Executive Summary
On October 3, Ukrainian drones for the first time struck Russia’s largest oil refinery in the Orenburg region — Orsknefteorgsintez, which supplies fuel to the Urals and the Volga. The strike was notable for several reasons: it hit a target located 1,400 km from the front (if the drones routed around Kazakhstan, the distance exceeded 1,700 km), underscoring the vulnerability of Russia’s deep rear. On the same day, long lines formed at gas stations in Orsk: locals reported that some stations had only one pump operating, and some only accepted cash. Thus, a military strike instantly morphed into a social crisis at the local level, amplifying public anxiety.
This episode fit into a broader trend: since January 2025, Ukrainian drones and industrial accidents have damaged 22 refineries, with a total of 48 major incidents recorded. The combined capacity of affected plants is estimated at 180 million tons per year — more than half of Russia’s entire refining output (270–310 million tons). According to Siala agency, 38% of primary refining capacity — around 338,000 tons per day — is offline, with roughly 70% of that downtime linked directly to attacks. Southern Russia, the Volga region, annexed Crimea, and the Far East have been hit hardest, where gasoline shortages have escalated into systemic crises: by late September, nearly all fuel had disappeared from Crimea, and in Primorsky Krai the price of AI-95 fuel exceeded 100,000 rubles per ton (+30% over the summer). These facts indicate that even with a nominal safety margin, the system is being steadily depleted, and each new strike lengthens recovery times.
The Kremlin and regional governors project calming narratives, avoiding explicit links between the crisis and strikes on refineries. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted that “the government is taking the necessary measures,” while Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak assured that “the situation is absolutely under control, supply and demand are balanced.” Regional authorities cited “panic buying” and “seasonal demand growth.” Yet their actual moves — banning gasoline exports, negotiating imports from China, South Korea, and Singapore, arranging a sevenfold increase in supplies from Belarus, and even proposing to reauthorize the toxic additive monomethyl aniline (MMA — an octane booster banned in 2016 under EU-aligned standards) — show that the situation is exceptional and requires emergency measures.
Russians increasingly see the crisis as a warning signal. According to state-run Public Opinion Foundation polling on September 28, among all non-food products, gasoline ranked first for reported price increases — 39% of respondents noted it had become more expensive. Street interviews by independent outlet Sotavision confirmed that many directly link rising prices to the continuation of the war, despite propaganda efforts. On regional social media, including Kremlin-controlled VKontakte, thousands of users angrily posted: “What is going on? Why is gasoline so expensive and when will this end?”
The Kremlin responded with a large-scale online campaign: more than 550 trolls left over 1,300 comments under 381 posts, explaining the crisis as “plant modernization,” “rising global prices,” or blaming Ukraine for refinery strikes. Yet officials themselves admit that “panic buying” drives people to purchase more fuel, accelerating price growth and turning social discontent into an economic factor.
The Kremlin’s information campaign shows clear cracks. Official spokesmen and state-controlled media emphasize Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, while staying silent on domestic fuel shortages. Meanwhile, pro- war Z-channels openly criticize the government for impotence: “There is no deep rear in modern war,” wrote the channel Starshie Eddyi. The channel Two Majors added:
“Responsibility is blurred, and there will be no adequate measures.” Thus, the gasoline crisis has emerged as a point of vulnerability for the Kremlin on three levels at once: economic, social, and military. If Ukraine retains the resources to sustain its strikes, the cumulative effect will build — and the situation risks spinning out of control."
Unprecedented Scale of Strikes and Consequences
In 2025, Ukrainian drones and industrial accidents have already affected 22 oil refineries (ORs) in Russia. Since January, a total of 48 major incidents have been recorded in the sector — drone strikes, fires, and accidents. The combined capacity of the affected plants is estimated at 180 million tons per year, which is more than half of Russia’s total refining output (270–310 million tons). The most frequently targeted facilities were the Volgograd refinery (6 incidents), Ryazan (5), Afipsky, Novokuibyshevsk, and Syzran (4 each). The geography of incidents shows particular vulnerability in the south: 13 strikes and accidents occurred in southern Russia, 12 in the Volga region, 7 in Central Russia, 3 in Bashkortostan, and 2 in the North. Other regions, including the Northwest, the Far East, and the Urals, reported only isolated cases. Thus, the main blow fell on clusters supplying the domestic market and agricultural regions, directly worsening the fuel crisis and turning it into a systemic problem.
According to Siala agency, “38% of Russia’s primary oil refining capacity is idle — around 338,000 tons per day.” About 70% of this downtime is linked specifically to drone strikes. For comparison, in August 2022 the figure stood at 196,000 tons. This difference highlights the unprecedented scale of the gasoline crisis. A key feature has been the high frequency of repeated attacks. For example, the Volgograd refinery was attacked four times in August–September alone, while the Novokuibyshevsk refinery was hit three times in one month. In September, the Kirishi refinery (Kinef), Russia’s second-largest by capacity (20 million tons per year), came under strike. This demonstrates that even the most strategically important facilities are not shielded from systematic attacks. As a result, the hardest-hit regions are those where refining capacity is concentrated: the Volga region (Samara, Saratov, and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts), southern Russia (Krasnodar and Rostov regions), as well as annexed Crimea and the Far East. The Kremlin-aligned Kommersant reported that the number of functioning gas stations in southern Russia dropped 14% since July, while in annexed Crimea the figure fell by 50%. Thus, refinery strikes are directly transforming into social and regional crises.
The first alarming indicators appeared in annexed Crimea and the Far East. In Crimea, shortages of AI-95 gasoline emerged as early as mid-August, and by late September all other fuel supplies had disappeared. Residents created online chats sharing the locations of the few operating gas stations. “What Crimeans feared has happened. There is no gasoline at stations, many are shutting down to avoid paying staff wages. The unfolding fuel collapse has hit both ordinary people and businesses,” a local activist reported.
This shows how quickly the crisis has acquired a social dimension: gasoline has become not only an economic factor but a part of everyday survival. Authorities in the annexed republic attempted to calm panic. Its “head” Sergey Aksyonov claimed: “Within two days gas stations will be supplied with AI-95, and within two weeks with AI-92.” But by September 29 he was forced to impose rationing — no more than 30 liters per car. In other words, the initial promises failed, and the measures came too late.
Similar stories unfolded in the Volga and Central Russia. In Nizhny Novgorod region, the price of AI-95 jumped from 59 to 88 rubles per liter ($0.61 to $0.92) in just one week. One resident complained: “My wife is nine months pregnant. There is no maternity ward in our town, we have to travel 80 km to Arzamas, but we don’t have enough fuel to get there.” In the Far East, the crisis was exacerbated by repairs at the Khabarovsk refinery. In Primorsky Krai, according to exchange data, the price of AI-95 exceeded 100,000 rubles per ton (+30% over the summer).
Soothing Propaganda Narratives and Emergency Measures by the Authorities
Regional governors largely offered terse comments on the unfolding crisis. Even when acknowledging drone attacks, they avoided naming specific facilities or directly linking the shortages to strikes on oil refineries (NPZs). Most statements framed the issue as a matter of rising gasoline prices, described in a restrained and reassuring tone. A notable exception was the reaction of the “governor” of annexed Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, who blamed the situation on “panic”: “Gasoline is being delivered nonstop, but because of panic at gas stations we cannot yet reach normal operating levels.” By October 2 he was already reporting price stabilization. Also telling was the statement from Alexander Khinshtein, governor of the border Kursk region, who said he had submitted an “urgent request” to the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) to monitor prices: “The federal center is taking the necessary measures to stabilize the situation.” In Penza region, governor Oleg Melnichenko attributed shortages to “logistical issues due to seasonal demand increases.” In Khabarovsk region in the Far East, governor Dmitry Demeshin said the crisis had arisen because private gas stations were unable to purchase fuel on the exchange: “I am keeping the fuel crisis in Vaninsky and Sovetskaya Gavan districts under my personal control.”
National authorities projected similar calming narratives. Presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated: “The government is taking the necessary measures. Issues arise in some places. Here we should focus on what Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak has said as the key overseer of this sector.” At the Kremlin’s Valdai Club, Novak emphasized: “The situation is absolutely under control. The Ministry of Energy is actively working with all regions in a command-center mode. Overall, supply and demand across the country are balanced.”
Major national propaganda outlets covered the story through the prism of government action and ministerial statements, almost completely decoupling it from the refinery strikes. Reports were built around official quotes and stressed that the problems were “local” and “temporary.” The Kremlin clearly sought to avoid any causal link between rising prices, fuel shortages, and the war, framing everything as a manageable disruption. This narrative emerged against the backdrop of declining public support for the war, as reflected in recent polling data.
Yet the actions of the federal authorities themselves underscore the unprecedented nature of the crisis. Since September 21, the government has imposed a ban on gasoline exports and opened negotiations on imports from China, South Korea, and Singapore. Kommersant reported that duties on the Far East would be reduced to zero, while up to 150,000 tons of fuel per month from Siberian refineries would be redirected to western regions. Belarus pledged to increase deliveries from 45,000 tons in September to 300,000 tons. However, these steps are largely reactive and do not resolve the core problem — the vulnerability of Russian refineries to attacks.
Amid shortages, the government took a controversial step: Deputy Prime Minister Novak proposed temporarily allowing the use of monomethylaniline (MMA) — an octane-boosting additive banned in 2016 during the transition to European environmental standards. The measure is expected to add about 50,000 tons of gasoline per month. Yet the Ministry of Energy had previously acknowledged that “MMA negatively affects gasoline, vehicle engines, and the environment.” In effect, the authorities are reverting to a toxic practice simply to “plug the hole” in the crisis. This highlights the extreme pressure on the system, where short-term fixes are being prioritized despite long-term costs.
The Kremlin’s Military Response, Trolls, and the Anger of Z-Authors
Kremlin trolls on the state-controlled social network VKontakte pushed divergent narratives. In just the first week of October, more than 550 such accounts posted over 1,300 comments under 381 posts mentioning fuel shortages and rising gasoline prices. Unlike in earlier campaigns, this time the bots did not follow a single script: some wrote that “there is no shortage at all,” others admitted prices were rising but quickly added — “the market is being monitored, and everything will be fine.” Some trolls explained the crisis as the result of “modernization of oil refineries (NPZs)”: “Prices are rising now because investments in refinery modernization are driving them up.” Others shifted blame to global energy markets: “And that’s normal, in my view.” Still others tailored their responses to a military audience and directly accused Ukraine: “It’s all the Khokhols’ fault, they’re hitting our refineries because they can’t do anything to us at the front.”
National propaganda outlets operated with more caution. They shifted the focus away from Russia’s domestic crisis to strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. For example, in the evening news broadcast on the national propaganda outlet Channel One on October 3, the lead story was about strikes “on Ukraine’s rear areas,” presented as a successful military action. The mass attacks on Russian refineries went entirely unmentioned: the Kremlin preferred to highlight only its own “successes” while concealing domestic vulnerabilities.
On the night of October 3, Russia launched its largest attack on Ukraine’s gas infrastructure since the start of the war. According to the state-owned company Naftogaz, 35 missiles and 60 drones were fired at sites in Kharkiv and Poltava regions. “This is deliberate terror aimed at disrupting the heating season,” said company head Serhiy Koretsky. Ukraine’s Air Force reported: “There were 18 missile and 78 drone hits across 15 locations.” Russia’s Ministry of Defense, in turn, claimed “all targets” — defense industry sites and gas infrastructure — had been destroyed. Yet even these massive strikes did not reduce frustration within Russia’s radical pro-war community. The so-called Z-authors — pro-war Telegram channels — have become increasingly critical of the government’s impotence. The October 3 strike on distant Orenburg region was especially painful for them: Ukrainian drones attacked the Orsknefteorgsintez plant, which processes nearly 6 million tons of oil annually and supplies fuel to the Urals and Volga. The facility is located 1,400 km from the front line; if the drones circled through Kazakhstan, their route exceeded 1,700 km. Here, radical authors unleashed their anger at the weakness of Russia’s air defenses (PVO). The large pro-war Z-channel Starshie Eddyi wrote: “There is no deep rear in modern war, and air defense, PVO systems, MOGs, and most importantly — the responsible comrades — being 1,000+ km from the line of contact, shouldn’t be scratching their balls but maintaining constant combat readiness. Now [the Ukrainians] are happily posting videos filmed by idiotic Orsk residents capturing the strike from every angle.” Another large pro-war channel, Dva Mayora, summed it up:
“The problem will persist (or even worsen) until there is a specific responsible individual or agency accountable for breaches in our PVO by Ukrainian flying contraptions. Responsibility is ‘smeared,’ meaning no one is accountable and no adequate measures will be taken. Moreover, this tactic by the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been endorsed by Trump, so adored by our journalists, and Zelensky explicitly describes this strategy of economic damage as military doctrine.”
While official propaganda insists everything is “under control,” the radical patriotic segment sees Russia’s infrastructure as vulnerable and leadership as unaccountable.