For several decades, Russia has consistently built up its media presence in the Spanish-speaking world, viewing Latin America as a key direction of its information policy. As early as 2009, the television channel RT en Español was launched; by 2018, its 24-hour broadcasting reached up to 18 million viewers, while RT’s Spanish-language accounts had gathered more than 25 million followers, allowing Moscow to establish itself in the regional media environment as an “alternative” source of news and interpretations of international affairs. At the same time, the Kremlin invested in a network of local partners and retransmitters: regional television channels across Latin America incorporated RT packages, and certain stations received official authorization to use their frequencies and digital platforms for the multiplatform promotion of pro-Russian content.
After 2022, amid sanctions and restrictions imposed on RT and Sputnik in a number of jurisdictions, the Spanish-language influence infrastructure was reoriented from overtly state-run channels to a hybrid network of “alternative” media outlets and personal brands. Around the RED projects (Canal Red, Diario Red, La Base) and associated figures such as Inna Afinogenova, an ecosystem has taken shape that, through YouTube, TikTok, Telegram, regional television channels, and online portals, scales Kremlin narratives across Latin America — from anti-Americanism and anti-NATO rhetoric to the promotion of the idea of a “multipolar world” and support for friendly left-wing populist forces. As a result, Russia has not curtailed its campaigns but has shifted them into less visible, more flexible formats aimed at the long-term shaping of a worldview favorable to the Kremlin and at influencing political processes in the region.
Circles of Influence of Kremlin's propaganda
Russia structures its presence in the region unevenly, forming several “rings” of influence depending on the level of political loyalty and the degree of media penetration. In some countries, Russian entities maintain physical offices and enjoy almost unrestricted access to audiences; in others, they are limited to cable packages and online distribution as just one of many sources of information.
This multi-layered architecture allows the Kremlin to combine direct RT broadcasting with a network of local partners, retransmitters, and affiliated projects, expanding its reach where the political climate is favorable and maintaining a baseline presence where conditions are less comfortable. Such a model makes propaganda more resilient to blocking measures and enables the rapid expansion of influence in individual Latin American countries as domestic circumstances evolve.
Propaganda ecosystem
The Russian propaganda ecosystem in Latin America is not a single television channel but an interconnected network of platforms, each of which picks up and amplifies the same narratives. RT en Español provides “official” television and online content with a multimillion audience, Telegram channels such as Rybar and numerous Spanish-language retransmitters turn this content into a constant stream of posts and memes, and the network of “Pravda” websites publishes thousands of articles, disguising reprints of RT and Sputnik materials as supposedly local or “alternative” media outlets. At the same time, Russian embassies and diplomats engage with local media and social networks, repeating the same talking points — from accusing NATO of provoking the war to portraying Russia as a defender of the “Global South.” In Mexico, for example, the ambassador used an interview with the popular blogger El Chapucero to boast about the growth of RT’s audience following an advertising campaign in the metro, while in Chile and other countries pro-Kremlin outlets such as Pressenza and El Ciudadano took part in coordinated campaigns, amplifying content from Russian sources through local formats and language.
In this complex structure, more than 100 channels cited by the Pravda Project network are involved, drawing content from around 1,200 other Telegram channels. Among the most widely redistributed sources: Sputnik Mundo, TASS, Rybar.18.2% of mentions and forwards occur within this core group of 100 channels, and 10% of their content ends up on Pravda Project websites. These channels form a multi-layered structure: some act as aggregators (collecting content from hundreds of other channels), others create original content, and a third group rapidly pushes this material onto Pravda sites, creating the illusion of numerous independent sources. The following list outlines the core Spanish-language Telegram channels with the largest reach within the military–geopolitical segment of this networked structure:
Rybar ES @rybaresp – Spanish version of the major Russian military channel Rybar (over 1 million subscribers in the Russian version), run by Mikhail Zvinchuk. The U.S. is accused of interfering in elections;
Los Sombreros Blancos [Z] @ophiucu – one of the most active Spanish-language channels, with strong links to “Ucraniando” and other pro-Kremlin channels;
Ucraniando @ucraniando – specializes in military topics in Russia’s favor;
NUEVO ORDEN MUNDIAL @nuevo_orden_mundial_canal – one of the most frequently cited channels in the Pravda network, publishes radically left-wing geopolitical content;
La Trinchera Del Che @Latrincheradelche – receives content from “Los Sombreros Blancos [Z]” and “Ucraniando”;
Irina 🇷🇺 @Irinamar_Z – a powerful aggregator; 41.4% of its posts come from “El Ojo Noticias”, with more than 1,500 messages between them;
El Ojo Noticias @elOJOen – a key hub for content distribution;
InfoDefense ESPANOL @infodefSPAIN – Spanish-language version of the Info Defense project, a volunteer network run by Kremlin blogger Yurii Podoliaka;
ROKOT | TORMENTA @AnastasMi – Spanish-language version of “Surf Noise”;
Guerras y Geopolítica @guerrasygeop – a channel with branches into three more channels of the same name, focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine; TASS - Agencia rusa de noticias @tass_es – Spanish-language version of the Russian state news agency TASS.
Inna Afinogenova as Propaganda Case
Inna Afinogenova illustrates how Kremlin-linked media figures are relaunched in a more flexible format after leaving official state outlets. A former star presenter and deputy editor-in-chief of the RT en Español website, she formally “parted ways” with RT in 2022 but quickly returned to the Spanish-language information space as a supposedly independent journalist and host of left-wing populist projects. After leaving RT en Español in spring 2022, Inna Afinogenova launched her own YouTube channel, where she publishes political commentary, excerpts from La Base and Macondo, as well as her own original videos. First through her own YouTube and Telegram channels, and later via La Base and Canal Red Latinoamérica, Afinogenova relocated her activities to Mexico, where she became a local face of Russian propaganda, adapting familiar Kremlin narratives to the Mexican and broader Latin American context. YouTube ▶ Founded: May 2, 2022 ▶ Subscribers: 687,000 | Videos: 400 | Views: 59+ million
Instagram ▶ Launched: April 2024 ▶ Followers: 278,000 X (Twitter) ▶ Followers: 397,000 Telegram ▶ Subscribers: 15,000 The core audience is concentrated in Spain and across key Latin American countries – Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela – indicating a deliberate focus on Spanish-speaking political environments with existing sensitivities toward U.S. and European influence. The content consistently centers on criticism of NATO, the European Union, and the United States, while amplifying radical left-wing “anti-colonial” narratives that frame global politics through the lens of Western domination, sovereignty, and historical grievance.
Kremlin's narratives
The Kremlin systematically adapts its propaganda narratives to the specific experiences and contexts of different countries. The narratives of Canal Red and Inna Afinogenova in Mexico (2024–2025) serve as a crucial example of how Kremlin-aligned messaging is adapted to the local political context.
"The U.S. oppresses Mexico". The United States is Mexico’s main enemy. From the war of 1847 to present-day interventions, it has always suppressed Mexico. All of Mexico’s problems stem from its dependence on the U.S., and the country must break free.
"The American threat is growing". Soon the U.S. could invade under the pretext of fighting drug cartels. Washington uses the border as a tool of pressure. Mexico cannot trust the United States.
"NATO as the cause of wars". NATO started the war in Ukraine and interferes in the affairs of other countries. The alliance represents a threat to global peace, and Latin America should keep its distance.
"Spain as a modern colonizer". Spain continues to behave like an empire. The Mexican government was right to refuse to invite the Spanish king. Europe exploits Latin America. "A new world order without the West". Mexico should align itself with Russia, China, and BRICS countries. The West has lost its moral authority to teach others. The time has come to build an independent, multipolar world.
"The opposition as U.S. puppets". Politicians and journalists who criticize Mexico’s ruling Morena party are working for U.S. and Western interests. The real “free press” is represented by alternative channels like Canal Red. "A new world order without the West". Mexico should align itself with Russia, China, and BRICS countries. The West has lost its moral authority to teach others. The time has come to build an independent, multipolar world.
"Morena and the Fourth Transformation as the true alternative". The governments of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Claudia Sheinbaum are the voice of the people. Only they fight for sovereignty and justice; all others are enemies of change.
Taken together, these elements demonstrate that Russia’s information strategy in Latin America is not episodic but systemic: it combines state media, quasi-independent platforms, personal brands, diplomatic channels, and digital amplification networks into a resilient and adaptive ecosystem. By embedding its narratives within local political debates – from anti-American sentiment and anti-colonial discourse to support for specific political forces – the Kremlin seeks not merely to shape media agendas, but to gradually influence perceptions of sovereignty, alliances, and global order. In doing so, it positions itself as a legitimate partner of the region while simultaneously weakening trust in Western institutions and democratic norms.