Executive Summary
Through its propaganda channels, the Kremlin increasingly speaks of losing influence in the South Caucasus, explaining this by claiming that “Russia’s enemies” are taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on the “Special Military Operation” and declaring the need to mobilize and take corresponding measures. Notably, the narrative of “enemies exploiting Russia’s distraction with the war,” which the Kremlin uses to justify harsh statements from regional leaders and such image-damaging events as meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House, in fact only reinforces the distancing of regional countries from Moscow. The reasons: The Kremlin’s inflexible and aggressive policies, its openly imperial ambitions, threats currently unbacked by real capabilities, and the insulting rhetoric of Russian propagandists.
In its official rhetoric, the Kremlin tries to maintain balance: it leaves room for normalization of relations with Baku, demonstrating “openness to dialogue” and a “strong position.” Officials avoid sharp statements or using propaganda narratives: presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, for example, spoke of a possible meeting between the leaders of Russia and Azerbaijan in China at the SCO summit and prospects for rapprochement.
Moscow leaves maneuvering space because it has very few “strong cards” against Baku and few allies. Even radically minded propagandists allow for possible backtracking, stressing that the main enemy of Russia in the South Caucasus context is not Azerbaijan but the West — above all, the United Kingdom. This allows the propaganda machine to quickly pivot if needed, claiming that Azerbaijan was under Western influence but that national interests dictate Baku’s friendship with the Kremlin. However, the Kremlin’s real stance on the loss of influence in the South Caucasus should be assessed not by official statements but by the aggressive propaganda campaign against Baku and Ankara, and by Russian strikes on facilities of the Azerbaijani corporation SOCAR and the Turkish Bayraktar plant in Ukraine.
Kremlin-aligned nationalists and pro-war propagandists project hardline rhetoric — to the domestic audience this is presented as proof that Moscow will not tolerate humiliation and can respond to the “West” in the South Caucasus with extreme toughness. Added to this are threats the Kremlin could actually implement: disruptions in trade in Azerbaijani goods (explicitly mentioned by State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulev) and pressure on diasporas, which is already underway and announced for intensification. Meanwhile, key propagandists like TV host Vladimir Solovyov make direct hints about a possible “new Special Military Operation,” suggesting that in the region — “Russia’s soft underbelly” — conditions may arise for a joint Russia–Iran operation against NATO influence, “where Britain and France play a major role,” often accusing Turkey of serving British interests in the region and of negatively influencing Baku.
Threats of military action against Baku should be considered in light of the fact that the Kremlin lacks, and will continue to lack in the foreseeable future, the capability to conduct a war against Azerbaijan, Turkey’s main partner. But a Kremlin response to its loss of influence in the South Caucasus is inevitable. Personnel reshuffles in the Russian presidential administration, where virtually all foreign policy functions are now being transferred to Sergey Kiriyenko, indirectly confirm that the Kremlin’s policy in the region will be significantly intensified. With few tools against Baku and little appetite to clash too strongly with Yerevan — which provides “economic support” to Moscow in the wake of Western sanctions — the only realistic lever for regaining influence and a foothold in the region after the current phase of the war in Ukraine may well be Georgia, weakened by its own policies and the pressure from Moscow.
Against the backdrop of its ambiguous policy toward Baku and Ankara, Russian authorities are also advancing their anti-migrant campaign, initially intended to deflect attention from crimes committed by participants in the war and other socio-economic consequences, redirecting focus toward the traditional tool of stirring interethnic tension. The key point is that repression of the Azerbaijani diaspora, unlike the Kremlin’s standard anti-migrant focus on arrivals from Central Asia, is a separate political decision — and whether persecution of Azerbaijanis takes a radical form depends on the development of bilateral relations and on Baku’s leverage over Moscow. In January 2025, Russian courts outside Moscow recorded a significant number of cases under Article 18.8 (‘Violation by a foreign citizen or stateless person of the rules of entry into the Russian Federation or the regime of stay’), Article 18.10 (‘Illegal labor activity of a foreign citizen or stateless person in the Russian Federation’), and Article 18.11 of the Russian Administrative Code (‘Violation of the rules for employing and using foreign workers’). Following Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani passenger plane at the end of 2024 and President Aliyev’s subsequent reaction, Azerbaijanis ranked third among migrants prosecuted under these provisions in Russia — after citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — accounting for 6.7% of all cases. Notably, even propagandist Vladimir Solovyov on “Rossiya 1” raised rhetorical questions, hinting that not enough was being done:“Diasporas — what are they? Dual loyalties? There must be the harshest approach...”
Moscow’s dual approach is most evident in its policy toward Turkey. The Kremlin is forced into caution: Turkey is too strong and too important in terms of influence across multiple regions and the broader “Global South” narrative (Ankara holds “partner country” status with BRICS). However, this demonstrative restraint at the official level is offset by angry statements and posts from the Z-segment of Kremlin-backed bloggers, who systematically discredit Turkey to multimillion audiences, label it an enemy on the rise, and shame Russians who vacation there, accusing them of sponsoring Ukraine’s military. Pro-Kremlin economist Konstantin Dvinsky even calculated: “If last year 6.7 million Russians vacationed in Turkey, then they financed Ukraine’s killing of about 67,000 Russian soldiers.” At the same time, the prominent Z-channel “Rybar,” close to the Ministry of Defense, claims that Turkey acts in the interests of the United Kingdom, imposes “its agenda” on the region, and builds a foothold for pressure on Russia and Iran. On the night of August 28, the Kremlin struck the Turkish Bayraktar drone plant in Ukraine, with Z-correspondent Alexander Kots noting this was already the fourth strike in six months. A similar duality is evident in Moscow’s policy toward Georgia. The Kremlin plays a subtle game, carefully weaving Georgian leaders’ statements into its campaigns. Above all, it exploits criticism of former president Mikheil Saakashvili, who allegedly pushed Georgia to open a second front at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Simultaneously, Moscow emphasizes that the country’s current authorities supposedly pursue an “independent policy” in their national interests. Yet propaganda always leaves an opening: it asserts that the West dreams of dragging Georgia into war with Russia, and if power in Tbilisi shifts to a pro-American government, the Kremlin could act more harshly. Propaganda actively cites Tbilisi mayor Kakha Kaladze, who said: “In the prime minister’s office there were threats, blackmail, and insults, he was urged to open a second front in the country,” and deputy speaker of parliament Giorgi Volski, who accused the Baltic states of trying to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia. Similarly, the “Kavkazar” sub-project, part of the network of the major military blogger “Rybar,” stressed: “The difference is obvious — in Ukraine they are fully integrated into Western strategy and accept any conditions, while in Georgia they choose independence and refusal to take part in someone else’s war.”
Regarding Armenia, the Kremlin speaks even more cautiously, limiting itself to promises of meetings at Yerevan’s initiative. At the same time, Moscow omits the fact that Armenia is no less important to it because of greatly expanded economic cooperation under Western sanctions. Meanwhile, Kremlin-controlled bloggers and media conduct a massive campaign against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, calling him a traitor who sold out the Armenian people, betrayed the church, and “bowed to the West.” Propagandists use the harshest language, simultaneously supporting pro-Russian protests and seeking to deepen social divisions. A telling moment came on August 23 in Armenian city Gyumri, where two rallies were held near Russia’s 2nd base: the “In the Name of the Republic” party, with dozens of participants, demanded withdrawal of the base, while the “Mother Armenia” party and allies gathered around 200 people in its defense. Russian propagandist media emphasized that “the pro-Russian rally gathered 200 people versus 32 at the anti-base rally.” This was used to claim that “Armenians themselves are asking us to stay.” For the Kremlin, this is extremely valuable, as it is supposed to legitimize its military presence in public opinion.
Despite the scale and continuity of Kremlin propaganda, it has clear vulnerabilities. Most importantly, the aggressive rhetoric about a “new Special Military Operation” in the South Caucasus clashes sharply with Russian public sentiment: for the third straight month, the majority of Russians say Russia should live in peace, according to sociological surveys. Another weakness is Moscow’s constant attempts to present itself as surrounded by allies, while in reality each new escalation with neighbors reduces the number of countries it can call “friendly.” Earlier statements about cooperation now look odd and undermine trust in the authorities, accused of short-sighted policy. The anti-migrant campaign, though seemingly supported by part of society, also carries risks: targeting diasporas, especially major businessmen, hits the economy, already weakened by war.
This campaign has become the main theme of propaganda and of the largest nationalist movement, the “Russian Community,” but this FSB-supervised movement increasingly “overreaches,” as even Kremlin spokespeople admit. This creates tension within the authorities and conflicts between security services and civilian officials. The Kremlin is forced to negotiate with those it only recently branded as enemies. A telling example — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev: he was publicly called a traitor and enemy of Russia, yet President Vladimir Putin is still preparing to meet him and smiling during handshakes. Such duality undermines the image of a “firm line” and is perceived by part of the patriotic audience as weakness. According to a May survey by the independent Levada Center , among countries Russians named as “closest allies,” few mentioned Azerbaijan, even fewer Turkey, slightly more Armenia, and only a handful Georgia — whose government has been pursuing the Kremlin’s most aligned policies for the third year running. At the same time, a significant share of respondents classified Georgia as a “hostile country,” the highest level in recent years.
The failure of the Kremlin’s and presidential administration’s policies toward neighboring states and propaganda efforts is obvious, leading to reshuffles and reallocation of functions in the administration, where virtually all foreign policy authority is shifting to Sergey Kiriyenko. According to sources, even the leak to Western media that deputy chief of staff Dmitry Kozak was “opposed to the war in Ukraine” was initiated by Kiriyenko to further weaken Kozak, who has clearly failed in his foreign policy role.
Relations with Azerbaijan
The Kremlin’s campaign, centered on attacks against the Azerbaijani diaspora and attempts at pressure through military threats, continues despite the August 22 Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation meeting in Astrakhan (its 23rd session), as well as a phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov.
Propaganda outlets covered these contacts in a restrained and dry, news-like manner, mainly citing press releases about ongoing and planned cooperation projects. At the same time, the official Kremlin continues to adhere to its main narrative: while acknowledging problems in relations with Azerbaijan, it leaves hope for improvement. It was in this vein that presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated: “Sometimes difficult periods occur in relations between two countries. Right now is one of those periods. We hope this period will pass. We believe that cooperation between the two countries truly brings mutual benefit.” The Kremlin also leaves open the possibility of a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China, stressing that concrete plans will become clear later, and sends positive signals by expressing hope for “normalization” of relations. Nevertheless, through key propaganda channels the Kremlin continues escalation and even tries to threaten Baku, only slightly softening the direct threats of a new “Special Military Operation” earlier voiced by State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulev and TV host Vladimir Solovyov. On his “Solovyov Live” broadcast on August 27, Solovyov pushed a narrative almost identical to Kremlin discourse on the war with Ukraine: he claimed that the Azerbaijani people cannot be the enemy — instead, the “elites” are. “What is happening in our ‘soft underbelly’ could well be grounds for a joint special military operation with Iran against the unfriendly influence of NATO countries, where Britain and France play a major role, and against those foolish enough not to understand what is going on,” he said. Militaristic statements, actively amplified by the network of propagandists connected to Solovyov and the Russian presidential administration, are echoed by the mainstream national media against the backdrop of Baku’s harsh rhetoric. It is in this context that propaganda outlets cite speeches by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. For example, during a meeting with residents of Kalbajar he said: “We must be ready for war at any moment. Because global processes are developing in such a way that no one can know what will happen tomorrow. The guarantor of our security is ourselves: the state, the people, and our armed forces.” The national outlet Gazeta.ru on August 22 quoted Aliyev’s remarks, adding commentary from Z-author of the “Starse Edda” channel. He asserted that Aliyev was speaking specifically about Russia, since Moscow “went after his business in Ukraine” and “is jailing Azerbaijani gangsters.” In his view, escalation from Azerbaijan could provoke a Kremlin response: “Aliyev should bear this in mind: in high-intensity combat operations like those now in Ukraine, his army and, most importantly — his infrastructure, above all oil — will run out very quickly. In his place I’d sit quietly and not tempt fate, but apparently victory over Pashinyan went to Ilham Heydarovich’s head, and he fancies himself if not Alexander the Great then someone very close to him.”
In the same vein came Aliyev’s interview with Al Arabiya, where he expressed “support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.” “But the fact that Aliyev called the Ukrainian conflict an invasion — that is already a direct attack on Russia. At least we are drawing conclusions: we should not delude ourselves about Azerbaijan or present it as a partner. That was a misunderstanding,” said State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin in response. Aliyev’s words about Azerbaijan’s “occupation” during Soviet times also sparked reaction. Human Rights Council member Marina Akhmedova asked: “So it turns out that all those years in Baku it was his father who headed the Soviet occupying forces, and Ilham Aliyev himself is the successor of those occupying forces?”
Thus, despite meetings and phone calls between representatives of the two countries, the Kremlin is not softening its rhetoric and maintains a confrontational tone through propaganda resources. Through its propaganda networks, Moscow explicitly declares that it will not accept the loss of influence in the South Caucasus and views Azerbaijan — allegedly pushed in this direction by Turkey — as the key driver of the region’s distancing from Russia. At the same time, the Kremlin leaves space for agreements, shifting the emphasis to “external influence.” This narrative coincides with the line Russian authorities promote with regard to Donald Trump, periodically accusing the American “Democratic Party establishment” of unfair pressure on the U.S. president. “A major factor in shaping Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course is external influence, not the head of state or the foreign minister,” pro-Kremlin political analyst Artur Ataev told Vedomosti.
In the same spirit are publications by the media outlet Bloknot, which linked Aliyev’s rhetoric to the upcoming “historic” SCO summit in China on August 31. The outlet framed it as “an attempt by globalists to spoil someone else’s celebration,” noting that the summit supposedly demonstrates the “growing influence of the Global South.” “So Ilham Heydarovich had to take the stage at the command of his British masters to ‘kick’ Russia. After all, Russia is the legal successor of the USSR and therefore the main ‘occupier’ of the world,” wrote Bloknot, adding a collage of Aliyev against the British flag. “Pride is a dangerous thing! And the British are very skilled at exploiting it, promising that you (together with the Turks) will rule the ‘Great Turan,’” wrote the pro-Kremlin Telegram channel “ZeRada,” which positions itself as “Ukrainian” but in reality, spreads Kremlin narratives.
Pro-government Z-channels sustain the most offensive and derogatory narratives about Azerbaijan, differing only in degrees of hatred. The large channel “Pozdnyakov 3.0” published reports about the unregistered party “Other Russia of E.V. Limonov” staging a protest in St. Petersburg on August 27 near Azerbaijan’s consulate under the slogan “Our partner Aliyev supports Kyiv.” Three activists were detained but soon released without charges. “It’s becoming physiologically disgusting to the point of nausea from Aliyev’s open Russophobia, to the extent that one doesn’t even want to comment. In reality, what came out of the Azerbaijani leader’s mouth was typical Sorosite rhetoric... Russophobia is a very dangerous disease that usually only intensifies over the years. Maybe now the Kremlin will understand this?” wrote the Z- channel “RIA Katyusha.”
Individual Z-bloggers echo the same tone. “For presidents of loose morals there is always the option... to offer their (intimate) services to the Western Russophobia market. For a small price your country will turn into yet another cardboard battering ram used to ‘butt’ Russia. After that, the country traditionally breathes its last,” claimed Z-author Alexey Antonov. “In Moscow at the official level they will smile sweetly at him and send congratulations, but meanwhile SOCAR facilities in Ukraine are in for hard times. As is the Azerbaijani criminal underworld in Russia. The response to Baku’s hysterics will not be what Aliyev expects. In fact, it’s already happening. Russophobia has a price, and it will have to be paid,” wrote Z-blogger and military commentator Boris Rozhin of the propaganda program “Big Game” on Channel One.
The Turkey Factor in Kremlin Campaigns
National propagandists and Z-bloggers increasingly attribute actions against Russia to Turkey in the interests of the United Kingdom. This is stated, in particular, by the Z-channel “Rybar,” close to the Ministry of Defense, in its programmatic publication “Corridor of Dependence”: “The situation demonstrates the illusory nature of sovereignty in post-Soviet states. In Turkey, acting also in the interests of the British, they continue to impose their agenda on the region and create a foothold for pressure on Russia and Iran. The construction of the transport corridor under U.S. patronage and with the use of Turkish contractors is not an economic but a geopolitical project, whose ultimate goal is the attempt to push Russia out of the region and subject the population to ideological conditioning.” Similar ideas are voiced by propagandist and host of the “Solovyov Live” channel Sergey Mardan, who claims that Turkey is in fact not acting in its own interests: “Turkey with its ‘Great Turan’ is more likely to lose than to gain from it. Washington is solving several problems at once — pushing Russia out of the South Caucasus, cutting it off from Iran, and providing its main Middle Eastern ally with a stable transport and energy artery. Turkey’s place in this plan looks rather shaky.”
The Rybar channel, close to the Ministry of Defense, directly claims that Turkey is trying to displace Russia from the South Caucasus: “Today in Gyumri another attempt at an anti-Russian action failed: a handful (to be precise, 32 people) from the pro-Turkish movement ‘For the Republic’ (EK Stratcom: as they call the pro-democracy Armenian party) came out against the 102nd Russian military base, but faced an organized counteraction from the ‘Mother Armenia’ movement (EK Stratcom: pro-kremlin movement). Patriotic activists unfurled slogans of ‘Hands off the Russian base!’ ‘Yes — to Armenia’s security!’ and effectively drove the provocateurs off the square. Those who had planned an information picture for Western media simply fled. ... Local residents perfectly understand that the presence of the Russian base in Gyumri is a guarantee that after Karabakh and the Zangezur corridor the country will not be left face to face with Turkey and Azerbaijan.”
The Belarusian propaganda channel “BelPVO” goes even further, publishing the article “Turkish Expert of Instability” and describing Ankara’s attempts to strengthen its influence. The post was republished by Russian Z-blogger Ramzay: “Of particular concern is the activation of discussions about training militants on Syrian territory with their subsequent transfer to Azerbaijan. These actions likely fit into the broader context of alliance commitments between Ankara and Baku. The main focus, apparently, is on training radical fighters for later use in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus.”
Nevertheless, because of Turkey’s key role in the Kremlin’s important campaign to portray itself as a “peacemaker” in the war with Ukraine — through a series of meetings with the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, and thanks to Ankara’s trade ties, military and political power — the Kremlin avoids sharp attacks on Turkey’s leadership at the official level. It delegates that role to the Z-community and some propagandists, who may speak harshly but only in their own names. Publicly, Moscow emphasizes that it values Turkey’s position and repeatedly agrees to negotiations specifically on its territory. However, each new statement about President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s mediation in the conflict — the latest came on August 28 after his conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — sparks irritation among war supporters, who believe that Turkey is part of the conflict and is acting against Russia on Ukraine’s side. On the night of August 28, the Russian army struck the Turkish Baykar plant near Kyiv, as well as attacking the Azerbaijani embassy, according to Zelensky. Such a “hybrid” response allows the Kremlin to balance: on the one hand, to demonstrate a “tough reaction,” and on the other — to avoid direct military clashes, for which the country lacks resources.
The Z-community, inspired by the Russian PA, views Turkey and its position in sharply negative terms and predictably reacted with outrage to reports of possible Turkish troops being sent to Kyiv as security guarantors in the event of a peace deal with Russia. Anti-Turkish campaigns regularly sweep through pro-war channels. For example, the large million-subscriber Z-channel “Two Majors,” directly linked to Russian security services, published the post “How Turkey Uses Azerbaijan to Deceive Its Co-Religious,” accusing Ankara of receiving shipments through Azerbaijan despite its anti-Israel rhetoric. The post was accompanied by a mocking meme of Aliyev and Erdoğan and aimed at discrediting the leaders. The “Kavkazar” project, linked to the major propaganda channel “Rybar” and the Russian Ministry of Defense, operates in the same direction, spreading the post “Educational Jihad.” It claimed that “the Turkish authorities, in the interests of Western partners, are methodically displacing Russian education and destroying traditional academic ties. Under external influence, Azerbaijan’s educational sovereignty is being completely destroyed, forming a generation of professionally incompetent cadres with an imposed pro-Turkish identity.”
Thus, the Kremlin seeks both to maintain the appearance of respect toward Turkey as a strong partner and, at the same time, to discredit it inside Russia and the region through propaganda channels. The strategy is aimed at undermining trust in Ankara and weakening its alliance with Baku and potential ties with Yerevan. But the visible effect of such campaigns is largely limited to the audience of Russian-speaking consumers of propaganda and subscribers to pro-Kremlin channels, although, of course, the narratives are picked up by regional pro-Kremlin forces in Georgia and Armenia.
The Azerbaijan Factor as Part of the Kremlin’s Anti-Migrant Campaign
The Kremlin’s large-scale anti-migrant campaign, intensified after the terrorist attack at “Crocus City” near Moscow and aimed primarily at distracting society from the rise in crime associated with war participants as well as a range of other socio-economic problems, is increasingly shifting its focus toward diasporas. This is evident both in raids and citizenship revocations against members of national communities, as well as in propaganda narratives.
This shift is linked to an attempt to pressure the Azerbaijani leadership. One of the key episodes was a large raid in Yekaterinburg, during which the Safarov brothers were detained and killed. From that moment, criminal cases began to be opened against members of the Azerbaijani diaspora, with revocations of citizenship and deportations. Whereas earlier propaganda spoke about migrants in general, without emphasizing specific nationalities, it now singles out the Azerbaijani diaspora, stressing that repression is directed specifically against it. The Kremlin seeks to justify its actions by claiming alleged criminal ties of diasporas, their representatives’ disregard for the law, and their potential danger. Notably, even amid this active campaign, state propagandists continue to hint that not enough has been done. “We need to take a very close look at the diasporas. Diasporas — what are they? Are they a kind of dual loyalty? Are they representatives of Russia’s interests in the countries from which people have come, or are they attempts to exert influence on Russia through those who are here? There must be the harshest approach...” propagandist Vladimir Solovyov said on the program aired on “Rossiya 1” on August 24.
The campaign against diasporas has also encompassed the case of political scientist Sergey Markov, considered a pro-Kremlin and pro-war expert. The Ministry of Justice designated him a “foreign agent.” National propaganda, especially the network associated with Solovyov as well as Z-bloggers, present Markov as a demonstrative example of an “agent of influence” operating inside the country. In their interpretation, this is supposedly how Baku spreads its influence — through members of the diaspora who recruit supporters even within the Russian system.
The major propaganda outlet Life, linked to Yury Kovalchuk’s media empire, published an “investigation” about Markov just three days after he was added to the “foreign agent” registry. The article, titled “Smiling at Aliyev? Where Did Political Scientist Markov, Labeled a Foreign Agent, Get an Apartment Worth 100 Million,” claims that the final blow to the expert was the “Shusha scandal” in July, when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev “criticized Russia” and the political scientist “smiled and showered Aliyev with compliments.” The Z-channel “Segodnya.ru,” reposting commentary by war correspondent Kotyonok, was even harsher: “The ‘foreign agent’ label ‘Markov-zade’ was well deserved, but still selective. After all, at least a dozen more pro-Azerbaijani singers from the State Duma, the expert community, and so on have so far evaded proper attention from Russia’s sluggish state machine and gone to ground. ... In any case, the situation with a foreign agent from ‘United Russia’ will show how consistent the state will be under conditions of rampant and seemingly unchecked ethnic groups of influence and the corruption infecting the highest echelons of power.” Thus, curators of the Z-community create the illusion that “patriotic” public opinion is consistently demanding the Kremlin “restore order.” “Russia needs a tough, centralized state policy to counter such infiltration. Migration control, business inspections, scrutinizing diasporas for loyalty. No parallel structures (like ‘dialogue with diasporas,’ which in fact are organized crime groups) — everything under a single Russian flag. Otherwise, such statements from Aliyev will only multiply. Over there, they understand only strength,” concludes one of the key Z-channels, “Two Majors.”
Useful Links
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