Kremlin's Soft Power Offensive: New Strategy for Diaspora and Foreign Influence

Executive Summary

Kremlin centralizes soft power under Kiriyenko in major reorganization. In August 2025, Putin dissolved directorate overseeing foreign cultural cooperation (led by Dmitry Kozak) and transferred control to a new Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation under Sergey Kiriyenko. This institutionally elevated soft power operations to a centralized Presidential Administration project. Kiriyenko now simultaneously controls five directorates, consolidating authority over Russia's influence apparatus. The reorganization followed an internal campaign portraying Kozak as insufficiently supportive of the war — signaling that soft power is now fully subordinated to wartime political objectives.

The Institute for International Studies at MGIMO produced a confidential document, “Prospects for engagement with representatives of the Russian diaspora under current geopolitical conditions,” authored by Yevgeny Kozhokin (a MGIMO staff member and former commander of Military Unit 61360 of the Foreign Intelligence Service/SVR). Addressed to the Presidential Administration's directorate led by Vadim Titov, the report offers practical policy recommendations for engaging Russian expatriates and foreign nationals interested in Russia.

It describes a structured Kremlin strategy that categorizes targets into four groups:

Group I—Loyalists: Russians abroad who "preserve Russian identity and counter Russophobia." Engagement through Orthodox churches, Sunday schools (explicitly apolitical), cultural events (Immortal Regiment, St. George Ribbon), and Rossotrudnichestvo's "Russian Houses." This is the primary focus receiving most resources.

Group II—Opposition: Those who "distance themselves from contemporary Russia" or engage in "hostile actions." Core recommendation is "pursue a policy of silence", do not engage, deny them media oxygen. Complement with a legal warfare such as freezing assets, blocking pensions/benefits, restricting consular services, aggressive use of Interpol red notices. Aim is to render them "toxic citizens" with no platform and no resources.

Group III—Apolitical majority: The largest target group, focused on work and family. Strategy: "build bridges" through education, culture, consular services that solve everyday problems. Emphasis on high-quality entertainment (films, animation, series) embedding pro-Kremlin narratives "softly and unobtrusively" to normalize violence and define enemies/friends without overt propaganda. Targeting second-generation emigrants as most promising for long-term influence.

Group IV—Activist proxies: Kremlin-loyal organizers of patriotic actions abroad who maintain distance from formal state structures, providing deniability. Example: "Anti-Fascists of the Baltics" collected intelligence on NATO infrastructure, pro-Ukraine activists, and critical infrastructure while recruiting informants—passing data to FSB handlers. Putin personally endorsed such networks: "We have people there to lean on."

Rossotrudnichestvo expands operations despite crisis, outspends defunct USAID. Budget increased from $52M (pre-war) to $72M in 2025 while USAID closed globally. Spending on Russian language promotion tripled from $6.5M to $23.5M, including $2.2M for textbook exports to Europe (Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Italy)—history books edited by Medinsky justifying the Ukraine war and warning of "neo-Nazism." "New Generation" program brings foreign journalists, bloggers, young leaders to Russia for fully-paid immersive experiences, training in state media structures. Focus: Africa (14 of 26 new Russian Houses), Middle East, Latin America—regions with less political pressure.

Why it matters

Regime compensates for domestic isolation with long-term influence investment. As Russia faces Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the Kremlin is doubling down on cultivating alternative support networks. The strategy acknowledges 650,000+ post-invasion emigrants (previously denied) and treats diaspora/foreign audiences as interconnected targets for sustained engagement. This isn't traditional diplomacy—it's re-building parallel structures (educational, cultural, religious) that function as Kremlin access points across generations, particularly through children and youth. Rossotrudnichestvo head admits constraints but frames soft power as essential despite budget crisis: "The country needs shells, but humanitarian policy must continue." Creates exploitable vulnerabilities in Western societies. The four-tier strategy deliberately targets Western weaknesses: (1) Diaspora community infrastructure (churches, schools, cultural centers) often operates below government radar as "apolitical"; (2) Free speech protections limit ability to counter "silent" campaigns or cultural content; (3) Withdrawal of U.S./Western soft power leaves vacuum Russia fills; (4) Economic integration of second-generation emigrants creates leverage points. The activist proxy model (Group IV) is particularly dangerous—provides intelligence collection, recruitment pipeline, and deniable action capacity while Kremlin stays formally distant.

Conclusions

Key vulnerabilities: (1) Western soft power retreat creates strategic vacuum Russia systematically exploits; (2) Diaspora infrastructure (churches, schools, cultural organizations) operates as long-term influence vector with minimal oversight; (3) Second-generation emigrants increasingly targeted as most receptive to cultural normalization of Kremlin narratives; (4) Activist proxy networks provide deniable intelligence/recruitment capacity in NATO territories; (5) Educational programs (30,000 foreign students annually) build multi-decade dependency relationships, especially in Africa and Middle East.

Strategic recommendations:

→ Counter institutional penetration with transparency requirements: Mandate disclosure of Rossotrudnichestvo funding for all cultural organizations, educational institutions, and media platforms. Establish registration requirements for "Russian Houses" and coordinating councils (KSORS) as foreign influence operations. Track textbook distributions—particularly Medinsky's revisionist histories entering European schools. Transparency doesn't require closure but prevents covert operation and enables informed community decisions.

→ Revitalize Western soft power to compete for apolitical majority (Group III): The apolitical diaspora majority responds to whoever provides better services, content, and community. Western strategy should: support independent Russian-language media and cultural production as alternatives to Kremlin content; create cultural spaces for diaspora that aren't state-controlled but offer genuine community. Focus on second-generation youth before Kremlin normalization takes hold. Competition for hearts and minds requires actual investment, not just sanctions and restrictions.