Kremlin's Hardline vs. Rising Peace Demand and Z-disillusionment

What Happened

Record peace support contrasts with Kremlin’s increasingly intransigent stance

According to data collected by the Levada Center in February–March 2026, 67% of Russians currently support initiating peace negotiations – a record high and a six-point increase over the previous month (with Russian Field reporting 53% in favor). Conversely, public support for continuing the conflict has declined to 24%, the lowest level recorded to date. Engagement with the conflict has also diminished, as only 44% report paying close attention.

Furthermore, 83% of respondents indicated they would support President Putin if he were to sign a peace agreement, while opposition has decreased to a historic low of 12%.

Despite these trends, the Kremlin continues to steadily escalate its rhetoric. On March 11, spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow no longer considers itself bound by the framework set forth in Istanbul in 2022 regarding peace talks with Ukraine, citing substantially altered circumstances. This position represents a shift from prior statements by Putin and Lavrov, who had previously asserted that any resolution must derive from the Istanbul agreements.

State media have emphasized that these agreements are now considered outdated, referencing external factors – including the conflict in Iran and rising oil prices – as reasons suggesting that current conditions may be more advantageous for Russia than for the United States.

Against the backdrop of growing contrast between public demand and the Kremlin’s aggressive policy, the authorities continue tightening censorship and targeting the last relatively independent sources of information in Russia, such as Telegram, with announcements of its possible blocking becoming almost daily.

Z-community disillusionment intensifies over rhetoric–reality gap

Meanwhile, pro-war bloggers are becoming increasingly vocal about the growing discrepancy between officially exaggerated narratives of Russian success and the reality on the battlefield. Their narratives suggest that Russia is fighting as if it were only a few steps from a ceasefire, although no ceasefire is in sight.

With spring approaching, pro-war commentators also warn that Ukrainian and Anglo-American headquarters may be preparing another surprise similar to the Kharkiv–Kupiansk operation.

Anxiety has factual basis: Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces regained 460 sq km, while ISW estimates 257 sq km and notes that counterattacks could disrupt Russia's spring–summer 2026 offensive. In the last two weeks of February, Ukraine liberated more territory than it lost – the first time since the 2023 counteroffensive.

Z-authors increasingly frame their critique not only as dissatisfaction with official rhetoric but as criticism of the war management system. Even Putin’s heroic storyline (a 21-year-old contract soldier who reportedly held a position alone for 68 days near Grishino and was awarded Hero of Russia) triggered critical reactions. As one popular pro-war channel, DShRG Rusich, asks: “How did a fighter end up alone at a position for two months? Which officials bear criminal responsibility?”

Bryansk strike highlights ongoing war and air defense lapses

The attack on Russia's Kremniy El plant, a crucial microelectronics producer for military systems, resulted in seven deaths and 42 injuries. To shift attention away from the fact that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory remain possible five years into the war, the Kremlin continues to promote the narrative that it is fighting not Ukraine, but Britain and the entire West.

The Foreign Ministry claims Western capitals aim to provoke escalation and undermine peace. Public commentators also question the effectiveness of Russia's responses, with criticism directed at inadequate air defense for vital infrastructure and frustration over official narratives.

U.S. engagement is sustained primarily for tactical advantage rather than indicating a strategic realignment

On March 10, President Trump and President Putin engaged in their first call since late last year. On March 11, Dmitriev held discussions in Florida with Witkoff, Kushner, and Grunbaum.

On March 12, Dmitriev stated that “numerous countries – most notably the United States – are beginning to better appreciate the critical, system-forming role of Russian oil and gas in maintaining global economic stability, while also recognizing the inefficiency and detrimental impact of sanctions imposed on Russia”.

These engagements appear to be efforts to leverage potential economic agreements or concessions – particularly in the energy sector – to reinforce Russian positions, rather than signalling a willingness to alter policy direction. Impact immediate: Politico sources report Russian advance pace "noticeably slowed" within 48 hours; Ukraine's General Staff source says "in some sectors, assaults stopped altogether"—Russian troops like "blind kittens." Z-space consensus: no viable alternatives exist. Voennyi Osvedomitel mocks: "Fighting NATO while relying on NATO satellite internet—and not developing alternatives—is a so-so idea." Drone developer Chadaev blames "Collective Leadership" being "repulsed by horizontal ties." Z-authors recall generals imprisoned for theft in military communications projects.

Assassination attempt on GRU general exposes security failures and internal rifts. February 6: Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev (GRU First Deputy Chief, reports to Admiral Kostyukov who leads Russia's negotiation delegation) targeted in Moscow—fourth rear-area assassination attempt on general since invasion began. Lavrov blames "Zelensky regime," but Ukraine didn't claim responsibility and Washington Post reports Western intelligence doubts Kyiv involvement. Pro-Kremlin insider channel "Provisional Government 2.0" suggests internal security-services infighting: Alekseyev became key coordinator of PMC Redut, Storm Z, Volunteer Corps after Wagner's destruction—"irritated parts of military/security establishment." His "Española" unit dismantled fall 2025; its leader died under unclear circumstances. Channel notes: "Both Shoigu and FSB services have resources for such actions"—any operation easily blamed on "Ukrainian hitmen." Z-volunteer Rudenko: "Slap in the face to our special services... reputational losses." Two Majors: "Officers safer in Bakhmut than Moscow... no security detail, live in ordinary apartments."

Why it Matters

Despite falling public support, the regime maintains its aggressive stance, even as attention to the conflict fades. The Kremlin has toughened its position, dismissing calls for de-escalation and shifting away from past negotiation frameworks.

It now relies on adversary fatigue instead of military advances, intensifying the divide between demands for peace and pro-war frustration, but continues its confrontational policies. With the 2026 Duma elections approaching, authorities are preparing to significantly reduce war messaging due to negative public perceptions.

Z-disillusionment highlights failures in Russia's war management system that the regime cannot admit. Pro-war writers criticise the Defense Ministry for optimistic briefings that don't match reality, raising concerns over further setbacks like Kharkiv–Kupiansk or Kursk.

Ukraine's recent territorial gains intensify these anxieties. They suggest Russia cannot acknowledge failures to its ultranationalist base or produce victory for the wider public. The Bryansk strike exposed air defense weaknesses and led the Z-community to question government priorities.

Conclusions

Key vulnerabilities: