Executive Summary
The European summits in Yerevan on 4-5 May provoked a sharply hostile response from Moscow: the Kremlin is threatening that Armenia's European orientation will have consequences comparable to those that followed Ukraine's European choice, while characterizing Volodymyr Zelensky's visit as an illustration of Yerevan's "anti-Russian course". In its efforts to prevent Armenia's definitive exit from its sphere of influence, Moscow is running an active campaign to delegitimize Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and other senior members of the Civil Contract party – with the aim of undermining the party's result in the June elections and derailing the further rapprochement between Yerevan and the EU.
An extensive disinformation campaign, coordinated across Kremlin-controlled media, official public figures, and the Telegram-ecosystem, took shape around the European Political Community summit on 4 May and the inaugural Armenia–EU summit, targeting Russian and Armenian audiences simultaneously.
During the period of 3–8 May, the Russian information space synchronously promoted the narrative that the Yerevan summits were part of a "geopolitical offensive by the collective West" aimed at displacing Russia from the South Caucasus. Within this framing, Armenia is cast as "a second Ukraine," a "springboard," and an instrument of anti-Russian policy that the West is using to exert pressure on Moscow – not as an independent actor in international affairs. Russia, presented as "the sole guarantor of security and stability" in the South Caucasus, is contrasted with a destructive EU and United States depicted as sources of regional destabilization and potential new conflict. The campaign placed particular emphasis on Volodymyr Zelensky's visit, describing him as Nikol Pashinyan's "personal guest" and accusing Yerevan of providing a platform for Zelensky's "anti-Russian statements" and "terrorist threats" on the eve of Victory Day – a charge that prompted even an official response: on 7 May, the Armenian ambassador was summoned (1) to the Russian Foreign Ministry and informed of "the unacceptability of providing a platform for the leader of the Kyiv Nazi regime."
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's European course is framed as a threat to Armenia's stability, security, and sovereignty. This narrative focus is corroborated by internal Kremlin documents (2): Moscow's primary objective is to turn Armenia's electoral campaign into a referendum on personal no-confidence in Nikol Pashinyan and to reduce Civil Contract's electoral result, by expanding the reach of controlled critical narratives to 3 million views per day (up from 1 million per day in autumn 2025) and growing a network of public figures loyal to the Kremlin's agenda to 40 individuals.
To this end, Moscow is actively exploiting fears and grievances within Armenian society: during the summit period, Kremlin-linked Telegram channels targeting domestic Armenian audiences were pushing narratives that a stronger European presence increases the risk of a new war and inevitable escalation by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and that European integration unambiguously threatens Armenia with the imposition of an LGBTQ+ agenda, "the destruction of traditional society," and the loss of cultural sovereignty.
Moscow's official response to the summits was sharply hostile: Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on 7 May accused (3) the EU of interfering in Armenia's internal affairs, invoking Ukraine as an illustration of what the European choice leads to:
"Let the citizens of Armenia see who Brussels considers the symbol of its 'successful' policy – a bloodstained neo-Nazi regime […] What a gift – to show the Armenian people Brussels's 'protégé', who has become the embodiment of what the EU does to 'young democracies'."
Vladimir Putin maintained (4) the same narrative in his statement on 9 May: "What we are now experiencing [with regard to Armenia] mirrors everything that happened on the Ukrainian front. And how did it start? With Ukraine's accession – or attempted accession – to the EU. […] All of that later led to a coup, to the Crimea situation, to the position of south-eastern Ukraine, and to armed conflict. That is what it all led to." In the statement, he put forward a proposal framed as a compromise – to hold a referendum on withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Community and on joining the EU. Should Moscow fail to undermine Civil Contract's result in the June parliamentary elections, such a referendum would evidently serve as the Kremlin's fallback opportunity to influence the country's strategic course.
Official Russian propaganda responded in the same register, this time in unison with the pro-war Z-community: on national television, Sunday prime-time news broadcasts described (5), (6) the summits as "a continental gathering of Russophobes" whose purpose was "to drive a wedge between Armenia and Russia." Narrative activity was simultaneously under way on political talk shows: the display (7) of a map of the South Caucasus featuring a separately marked "Nagorno-Karabakh" on Channel One's program Vremya Pokazhet ("Time Will Tell") prompted an official protest from Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry (8) – a move through which the Kremlin was simultaneously signaling, via propaganda, that alignment with Russia offers Armenia a prospect of reclaiming Karabakh, while putting pressure on a recalcitrant Baku by deliberately calling Azerbaijan's territorial integrity into question. Within the Z-community, these narratives were radicalized further: Z-propagandist Yuri Podolyaka declared outright that "Pashinyan's Armenia is not merely a non-ally of Russia – it is its systemic enemy" (9); narratives portraying Yerevan as ungrateful for Russia's economic and social support were circulated actively (10); and Z-military blogger Roman Alekhin called (11) for accepting the loss of Armenia as an ally, shifting to "pragmatic relations" with Yerevan, and – should Armenia "start threatening Russia in one way or another – we simply bomb it. And that's it."
Within the Armenian and Armenian-oriented Russian-language information space, a deepening split between anti-Russian and pro-Russian narratives is simultaneously under way. One group of commentators accuses Moscow of having "abandoned Armenia," pointing to the events of 2016, 2020, and 2022 and criticizing the CSTO and the Russian military presence. Another argues that breaking with Russia will turn Armenia into "a second Ukraine," make it an instrument of someone else's geopolitical conflict, and lead the country into a new war and the loss of statehood. In this environment, a segment of the Armenian opposition and its affiliated media ecosystem is effectively functioning as an infrastructure for Russian influence during the pre-election campaign.
An IRI international survey (12) (February 2026) points to the prevailing trend among Armenian citizens: 47% of respondents believe the country is moving in the right direction; the share of those who identify security and borders as the main problem has fallen (21%, down from 44% in summer 2025), while support for rapprochement and integration with the EU is growing. This provides important context: the summits and the symbolic consolidation of ties with Europe build on a shift already under way, as a growing proportion of Armenian citizens embrace a European future for their country — a trajectory the Kremlin is striving by every available means to reverse.
The Kremlin's Official Response: "Yerevan's Anti-Russian Course"
Moscow commented extensively on the summits in Armenia, focusing on "Yerevan's anti-Russian course" and "Russia's betrayal" – the principal voice being Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, whose briefing on 7 May set (13) the overarching narrative frame. She described the summit as a "political show" featuring "pompous speeches" and "Western travelling performers" whose purpose was "to draw Armenia ever further into the aggressive Euro-Atlantic standards and mechanisms that are alien to it."
Zakharova's central line was a critique of the Yerevan authorities' European choice, portrayed as benefiting neither ordinary Armenian citizens nor Armenia as a country: "The EU's formula is simple – 'squeeze every last drop' out of Armenia in the struggle against Russia, while giving nothing in return apart from PR stunts." She dwelt at particular length on what she presented as the catastrophic consequences of that choice for Armenia, illustrating them with the example of Ukraine and simultaneously criticizing the invitation extended to Volodymyr Zelensky to attend events in Yerevan: "Let the citizens of Armenia see who Brussels considers the symbol of its 'successful' policy – a bloodstained neo-Nazi regime […] What a gift – to show the Armenian people Brussels's 'protégé', who has become the embodiment of what the EU does to 'young democracies'." At the same time, against the backdrop of Moscow's extensive interference campaign in Armenia's electoral process, documented earlier by the EK Strategic Communications Center (14), Zakharova accused the EU of interfering in Armenia's internal affairs: "All of the above [the Yerevan summits] is the attractive packaging that Brussels, Paris, and other EU figures are trying to 'sell' during Armenia's pre-election period. EU officials have again announced that Yerevan can 'count on them' when it comes to conducting the upcoming electoral campaign."
The Foreign Ministry as an institution operated more in the background – through official statements that were then amplified by state and affiliated media. In early May, Sergei Lavrov's public line on the summit was virtually absent, and the Foreign Ministry's information posture was built almost entirely around Zakharova's statements, which were actively disseminated by Russian propaganda outlets: RIA Novosti, Vzglyad, Parlamentskaya Gazeta, Sputnik, International Affairs, and others.
The significance of the issue for the Kremlin is underscored by the fact that Vladimir Putin himself commented (15) on the situation in Armenia in detail during a press conference on 9 May. He continued to advance the narrative Zakharova had articulated earlier – that the European choice will lead to catastrophic consequences: "What we are now experiencing [with regard to Armenia] mirrors everything that happened on the Ukrainian front. And how did it start? With Ukraine's accession – or attempted accession – to the EU. […] All of that later led to a coup, to the Crimea situation, to the position of south-eastern Ukraine, and to armed conflict. That is what it all led to. This is a serious matter." As he had done during Nikol Pashinyan's state visit to Moscow, Putin again deployed the argument that Armenia's simultaneous membership of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Community is incompatible, given that Armenia "derives significant advantages from the latter: trade turnover with Russia in 2025 stood at USD 7 billion, against a GDP of USD 29 billion." Apparently allowing for the possibility that Moscow's interference campaign in Armenia's June parliamentary elections might fail and that pro-Russian forces might be defeated, he proposed holding a referendum in Armenia on withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Community and joining the EU – the mechanics of a referendum would allow the Kremlin to mount a more effective interference campaign than is possible in the current pre-election contest, which involves many domestic actors, interest groups, and individual voter preferences.
The Russian Media And Z-Community Campaign: "Armenia Is No Longer An Ally – It Is An Enemy"
The Russian media campaign in response to the summits in Armenia was extensive and strikingly uniform in its narratives. It was directed at three audiences simultaneously: domestic Russian, Armenian, and external – primarily European and Western. Three overarching narratives can be identified, from which subsidiary arguments were developed:
● "Armenia has betrayed Russia, and there will be consequences" (16): the summits are overtly anti-Russian and Russophobic in character; Yerevan has betrayed its ally and proven ungrateful; this undermines Russia's security and damages its interests.
● "The West will exploit Armenia for its own ends" (17): the EU is a colonizer that will squeeze Armenia dry; Europe has fed Yerevan empty promises and will deliver nothing; Armenia is being made into a springboard against Russia and a second Ukraine, drawn into war as expendable material.
● "Nikol Pashinyan has betrayed the country's interests and is leading it to ruin" (18).
The Armenia issue broke through to the national federal agenda immediately following Putin's prime-time appearance on state television. On 10 May, Sunday news programs on the national channels Channel One (19) and Rossiya (20) broadcast coverage in which the European Political Community summit was directly characterized as "a continental gathering of Russophobes" and "an anti-Russian debating club," with its "leitmotif" described as a drive "to drive a wedge between Armenia and Russia." In doing so, narratives that had previously circulated primarily in Telegram channels and Foreign Ministry official statements were legitimized and broadcast to a mass domestic Russian audience.
The propaganda effort's intensive promotion of key narratives even triggered a diplomatic incident: Channel One's national program Vremya Pokazhet ("Time Will Tell") (21) hosted a discussion of the deterioration in Moscow–Yerevan relations and the possibility of a "second front" opening against Russia in the Caucasus, and displayed a map of the region with a separately marked "Nagorno-Karabakh." This prompted an official protest from Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry (22), which described the presentation as a political provocation and an act of manipulation – the Kremlin unquestionably ordered Karabakh to be kept on the map both as a rebuke to a recalcitrant Baku and as a signal that alignment with Russia offers Armenia a prospect of reclaiming Karabakh. Russian official representatives, including the Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin, nonetheless confined their public rhetoric to "Yerevan's anti-Russian line," "violations of allied obligations," and "distancing from Russia," without directly setting Baku and Yerevan against each other or raising the sensitive Karabakh issue by name.
Within the Z-community of pro-war bloggers on Telegram, a fairly unified propaganda line has formed around the Armenia issue, in which Armenia under Nikol Pashinyan's government is progressively stripped of the status of "ally" and reclassified as an ungrateful and potentially hostile state that is allegedly "betraying" Russia in favor of France, the EU, and Ukraine. Along these lines, individual authors – among them Z-propagandist Yuri Podolyaka – have stated outright that "Pashinyan's Armenia is not merely a non-ally of Russia – it is its systemic enemy," (23) cementing the shift from political criticism to existential opposition. The "betrayal" and ingratitude narrative is reinforced through economic and social arguments: even the Putin-critical Z-channel Alex Parker Returns reproduces a schema in which Russia allegedly provides Armenia with economic benefits and social support, only to receive in return a political pivot by Yerevan towards France and the EU (24). The Yerevan summits are described in this logic as a demonstrative "pivot of gratitude." The Russian Foreign Ministry's line is also actively integrated into the Telegram space: official talking points about "broken promises" and "anti-Russian positioning" are repackaged in more emotionally charged language along the lines of "so much for doing good to your allies," (25) amplifying among audiences the effect of personalized grievance and a sense of betrayal. The channels of leading propagandist Vladimir Solovyov (26) and Z-volunteer Aleksei Zhivov (27) regularly reproduce, in news-feed fashion, the campaign's key signals: Pashinyan's refusal to attend the Victory Day parade on 9 May, statements distancing Armenia from the war in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky's visit to Yerevan, and Emmanuel Macron's rhetoric about expanding the European presence. These elements cohere into a stable narrative of "the rupture of the allied bond."
A distinct marker of radicalization is the shift in some commentary towards scenarios involving the use of force. Analytical pieces by Z-military blogger Roman Alekhin (28), (29) discuss the idea of formally acknowledging the loss of Armenia as an ally, winding down institutional ties, and shifting to "pragmatic relations". Several formulations go further, allowing for the use of force in the event of a threat to Russia's interests – a move that takes the discussion from the political plane into explicitly militarized rhetoric.
Disinformation Directed At Armenia: "Foreign Values And The Threat Of A New War"
In Armenian and related Russian-language Telegram channels coordinated by Kremlin-linked structures, a steady stream of disinformation and manipulative messaging has taken shape, embedding the EU summit and Armenia's broader European course within a wider frame of security threat and loss of sovereignty. The main thematic lines directed at the domestic audience are as follows:
● Security and the risk of war. One of the central themes is the persistent invocation of the threat of a new war. Scenarios of a "second front," Armenian border vulnerability, and the inevitability of escalation by Azerbaijan and Turkey are actively promoted. Within this context, the Yerevan summit and the growing European presence are interpreted not as a diplomatic process but as a factor increasing the probability of conflict and Armenia's involvement in a regional war (30), (31), (32).
● Delegitimization through cultural and normative themes. A separate and persistent strand is an attack on the very fact of the European presence through the theme of "traditional values." A number of channels are circulating claims that an LGBTQ+ agenda and the "destruction of traditional society" are being imposed on Armenia in the context of European integration. This strand has proved one of the most viral in the Telegram environment and is being actively disseminated in the form of emotionally charged posts and visual content (33), (34), (35).