a plan to seize control of Armenian NGOs that lost their funding following the closure of USAID.

5. Operation “Imported Voters”

In March 2026, Armenian intelligence warned of pressure being applied to Armenians in Russia, who were promised payment for travel to Armenia in exchange for "correct" voting. Reports emerged of the opposition booking coaches: the plan envisaged transporting approximately 80,000 people, each receiving an "electoral bonus" of 100,000 roubles. Blogger Mikael Badalyan – direct Armenia coordinator for the ANO Eurasia organisation, the Russian entity responsible for running hybrid operations in Moldova's 2025 elections – served as the public amplifier for this agenda, announcing "opportunities to organise a mass trip." Published Western intelligence assessments confirm the operation: the Kremlin established regional quotas for Armenian citizens whose votes were to be secured; the estimated cost of the operation is $50 million. The scheme proceeded despite the legal restriction depriving non-resident Armenians of the right to vote, and its public disclosure itself contributed to an atmosphere of pre-electoral pressure in the country. 6. Economic, Diplomatic, And Rhetorical Pressure

Two weeks before polling day, the Kremlin intensified public pressure and launched a campaign of restrictions on imports from Armenia, with a particular focus on the agricultural export sector – which employs 17.6% of Armenia's working population. Bans were introduced on flowers, mineral water, certain alcoholic beverages, fish, and a range of fruit and vegetables. On 25 May, Russia's Ministry of Energy threatened to abrogate the 2013 preferential gas supply agreement under which Gazprom retains a monopoly on gas distribution until 2043 (approximately $177 per 1,000 m³). Russia–Armenia trade had, however, already halved year-on-year – from $12.4 billion in 2024 to $6.4 billion in 2025. The contraction of re-export schemes means that Moscow is losing the "mutual benefit" lever and has replaced it with direct pressure on Yerevan.

The diplomatic high point was the EAEU summit in Astana on 29–30 May: a joint demand from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan for a referendum on the "EU or EAEU" choice; the opening of discussions on suspending Armenia's EAEU membership; and the recall of Russian Ambassador Kopyrkin to Moscow for consultations. Nine days before the elections, Putin publicly compared Armenia to Ukraine, and throughout May other senior Russian officials consistently advanced Kremlin narratives targeting Armenia: Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu ("signing bilateral agreements with the United States is aid to Pashinyan in his electoral campaign"), Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev ("Pashinyan is pushing Armenia onto the course of Banderite Ukraine"), State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin ("what we receive in return is Pashinyan's treachery and dishonesty"), Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, presidential foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk (responsible within the Russian government for CIS and EAEU affairs), Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov.

7. Military Presence As A Contingency Lever

Military Base 102 in Gyumri, operating under a basing agreement that runs until 2044, is Russia's last legitimate military foothold in the South Caucasus. As early as the summer of 2025, reports emerged of the transfer of additional equipment and ammunition to the base – an unambiguous signal from Moscow against the backdrop of Yerevan's accelerating political reorientation. The military base functions as a permanent insurance policy: a source of "roof" – cover and protection – for pro-Russian forces in street mobilisation scenarios, and a potent source of leverage in the event of a post-electoral crisis.

Key Russian Media Networks: Outlets, Websites, And Telegram-Channels

To disseminate its disinformation narratives, the Kremlin deployed a multi-layered media network comprising Russian state outlets, affiliated regional resources in Russian and Armenian, and covert proxy platforms mimicking supposedly independent Armenian media. This integrated system promotes both official narratives and localised disinformation, mutually reinforcing one another – setting the atmosphere and register of the electoral campaign in Armenia in a manner consistent with Kremlin objectives.

Russian state outlets:

• Sputnik Armenia (armeniasputnik.am) – the Armenian-language branch of the RT ecosystem, and the largest instrument of direct Russian media influence inside the country. Part of the MIA Rossiya Segodnya structure, funded from the Russian federal budget. Actively promotes the narrative that "Pashinyan is leading Armenia to a rupture with Russia, but is himself forced to acknowledge that without Russia the country's security and development are impossible."

• EADaily (eadaily.com) – an outlet covering the South Caucasus and the post-Soviet space. Core narrative: "Pashinyan – discreditor of the Mother Church"; reproduces material framing the "anti-Russian course" as an attack on Armenian identity. Target audience: the Russian-speaking Armenian diaspora in Russia. • RBC (rbc.ru) – coverage of the Armenian agenda is systematically framed in an anti-Pashinyan register: emphasis on the Church conflict, economic losses from the "Western turn," and threats to Armenian business in Russia.

• RT (Russia Today) – global reach, broadcasting the narrative "The West is destroying Armenia" in English, French, and Arabic.

• TASS and RIA Novosti – official coverage of the anti-Armenian component of the EAEU summit in Astana (29–30 May), and promotion of the narrative around the demand for a referendum in Armenia.

• Lenta.ru – positive coverage of Samvel Karapetyan and the Tashir Group, constructing an image of Karapetyan as a "defender of Armenian interests" notwithstanding his criminal prosecution.

Affiliated resources:

• Caucasus Watch – presents itself as an analytical resource on the South Caucasus. Its editorial line consistently promotes narratives of "instability under Pashinyan" and "the risks of Western integration."

• SDA proxy platforms: Erevan.one – a documented covert Kremlin proxy platform, affiliated with the "Social Design Agency" (SDA) of Sofya Zakharova and Margarita Klimanova, one of the Kremlin's key FIMI contractors. Presents itself as an independent Armenian-language media outlet for the diaspora. Covers all of the campaign's target narrative directions. Promotes a set of radical narratives and tabloid headlines: "Pashinyan's party has turned into an organised criminal network," "Europe will turn its back on Armenia."

Armenian outlets with a pro-Russian agenda:

• Kentron.am (Kentron TV) – the television channel of Multi Media-Kentron TV CJSC. The legal owner is Sedrak Arustamyan, but it is de facto controlled by Gagik Tsarukyan (Prosperous Armenia). Pro-Russian agenda: covers and promotes opposition rallies, gives airtime to representatives of pro-Kremlin opposition parties, and covers the consequences of Russia's sanctions against Armenia.

• AlphaNews.am – a multilingual news portal launched in May 2023. Founder: Viktor Soghomonian, former head of the office of second President Robert Kocharyan. Presents itself as a "pan-Armenian platform on life in Armenia, Artsakh, and the diaspora." Systematically deploys anti-Western narratives and an anti-Pashinyan agenda: "the authorities against the Church," "loss of statehood," "surrender of lands to Azerbaijan." Audience: Facebook – 121,000; Instagram – 34,000; YouTube – 105,000.

• Ishkhanutyun.am – an Armenian-language news portal launched in 2025–26. Editor-in-chief: Liya Sargsyan. Editorial line: strongly anti-government, with an emphasis on kompromat and sensational headlines: "Pashinyan denies owning property in the UAE," "Why hasn't Pashinyan's loyal slave been dismissed," "My Catholicos is president." Actively inflates scandals around corruption, the police, and the conflict between the authorities and the Church. Social media presence: Facebook (@ishkhanutyun), Instagram (@ishkhanutyun_am), YouTube (@ishkhanutyun_am), TikTok (@ishkhanutyun), Telegram (@ishkanutyun).

• Artsakh.news – an online news portal covering Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). No direct formal connection to Russian structures has been established; in terms of content, it is an opposition resource critical of Yerevan, with a revanchist Karabakh agenda. Promotes pro-Russian narratives on Karabakh through emotionally charged content about the "lost homeland."

• Mamul.am – a news agency. Periodically reproduces narratives aligned with the Russian agenda on the Church and Karabakh.

• Armenia Daily (armeniadaily.org) – a propaganda outlet used as a seeding tool for high-impact disinformation stories. Publishes fabricated content, including allegations of Pashinyan's involvement in paedophilia scandals. Traffic is extremely low – approximately 1,500 visits per month, of which 15% come from Russia and 70% from Armenia. Actively produces kompromat for subsequent citation by higher-audience Telegram channels; the site's low traffic is offset by the viral spread of individual items through @ArmenianVendetta and similar channels.

Disinformation Networks On Telegram And Their Narratives

The core of the network is formed by channels with the highest reach and a clear editorial line:

• @anivarmenia (7,800–8,400 views) – the largest by reach; publishes analysis and news with anti-Western and anti-Pashinyan narratives.

• @sisumasis (4,500–5,200 views) operates as a news aggregator with narratives including “under Pashinyan everything will fall to Turkey” and “the country is occupied by Pashinyan”.

• @ArmenianVendetta (up to 12,000 views) – a high-engagement opposition channel oriented primarily at the diaspora.

The pro-Russian segment comprises several channels:

• @rusyerevantoday maintains a consistent pro-Russian editorial line with a high frequency of publications focused on criticism and kompromat against Pashinyan.

• @novosti24armenia promotes narratives about the Gyumri base as a security guarantee and the gas agreement, targeting a diaspora audience.

• @ArmAgr specialises in covering Russian economic pressure.

• @parallel95 operates at the intersection of Russia’s Ministry of Defence agenda and Sputnik, publishing analysis and digests.

• @MinaKhachatryanOfficial – a pro-Russian activist based in Moscow, providing opposition political commentary.

• @RodinaArm promotes the narrative of Armenia’s “historical bond” with Russia.

The revanchist Karabakh segment:

• @arcaxinfo and @moy_artsakh – both channels drive emotional mobilisation through the revanchist agenda, mutually reinforcing each other.

• @news7or provides rapid news coverage for an Armenian-language audience.

• @TsitsakBot – the network’s technical hub: a bot aggregator for automated narrative amplification without editorial filtering.

• Other minor relay channels: @azatagrum, @armsens, @abovyanarman, @ImHayastan.

Core Disinformation Narratives

• Gas blackmail – the threat to terminate the 2013 agreement is framed as a "response to Yerevan's betrayal."

• Military Base 102 in Gyumri as "protection" – Russian military presence is presented not as a threat but as a guarantee of the country's security.

• NATO and Western instructors – with references to WSJ and Der Spiegel, the claim that "Armenia is being drawn into a military alliance against Russia" is promoted.

• "Pashinyan is leading Armenia to war with Russia" – a continuation of the "Pashinyan–Macron deal" narrative, according to which France backs the Armenian Prime Minister in exchange for confrontation with Moscow.

• "Betrayed Karabakh" – revanchist mobilisation through anniversaries of losses and lists of the fallen.

• Economic collapse under the Western course – Russian bans on Armenian food imports and the fall in trade turnover are presented as the consequence of the pro-Western turn.

• Electoral falsification – the narrative was prepared in advance through polling manipulation and claims about "managed" results.

• "Russia – partner, West – threat" – nostalgia for the 2013 agreement; gas dependency is presented as "stability."

• Discrediting pro-Western media and NGOs – the "Western funding" narrative as an argument against pro-European media, amplified following the closure of USAID.

The #TellTheTruthSubscriber Campaign

In May 2026, a number of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels from Russia and Armenia joined forces in the #TellTheTruthSubscriber initiative, with the aim of collecting data on voting in Armenia for subsequent use in provocations. Participating channels included:

• External Enemy (@VneshniyVrag)

• Notes of an Armenian Officer (@hayspaigrarumner)

• Arman Abovyan (@abovyanarman)

• Armenia Sensations-Reconquista (@armsens)

• Neighbours | Greater Caucasus (@sosedikavkaz)

• ArtsakhInfo (@arcaxinfo)

• Parallel (@parallel95)

• Red Chapel (@RoteKapelle_bot)

• Tsitsak (@TsitsakBot).

Sources