EK Strategic Communications Center

Executive Summary

For the first five months of 2025, Kremlin propaganda and disinformation campaigns were focused on the major narrative of “victory” ahead of the anniversary of the end of World War II. By May 2025, this “great victory,” according to Russian authorities’ narratives, was to be celebrated not only over fascist Germany in 1945 but also over “fascism” in Ukraine and the countries supporting Ukraine. The Kremlin packed this “victory” narrative with all sorts of real and fabricated events – from “triumph” over the West due to diplomatic gestures from the White House and efforts to fracture European unity, to the fake liberation of the Russian Kursk region, which was seized by Ukraine back in August 2024.

Since the start of the year, the Kremlin had slowed down all its campaigns, waiting to see what actions the new US administration would take. However, by March, having seen no significant risks or threats from an even more polarized West, the Kremlin not only resumed but significantly strengthened all its campaigns. Russian authorities have adopted the most maximalist terms for a peace deal with Ukraine, seeing it as an opportunity they cannot miss while Euro-Atlantic unity appears weakened — despite serious economic troubles, growing domestic demand for peace, manpower shortages at the front, and other internal vulnerabilities.

The final touch of the “victory” campaign, clearly adapted two weeks before the Kremlin parade due to the lack of any retaliatory actions from the West following Russia’s new attacks on civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, was an article published by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Among other things, this article introduced the distinct narrative of fighting not just against Ukraine but against “Euro-Nazism” and “Euro-Nazism as a common challenge to both Moscow and Washington.” Divide and conquer.

Tactically, the May 9 parade in Moscow can indeed be called a “victory” for Putin: sitting next to him on the parade stand was Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and slightly behind, not counting leaders from the Global South and other allies, were the leaders of Slovakia and Serbia – Fico and Vučić, who dared to come to Moscow and shake hands with a war criminal despite all the arguments against it from the head of European diplomacy. The May 9 parade on Red Square in Moscow, in its propagandistic and political significance, solidified only a tactical victory for the Kremlin, but from this theatrical display, one can also outline a strategic vision for the future. The Kremlin approached May 2025 as the main speaker and troublemaker of the global anti-democratic or anti-Western coalition, supported by China and even its own publicly sworn European leaders. Combined with the sharpened campaign against “Euro-Nazism,” China’s support for Russia’s aggressive policies, and the West’s failure to take decisive action to curb the Kremlin, Putin’s hands could effectively be untied in future invasions, whether hot or hybrid wars.

If the West falters and lifts sanctions from the Kremlin, not keeping them as punishment for the bloodiest war in recent decades and as a tool of restraint, the question of Russia’s new aggression under Putin could very likely move from the realm of “if” to “when.” The possibility of attempts to manipulate the West’s main military power, which has publicly declared its readiness for a reset, economic cooperation, and other handshakes with the Putin’s regime, further exacerbates the situation, turning “when” from an abstract time period into a very real prospect within electoral cycles.

The Kremlin’s threats to Europe, trying to divide Brussels and Washington, are clearly visible both in the “common challenge to Moscow and Washington” and in how Putin personally emphasized his attitude towards Europe in his emergency address about negotiations with Ukraine after the parade. He stated that countries that collaborated with Hitler would not speak to Russia in the language of ultimatums.

Global economic problems, the need to calm Russians who are expecting peace, the necessity to rearm, and the desire not to anger President Trump, pushed Putin to respond to Ukraine and the West’s demands and propose, instead of the requested 30-day ceasefire, direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. This proposal refers to the talks interrupted at the beginning of Russia’s invasion, when the Kremlin effectively demanded that Kyiv surrender.

Putin is walking a fine line — seeking to seize the moment and extract maximum advantage from the current political climate in the West, while avoiding steps that could trigger new sanctions instead of getting existing ones lifted. Whether the West will continue to follow the Kremlin’s manipulations or use Putin’s vulnerable position for maximum pressure across all areas will determine whether Ukraine and all of Europe will face a “just peace” or a new aggression.

“Victory”: The Development of the Narrative

The Kremlin’s central narrative of “victory,” manipulatively linked to World War II, was set from the very beginning of the year. Vladimir Putin declared 2025 as the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland, repeatedly equating the participants of the 1945 war with those in the aggressive war against Ukraine. This historical reference was embedded in the foundation of the “special operation,” when Putin declared its goal as “denazification.” “Everything we do – both on the frontlines and here – must be dedicated to a single goal – Victory,” Putin articulated the narrative during a meeting with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On February 24, the Ministry of Education launched the large-scale project “We won then, we will win now!” with over 500 events in universities across the country, involving more than 25,000 students and schoolchildren.

The term “victory” was consciously separated by the Kremlin from the real events on the frontlines. Despite limited progress and significant problems for the Russian army, Vladimir Putin declared that there was “an offensive practically along all sections,” and promised to “press” and “finish off” the Ukrainian Armed Forces. An important part of the campaign was the announcement of the full “liberation” of the Kursk region on April 26, despite harsh criticism from both independent analysts and pro-war Z-bloggers, who labeled it a “victory on credit.”

Escalating Confrontation

After the Kremlin saw no threats or risks from the new U.S. administration, and against the backdrop of a general split among Western countries, it intensified both its diplomatic pressure and military terror.

On April 16, with the publication of the Foreign Intelligence Service’s material “Just as 80 years ago, Eurofascism is a shared enemy of Moscow and Washington,” the Kremlin launched a large-scale campaign against EU countries, positioning itself against the descendants of the “defeated” as both historical and ideological opponents. On April 30, at a BRICS meeting, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated, “Europe has forgotten who liberated it from fascism.” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report titled “80 Years After the Great Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Once Again Over Europe.” In addition to significant escalation in rhetoric and threats of military invasion or strikes on European countries, the Kremlin returned to nuclear blackmail. Sergei Shoigu, in an interview with the TASS propaganda agency, stated, “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against it or the Republic of Belarus, including using conventional weapons.”

Concurrently, the Kremlin began to present increasingly harsh conditions for a possible settlement within the framework of negotiations. On April 26, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova declared that “after the Kursk region, all territories of Russian subjects still under Kyiv’s control will certainly be liberated,” referring to regions listed in the Russian constitution but not yet fully occupied by the Russian army. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an interview with the Brazilian newspaper O Globo on April 28, outlined a list of maximalist demands from the Kremlin, including the requirement for Ukraine’s “demilitarization,” which means limiting the size of the Ukrainian army, and “denazification,” which likely implies the cancellation of certain Ukrainian laws. Putin’s close associate, presidential aide and head of the Marine Board, Nikolai Patrushev, in an interview with TASS on April 28, stated that Russia was only approaching “victory” and that Odessa’s future “was not linked to the Kyiv regime.”

As part of intensifying pressure on Ukraine and its allies, the Kremlin carried out a series of strikes on civilian infrastructure aimed at maximizing civilian casualties. On April 4, Kryvyi Rih was attacked (21 killed, including 9 children), and Sumy (35 killed, including two children). On April 24, Kyiv was attacked, resulting in 12 fatalities, with another 90 wounded.

May 9 as the Triumph of the “Global Majority”

An important part of the overall “victory” campaign was the positioning of the Kremlin not just as a powerful player against whom attempts at sanctions and isolation have no effect, but also Vladimir Putin as one of the key leaders of the “global majority.” The preparation for May 9 focused on narratives about a “civilizational confrontation,” in which Russia and Putin are presented as the sole rightful heirs of the anti-fascist coalition, while Europe is portrayed as a resurgent source of Nazism.

The Kremlin aimed to demonstrate a divide and try to deepen it: a split between the EU and the US in their views on the future world, expressed, in part, through the subcampaign “The US – a historical ally since World War II,” thematically echoing the talks between Putin and Witkoff. Another important element for the Kremlin was emphasizing the divisions within Europe. Therefore, significant propaganda attention was given to the visits of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. The Kremlin, through the mouth of President’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov, called these visits “acts of heroism.” This “act” was contrasted with the attack on European leaders, portrayed in propaganda as the “descendants of the losers.” The main target was the head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, who called for not visiting Russia.

The main guest at the Kremlin’s “Victory Day” celebration was the leader of the PRC, Xi Jinping, who arrived in Moscow for a three-day visit. Despite the formal scheduling of the visit, it fit into the established ritual of celebrating the end of World War II, which has been in place since 2015: first, Xi visits Moscow on May 9, and then Putin attends celebrations marking the end of the war in the Pacific theater on September 3. This year, the image of the Russian and Chinese leaders sitting together at the parade became a symbol of the failure of US efforts to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. According to a source from The Washington Post, discussions of American attempts to provoke such a rift were a topic during Putin’s and Xi’s talks.

Propaganda actively quoted The Washington Post, which stated that “the Victory Day parade… became a victory for President Vladimir Putin himself as a leader whom the West is trying to isolate.” “The presence of guests from Asia, Africa, Latin America at the parade is a statement that the world has long and irrevocably moved away from the situation when its core was the political-ideological confrontation in the north. And it is extremely important that it was in Moscow, at Russia’s invitation, that this event took place, becoming a bright symbol of the expansion of the space of global politics,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, Director of Scientific Work at the Valdai Club, summarizing May 9. In this context, based on contacts with leaders of the “Global South,” especially China, the Kremlin demonstrates confidence and asserts that it can continue its campaign against Ukraine without consequences and expand its confrontation with Europe.

The Kremlin’s Balance

In negotiation rhetoric, the Kremlin balances between maximalist conditions it refuses to back down from and the desire to avoid conflict with the US — aiming to soften sanctions pressure. The domestic political situation remains difficult: according to Levada Center data, the share of supporters of negotiations reached 61% (the highest since 2022), while 30% were opponents. However, the Kremlin fears the reaction from the pro-war camp — primarily radical military figures and pro-war bloggers — to any hints of compromise.

An additional pressure point is the economic factor. In April 2025, civilian sectors showed a record decline of 15% year-on-year, the worst result since the start of the war. GDP growth in the first quarter was just 1%, compared to 4% in late 2024, signaling actual stagnation. In the first four months, the budget deficit amounted to 3.2 trillion rubles, with expenditures at 16 trillion rubles — 20% higher than the previous year. Revenues from oil and gas continue to decline, the “military” economic model is losing stability, and even the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance effectively acknowledge the recession.

Formally, Vladimir Putin has not rejected negotiations and even initiated direct talks with Ukraine on May 11. However, he rejected a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, which was recorded in a statement by the president’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov about the intention to “resist any pressure.” The proposal to hold talks in Istanbul on May 15 was hastily presented by the Kremlin as a major diplomatic success. Propaganda used phrases like “played masterfully” and “came out victorious” in relation to Putin’s actions.

Press secretary Dmitry Peskov, in a statement for journalists on May 12, emphasized the support from the “global majority” countries: “The approach, aimed precisely at finding a real diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian crisis, eliminating the root causes of the conflict, and establishing lasting peace, was met with support and understanding from the leaders of many states, including our partners in the CIS, BRICS, as well as from other countries.” Vladimir Putin highlighted this in his late-night statement on May 11, expressing gratitude for the “mediatory services” of China, Brazil, African countries, and the Middle East.

Negotiations: Offense and Defense

The topic of potential image damage for Vladimir Putin became a sensitive issue for the Kremlin after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal for a personal meeting between the two leaders in Istanbul on May 15. The sharp reaction from official spokespeople and propaganda highlights the importance of this issue. Konstantin Kosachev, Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council, called Zelensky’s statement “comedy,” asserting that such meetings would not take place. Meanwhile, Vladimir Dzhabarov, Deputy Chair of the Committee on International Affairs, emphasized Zelensky’s “illegitimacy,” accusing him of “treason” and “bloody crimes.” However, the potential involvement of Donald Trump in the negotiations in Istanbul could create problems for the Kremlin, which is wary of the rapprochement between Washington and Kyiv.

The main threats to the Kremlin remain new sanctions and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. In response to statements from European leaders expressing readiness for sanction pressure, the Kremlin has intensified its rhetoric. On May 11, Vladimir Solovyov, the chief Kremlin propagandist, announced on “Russia 1” that “a child’s head” had been found in the village of Russkoye Porechnoe (Kursk region), adding threats: “We will destroy you if you intervene. Your cities will burn like Donbass.”

Furthermore, the Kremlin continues its campaign to discredit European leaders, accusing them of drug addiction. Propaganda channels actively spread memes on this topic, and Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, on May 11 in her Telegram channel, accused Zelensky and European leaders of “addiction,” commenting on their actions in the context of conspiracy theories. The campaign was supported by Kirill Dmitriev, Margarita Simonyan, and TASS.

The Kremlin also continues to maintain a tough position while declaring a peaceful intent. On May 11, Putin stated that the goal was to “eliminate the root causes of the conflict,” referring to NATO expansion and the war’s objectives — the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine. Leonid Slutsky, head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, added: “The positions on Ukraine’s non-alignment status, on the demilitarization of Ukraine, and several other points voiced by the President of Russia some time ago will remain unchanged. At the same time, we must take measures to ensure that Ukraine no longer poses a danger to surrounding states and the surrounding world.”

The situation, where the threat of sanctions and increased military support for Ukraine are not realized in the event of continued delay of the war by Putin, creates a risk of escalation in the Kremlin’s aggression, likely with the potential for expanding its geographical scope. Russian officials and propagandists are increasingly claiming readiness to move to a more aggressive scenario, raising the threats to Europe.

Useful Links

Putin’s Tactical “Victory”and the New Test for Western Resolve

Executive Summary

Putin’s Tactical “Victory”
and the New Test for Western Resolve