Mobilization: Infrastructure Readiness and the Kremlin’s Political Vulnerability

Monthly Russian Army Losses Outpacing Replenishment

Russia's capacity to replenish its invasion force is gradually narrowing. In January 2026, according to Bloomberg, Russian army losses exceeded new recruits by approximately 9,000 personnel (22). Two factors account for this gap: the implementation of Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov's strategy of scaling Russian army casualties to 50,000 per month (23), and a slowdown in voluntary contract-soldier enlistment — corroborated indirectly by the sharp increases in one-time recruitment bonuses in at least 16 regions since January (24). In St. Petersburg the bonus was raised twice, nearly doubling from 2.5 million to 4.5 million rubles (25) (from $32,2k to $58k). The authorities have also turned to other instruments: by February 2026, an active recruitment campaign was underway at a minimum of 70 higher and secondary educational institutions across 23 regions (26), with students being offered "a special one-year contract," assignment to drone units 20 kilometers from the front line, continued tuition-free university enrollment, and large one-time payments inaccessible to an ordinary student by default. This approach fits with Russian society's broad indifference towards contract soldiers: in closed Levada Centre focus groups (27), Russians acknowledge that "contract soldiers' relatives should be the ones worrying about them — it was their own choice, it's their job, and a well-paid one at that."

Optimization of Mobilization Infrastructure and Information Controls

The Kremlin continues to upgrade its army recruitment system and build out the infrastructure needed to reduce administrative costs in the event of a new mobilization. Since the "partial mobilization" of 2022 — which remains legally in force, as no ending decree was ever signed — the Kremlin has been working through its lessons learned: developing a unified state register of military records; digitizing the issuance of mobilization and conscription notices; and introducing a set of automatic civil restrictions triggered by failure to appear at a military commissariat within 20 days, including bans on driving, obtaining new credit, and leaving the country. The upgrades have continued: the conscription age ceiling was raised from 27 to 30 in 2024 (28), and from 2026 conscription formally became year-round (29) (though actual induction dates remain unchanged, with the spring call-up still beginning on 1 April). On 10 March 2026, a bill was introduced (30) to the State Duma abolishing the mandatory suspension of a military commissariat's conscription decision when a citizen challenges it in court — meaning unlawful induction decisions will now have to be contested by the person who is already serving in the Russian army. All these measures are primarily aimed at improving recruitment figures by reducing the proportion of men who can successfully evade the draft.

The Kremlin has simultaneously drawn lessons from the public anger and ratings damage that accompanied the 2022 mobilization, when a sharp spike in Russian interest in independent media and uncensored platforms was recorded. The throttling of streaming services (YouTube) and the progressive blockage of Telegram and WhatsApp — the primary vehicles for state-independent communication and information — have recently reached peak intensity. Telegram traffic in Moscow fell 85% in the week of 9–15 March compared with the first week of the month (31), and a full ban is possible from 1 April, according to sources at the independent outlet The Bell (32). To manage information flows in the messaging "grey zone," the Kremlin is pressing ahead with an aggressive campaign to redirect users — through both promotion and administrative pressure — towards MAX, a state messenger fully transparent to the security services. Reports indicate (33) that users are automatically subscribed to pro-war and propaganda channels on MAX — including that of leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov — with no option to unsubscribe. The ability to monitor communications, track users, and suppress unwanted content quickly is of particular value to the Kremlin in the event of a domestic shock — exactly the kind of shock the 2022 partial mobilization delivered.

Domestic Political Risks of a New Mobilization Wave

Despite the upgraded mobilization infrastructure and tightened information controls, the risk of a formal new mobilization wave in the near term is relatively low. The authorities' efforts are far more likely to focus on coercing new conscripts into signing contracts. Ahead of the autumn elections to the Russian State Duma — personally important to Putin as a showcase for the propaganda image of "the unity of the peoples of the Russian Federation" in support of his aggressive policy course — the Kremlin is already dealing with a ratings slide driven by the messaging blockages and rising socioeconomic discontent, as recorded even by state-linked pollsters. Trust in the president stands at its lowest point since mid-2024 (72.9% (34)), per the state-controlled All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM); government disapproval is up 4 percentage points since January (35); and United Russia's rating fell 7 points in February alone — from 43% to 36% (36) — according to the state-linked Public Opinion Foundation (FOM). Kremlin-connected political strategists acknowledge that "the real trend towards a sharp ratings decline has already become entrenched, accompanied by tightening control over the information environment, including action against VPN services and alternative content sources." Several Telegram channels close to the Kremlin describe the effect of the messaging blockages as "the most unpopular decision in four years, after the partial mobilization — it infuriates absolutely everyone." (37) Against this backdrop, a decision to launch a new mobilization wave would unambiguously produce a further ratings collapse — one that, given record public demand for peace negotiations (67%, Levada Centre (38)) and the lowest share since 2022 backing continued military operations (24%, Levada Centre (39)), could seriously jeopardize the Kremlin's all-important nationwide State Duma campaign.

Frustration Within the pro-war Z Community

According to the Levada Centre, fear of mobilization is one of the main drivers of public anxiety in Russia: as of September 2025, 51% of Russians feared the declaration of a general mobilization — up 17 percentage points from February 2025 (40). Against a backdrop of rising discontent and falling approval ratings, a new mobilization wave could trigger a sharp increase in protest potential — the security-services-adjacent Telegram channel Dva Mayora ("Two Majors") draws a direct link between the messaging blockages and the risks of "internal unrest." (41) At the same time, the Kremlin's continued maximalism in the peace talks, and its constant insistence on recognition of "territorial realities," is being read by many pro-war Z-commentators as a signal that escalation and a new mobilization wave will follow the inevitable collapse of negotiations (42), (43), (44). Ultra-conservative Kremlin philosopher Alexander Dugin is among those calling for it (45): "Russia has a window of a few months in which something extraordinarily successful must be achieved — something visible and convincing. [...] These two months must be used to take Kyiv at any cost. All these salami strategies — take a bit more, then a bit more — don't work. [...] Because beyond that, the enemy's plan is roughly as follows: eliminate Russia's top leadership while simultaneously destabilizing protest sentiment from three directions [...] on the eve of pointless and unwanted elections." Pro-war blogger Maxim Kalashnikov echoes this, calling for a "Final Escalation" to seize what remains of Donetsk Oblast and demanding "a mobilization of at least half a million reservists." (46) Some Z-commentators also connect an anticipated mobilization to the purge of Sergei Shoigu's network — citing the arrest of his former deputy Ruslan Malikov as evidence that "a decision has been taken at the top to proceed with a new mobilization of reservists." (47) The most recent reporting from Nezygar, however, contradicts the hawkish faction's expectations: "the authorities are not, at least until summer or autumn, considering a new wave of forced mobilization" (48) — but after the elections one can expect "unpopular decisions, including on the mobilization of the economy and its final transition to a war footing, as well as the mobilization of military-age men." (49) The frustrated Z-commentariat also pushes back on the premise that a new mobilization wave would change the battlefield picture. Pro-Kremlin military correspondent Roman Alekhin argues that mobilization must not be declared, since "it would only help fulfil Zelensky's plan to destroy Russian soldiers within a month." (50) What can actually shift the situation, he contends, is innovation — technical and managerial. The Telegram channel Vozhak concurs, arguing that "the question of a second mobilization will resolve itself" depending on whether Ukrainian forces first develop effective countermeasures to "birdies" — killer drones that have effectively frozen the front line by turning a 20-kilometre belt into a kill zone (51). Pro-war military correspondent Kotenok (52) is more direct: mobilizing even 500,000 people cannot fix the problem, since "in reality the odds are high that many of them will, unfortunately, be killed fairly quickly." What the Russian armed forces actually need, he says, is structural reform of a deteriorating command system. His conclusion: "The task of achieving the special military operation's (SMO, the official Russian term for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine) objectives has not been dropped — it may simply be deferred in connection with a possible suspension of hostilities. All the more so because, by all indications, we are in for another major war." (53)

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