Executive Summary
The Kremlin has put all spheres of life in Russia on a strategic military track — from the economy, production, and trade, to propaganda, demographics, and even education in preschools. The theory that Russian authorities plan a gradual transition to peaceful life after the current war in Ukraine is not supported by the total militarization of society — from kindergartens to retirees. While Russian corporations fulfill defense orders planned for years ahead, children in Russian kindergartens listen to stories from SMO veterans, and schoolchildren learn not only how to operate drones but also how to assemble them.
In 2025, the Kremlin became significantly more active in demonstrating its readiness to continue the course of militarization, openly declaring long-term confrontation with the West and supporting its campaigns with concrete actions in military, economic, and political spheres, clearly framing the war in Ukraine as just a part of this broader concept of the Putin regime. The key ideological justification for this course is the fight against “resurgent fascism,” which the Kremlin increasingly “observes” in European countries, separating from the “fascist” narrative only the United States and a few of its partners in Europe since this spring. “Russia has been and will remain an unbreakable barrier to Nazism, Russophobia, antisemitism, and will fight against the abuses carried out by supporters of these aggressive destructive ideas. Truth and justice are on our side,” — outlined Vladimir Putin as the main narrative in his speech at the May 9 parade. To simplify and consolidate the image of confrontation, in 2025 Russian authorities expanded the campaign against “Ukrainian fascism,” launched before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, introducing the term“Eurofascism” into active circulation. Any actions or statements by European authorities, except for Putin-loyal leaders, are packaged into the narrative of a “Nazi” or “fascist” Europe that poses a threat to Russia.
In the country that “defeated fascism”, no one doubts what the Kremlin means when it calls “fascist Europe” a threat. At the same time, the Kremlin regularly invokes its imperial past and appeals to “national pride,” claiming that opponents are allegedly active even in countries considered Russia’s traditional spheres of influence. A case in point is the South Caucasus: after Armenia and Azerbaijan distanced themselves from Moscow and signed a conflict-resolution declaration in Washington, several pro-government figures — including State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulyov and propagandist Vladimir Solovyov — hinted at the possibility of launching a new “special military operation” in the region. Russian war correspondents with audiences in the millions launched the campaign “Bought a ticket for a vacation in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s partner) = helped the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” while Russian nationalists, following directives from security services, conduct campaigns against the Azerbaijani diaspora. Aggressive rhetoric is directly reinforced by economic decisions. The Kremlin continues to shift Russia’s economy onto a military track. Despite active discussions about peace in Ukraine, the military budget in 2025 reached a record 13.5 trillion rubles (≈ 167.5 billion USD), with plans for 2026 and 2027 at roughly the same levels: 12.8 and 13.1 trillion rubles (≈ 154.2 and 157.8 billion USD).Defense expenditures now account for 41% of all Russian budget spending. Defense industries show the highest growth, while civilian production continues to stagnate. The large state corporation Rostec has become the flagship in this system, sharply increasing weapons production and becoming the country’s largest employer. Despite accumulating economic problems, the Kremlin does not intend to change priorities. On June 11, at a meeting reviewing the main parameters of the state armament program for 2027–2036, Vladimir Putin directly stated that the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex should “rapidly increase the combat capabilities of the ground forces” and coordinate the work of the MIC with the mobilization plans of the economy. This course is further reflected in mobilization policy. In the spring of 2025, a record draft call was conducted — 160,000 people, which can be justified by the war in Ukraine. However, for the first time, a bill was submitted to the State Duma on year-round recruitment of conscripts, potentially taking effect in 2026. Overall troop numbers have increased, the draft age has been expanded, an electronic draft registry was implemented, and several new restrictions were introduced. While, within the current conflict, the Kremlin is forced to continue raising contract soldier payments due to recruitment difficulties (sums reach up to 3 million rubles — ≈ 37,140 USD), active work is underway to further increase the number of conscripted soldiers in the upcoming future. At the same time, the Kremlin has chosen a strategy of systematically strengthening the system of “patriotic education” and militarizing youth: starting September 2025, the propaganda programs “Conversations about the Important” are being implemented even in kindergartens. In schools, mandatory initial military training courses are introduced, supplemented by militaristic competitions for young people, where military skills are practiced, such as “Zarnitsa 2.0.”5 Special emphasis is placed on teaching drone operation and involving teenagers in developing drones for the army. Thus, the militarization of society is built as a unified system — from kindergartens to weapons production. All these factors — massive military propaganda, a militarized economy, intensified campaigns to discredit “Nazi” Europe, and the renewed promotion of the Soviet legacy — clearly point to a long-term strategy of aggression and conflict extending far beyond the current war in Ukraine. Internal processes are also underway within the Russian presidential administration, FSB, SVR, and GRU to restructure influence work in other countries, including the renewal of leadership and redistribution of roles. The Kremlin is returning to strengthening campaigns abroad, which suggests that their number will significantly increase once resources are freed immediately after the end of the war in Ukraine, alongside already initiated military preparations. Additionally, according to closed polling trends, Russians want a peaceful life in the coming years, but assume that the Kremlin will continue to wage wars — in Ukraine or elsewhere — and public opinion, although dissatisfied with these expectations, is prepared for them. If the democratic world wants to be ready — both in terms of Russia’s hybrid war against the West, which will not spare the EU or the U.S., and the likely new aggression of the Kremlin — besides demonstrative military readiness by European countries, proactive work with public opinion inside Russia is required. Over the years of the war in Ukraine, messaging projects countering censorship in Russia have repeatedly managed to transform a large portion of pro-war and neutral audiences into anti-war, and pro-government audiences into ones close to opposition. Given the threats, such work must not only continue but be significantly intensified immediately, with targeted messaging campaigns in Russian social networks, messengers, and other formats, so that at the right moment polls will show the Kremlin that the share of Russians who do not want war, but passively accept this prospect, and the share of militarized people, particularly youth, is decreasing. As in the case of growing anti-war sentiment even among pro-government audiences in 2024–2025, which became a major challenge for the Kremlin and required enormous resources to strengthen propaganda and invent new threats and enemies, this tactic will also be effective in countering the Putin regime’s confrontation with the U.S. and EU.
Propaganda
The Kremlin explicitly states that it is ready and even intends to continue the militarization of all spheres and is prepared for potential confrontations. Traditionally, the Kremlin justifies any of its escalation actions by citing a threat of aggression against Russia and the need to mobilize for readiness to repel it. To simplify and solidify the image of confrontation, in 2025 authorities expanded the campaign against «Ukrainian fascism» by introducing the term «Eurofascism» into active circulation. It first appeared in a report by the Foreign Intelligence Service titled «Eurofascism, as 80 years ago — a common enemy of Moscow and Washington». This narrative has been adopted and actively developed in statements by the Foreign Ministry, its official spokesperson Maria Zakharova , and former president Dmitry Medvedev. The overall propagandistic framework — a parallel between 2025 and 1945 — was set by Vladimir Putin 9 at the Kremlin’s main annual event, the May 9 parade: «Russia was and will be an indestructible barrier to Nazism, Russophobia, antisemitism, and will fight the atrocities committed by proponents of these aggressive destructive ideas. Truth and justice are on our side». The campaign “Eurofascism — a threat to Moscow and Washington” undoubtedly serves the purpose of artificially driving a wedge between the two main democratic world powers — the US and Europe. The campaign portraying Europe as “fascist” or “Nazi” — as a threat to Russia — is ongoing, presented through text, video formats, podcasts, thousands of troll comments on social media, and so on, and serves as an attempt to prepare public opinion in Russia for any possible scenarios — from escalating tensions to outright war with certain EU countries. According to closed public opinion polls, the fact of a war with Europe would not surprise Russians: although most Russians desire a peaceful life and an end to Russia’s isolation, they expect the authorities to continue wars. «Nazism in Europe» automatically signals, following the campaign against Ukraine, to the audience that war with the EU is more than possible. Separately, the Kremlin emphasizes its readiness to defend what it considers «national interests» in regions defined as zones of influence. In 2025, this rhetoric intensified around the South Caucasus against the backdrop of distancing from Moscow by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context, State Duma deputy and Lieutenant General Andrey Gurulev stated: «A special military operation is a flexible concept. Flexible across the entire border of the Russian Federation», and his words were widely quoted by propagandistic media. A similar position was expressed by leading propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, referring to «very serious problems» in the South Caucasus: «From a geopolitical perspective, this could lead to consequences such that this may not be the last SMO of our generation». While a direct Russian attack on Azerbaijan is an unlikely scenario due to Turkish support, strikes on Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure in Ukraine have already occurred. This is accompanied by an increasingly aggressive nationalist campaign against the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia. Nevertheless, once the war in Ukraine is halted, the Kremlin will shift its focus to the South Caucasus under the authority of Deputy Head of Administration Kiriyenko. In this regard, Georgia is especially at risk: while the authorities attempt to cooperate with the Kremlin as much as possible, this makes them the most vulnerable in the region due to broken ties with the West and cool relations with Baku and Ankara. It is likely that Georgia will become the point through which the Kremlin will attempt to compensate for its losses in the South Caucasus in one way or another. The Kremlin’s narratives explaining the need for military aggression against Europe or other neighbors remain broad and are not limited to borders or spheres of influence. Propaganda seeks to justify any operation through stories about people who supposedly «await Russia». In the same vein, on August 19, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with Russia-24: «I want to emphasize again: we have never spoken about simply needing to seize some territories. Neither Crimea, nor Donbass, nor Novorossiya as territories were ever our goal. Our goal was to protect people, Russian people».
Economy on a military track
The three-year budget law for 2025–2027 provides for a 25% increase in military spending. Under the “National Defense” category, 13.5 trillion rubles (6.31% of GDP) have been allocated for 2025, with plans for 2026 and 2027 at roughly the same levels: 12.8 and 13.1 trillion rubles (≈ 154.2 and 157.8 billion USD). Overall, military needs — including security agencies, intelligence services, state defense orders, and other related areas — account for 41% of the entire Russian federal budget. The prioritization of military spending is directly reflected in industrial production. By the end of the first half of 2025, against the backdrop of stagnation or even decline in “civilian sectors,” the three main military industries recorded rapid growth: production of “other transport equipment and machinery” increased by 35%, output of “finished metal products” rose by 14%, and the production of computers, electronics, and optical devices grew by 14–15%. Despite the imbalance, the Kremlin has no plans to reduce the priority of the defense sector. However, similar to the late USSR, defense enterprises are instructed to expand production for civilian sectors as well — as stated by Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Thus, the Kremlin has put the economy on a military track and intends to maintain this model, despite obvious difficulties faced by both the civilian sector and ordinary Russians in daily life. The current level of funding allows not only the continuation of combat operations in Ukraine but also the expansion of armed capabilities. In particular, the state corporation Rostec reported a 27% increase in consolidated revenue for 2024 (up to 3.61 trillion rubles, approximately $44 billion USD) and a 119% increase in net profit. Investment volume grew 1.3 times, reaching 676 billion rubles, primarily due to an expansion of state defense orders18. Meanwhile, 80% of the weapons and equipment sent to the combat zone are produced by Rostec enterprises. In 2024, the corporation significantly increased arms production: output of new light armored vehicles and tanks rose by 10%, artillery shells by 30%, heavy weapon shells by 110%, and rockets for MLRS by 70%. At the same time, Rostec has become the largest employer among industrial enterprises, with a workforce reaching about 700,000 people (up 100,000 since 2022), and plans to hire an additional 160,000 by 2028. This also indirectly indicates the expansion of military capacity rather than plans for its reduction. Mass production of drones has acquired particular importance. Russia is now capable of launching hundreds of long-range drones daily and deploying thousands of tactical drones on the front lines. At the same time, the Russian Federation achieves a significantly higher return on invested funds than NATO countries: a Rostec artillery shell costs four times less to produce than a comparable product from the German company Rheinmetall.
Conscription and Mobilization
In 2025, conscription pressure in Russia increased sharply. By presidential decree, 160,000 people were planned to be drafted in spring 2025 — a record level for the past 11 years19. For comparison, 150,000 young men were drafted in spring 2024, and 133,000 in the fall of the same year. First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense, Andrey Krasov20, linked the record draft, as well as the increase in the Armed Forces by 180,000 people — to 2,389,130, including 1.5 million service members — to the perceived threat from NATO.
Another mobilization measure was the draft bill on year-round conscription, submitted to the State Duma. The law is expected to come into force on January 1, 2026. Under this provision, military commissariats will be able to distribute the induction of recruits evenly throughout the year, significantly enhancing the army’s mobilization potential. This should be combined with previously adopted measures: the upper age limit for conscription was raised from 27 to 30, and an electronic registry of draft notices has been implemented. The Kremlin does not want a repetition of the politically risky situation of a full-scale mobilization, and contract service is too costly for the Russian budget, so the strategy of increasing the army’s size is justified when planning for conflicts. From experiences in the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sees that financial incentives are extremely unreliable and require constant increases in funding. For example, in recruiting contract soldiers, the Kremlin faces significant challenges. In the second quarter of 2025, only 37,900 people received payments for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense. Compared to the same period in 2024, the number of new recruits decreased by 2.5 times. Authorities aim to maintain recruitment levels by increasing payments. The total amount of bonuses — including federal and regional payments — reached a maximum by February 2025 and has remained consistently high. In the 12 regions with the highest payments, the average amount over the past six months was about 2.7 million rubles (more than $30,000). Maintaining this level of spending on a contract army while facing significant personnel losses at the front is an extremely heavy burden for the economy, which is why efforts are focused on expanding the armed forces through conscription.
Military-Patriotic education and youth training
The Kremlin is significantly intensifying the militarization of youth, starting from kindergartens. On August 19, it was reported that propaganda activities included in the school program “Conversations about Important Things” will take place not only in schools but also in kindergartens for children aged 3–7 starting in September 2025. The “pilot” program covers 22 regions, including annexed territories of Ukraine. Thus, military propaganda is becoming a systemic part of the educational process, complementing already established practices of societal militarization: Russian kindergartens have previously held regular collections of “humanitarian aid” and meetings with military personnel in the format of “Lessons of Courage.” Militarization in schools is becoming even more entrenched. Since 2024 (piloted in certain institutions since 2023), lessons on “Fundamentals of Safety and Defense of the Motherland” have been held nationwide, combining a basic civil defense course with initial military training. These programs continue to expand and receive increasing support from authorities. For example, in three schools in Sverdlovsk Oblast, a course in initial military training is being launched: the project is aimed at military-patriotic education of teenagers and includes team games and meetings with “veterans of the special operation in Ukraine.” If successful, the governor promised to scale up the initiative. At the same time, Russian schools are increasingly introducing specialized classes in drone operation, and the first textbook on this subject has been published within the framework of the course “Technology.” The Kremlin is also promoting extracurricular militarist competitions intended to normalize war and encourage the development of skills applicable on the front. Among these is the militarist competition “Zarnitsa.” A separate focus is the involvement of children in drone development under the guise of educational projects. In the state-created “Bear Den” cyber-physical platform initiative for talented schoolchildren, participants first engage in games to learn programming and drone operation, and are then moved to clubs where they perform real tasks for sanctioned companies. From a young age, children are being involved in supporting Russian military efforts: they build drones and propose new ideas that are subsequently considered by the companies.
Conclusion
While the protracted nature of the war in Ukraine may not have been anticipated by Russian authorities, the militarization of society, the economy, and education, military propaganda, the intensification of anti- European sentiment, and all other massive campaigns and actions of the Kremlin point to the clearly strategic nature of the country’s militarization policy and its preparation not only for hybrid but also for hot military campaigns far beyond the current war in Ukraine.
Useful Links
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