Executive Summary
In recent weeks, as elements of the Russian elite have sought to advance a liberalisation agenda both in public discourse and within the Kremlin, senior figures across the security establishment have systematically escalated public accusations that European states are preparing aggression against Russia. These statements from the security bloc have been accompanied by a series of concrete provocations. The scale and coordination of the campaign suggest that the security apparatus is now openly pushing for an expansion of the war beyond Ukraine, where Russia remains unable to achieve the decisive victory it needs. If the security bloc strengthens its position, this shift would dramatically increase the risk of escalation in the Baltic region.
On 23 April, several Russian official bodies simultaneously issued alarmist statements regarding alleged provocations by Europe: the Security Council of the Russian Federation accused (1) Lithuania of stoking tension on the borders of Kaliningrad Oblast, while Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko declared that "NATO is deliberately pursuing a course of escalating confrontation in this part of Europe. <...> Western countries are deliberately rehearsing scenarios of a naval blockade and seizure of Kaliningrad Oblast" (2). These statements were subsequently echoed by State Duma Defence Committee member Andrei Kolesnik, who warned that "Western military exercises practising a blockade of Kaliningrad Oblast could trigger a Russian response after which there will simply be no Europe at all" (3). All of these statements fit into the Kremlin’s single escalation narrative — “Europe is preparing aggression against Russia” — which has intensified in recent weeks. In Kremlin rhetoric, this typically signals either an attempt at intimidation or preparations for Russian aggression under the cover of a supposed “response to a threat.”
The campaign has seen significant public involvement from the hawkish wing of the security bloc, joined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Sergei Shoigu (4) (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation), Sergei Naryshkin (5) (Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR), Nikolai Patrushev (6) (former Security Council Secretary and Chair of the Maritime Board), Sergei Lavrov (7) (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Dmitry Medvedev (8) (Deputy Chairman of the Security Council), the Security Council itself through its press service (9) and Lavrov's deputies (10). Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also joined the campaign (11), as the collegiums of the Russian SVR and the Belarusian KGB held an in-person meeting in Kaliningrad to "coordinate responses to the West's aggressive policy." Taken together, these facts make clear that in the ongoing intra-elite conflict over Russia's strategic direction, the security bloc has moved to publicly pressing for escalation of the war beyond Ukraine.
Since the beginning of April, the escalatory rhetoric has encompassed every country in the Baltic and Nordic regions: the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Poland, and even Denmark. The principal narrative centred on earlier accusations that the Baltic states had provided an air corridor for Ukrainian UAVs to strike Russian ports on the Baltic Sea — though that line of rhetoric was subsequently extended to Finland and Poland as well. At the same time, Norway is accused of planning attacks on Russian vessels in concert with "Ukrainian militants," while Sweden and Poland are charged with providing infrastructure to transport NATO military cargo with the aim of disrupting Russia's logistics links to Kaliningrad Oblast. The nuclear threat dimension plays a particularly prominent role in the campaign: Russian propaganda is actively developing the theme that "Europeans are planning to use nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation."
A notable distinction from previous campaigns is that the Kremlin has not confined itself to propaganda and official rhetoric, but has also engaged in concrete provocations. Russian aviation has increased its violations of Baltic airspace and provocative incidents in the Baltic Sea (figures from (12) the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence: the first three weeks of April — 13 interceptions; March — 19; February — 10; January — 6). Shadow fleet tankers used to circumvent sanctions are now ostentatiously escorted by Russian naval frigates (13), while the Russian Ministry of Defence has prominently published (14) a target list — comprising European manufacturers and suppliers of drones to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In these circumstances, the risk of direct or hybrid escalation by Moscow in the Baltic Sea region is substantial. The combination of three key elements — the overarching domestic narrative of "Europe preparing aggression against Russia," a series of concrete provocations, and public statements from virtually every senior figure in the hawkish wing of the security bloc — makes clear that the Kremlin is treating this intimidation campaign with the utmost seriousness.
Escalation becomes politically useful for the Kremlin: it can convert internal weakness into siege psychology, justify further securitization and militarization of Russian society, and, in the event of even limited tactical success, strengthen the security apparatus in its competition with civilian bureaucratic and oligarchic factions for control over the agenda. From a foreign policy perspective, against the backdrop of an already vulnerable position due to disagreements over the war in Iran, the damage to NATO from even a limited tactical operation by the Kremlin in any EU member state — if not met with an immediate Alliance response — would be tantamount to undermining NATO as an institution that has guaranteed the security of its members for decades. While a global war would entail significant additional economic risks for the anti-Western coalition, a limited tactical success in Europe without escalation into a broader conflict would also serve the interests of China and Iran, as it would amount to a humiliation and weakening of the United States.
On the other hand, public and non-public signals from the Russian Presidential Administration about the need to reduce the level of restrictions could, if this faction of officials and their patrons within the Russian elite strengthens, lead not only to a reduction in escalation against Europe but also to progress toward a peaceful settlement with Ukraine.
The Baltic region as an escalation zone
The escalatory rhetorical course the Kremlin established earlier against the Baltic states is continuing, and steadily expanding to encompass the wider region. The narrative alleging that "the Baltic states provided an air corridor for Ukrainian drones to strike Russia" continues to be actively promoted by Russian propaganda and official spokespeople, despite the fact that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and gas terminals in the Baltic Sea ceased more than two weeks ago — the last recorded strikes occurred on the night of 6–7 April, with their peak in late March. This sustained propaganda focus on the Baltic states signals elevated risks of escalation — whether direct or hybrid — risks that are further compounded by Moscow's accusations against other countries of the Baltic and Nordic regions: Finland, Poland, Sweden, and even Norway.
On 9 April, a propaganda campaign was launched alleging that Norway, in concert with "Ukrainian militants," was planning attacks on Russian vessels in the Barents and Norwegian seas (15), (16), and by mid-month this had coalesced into a single narrative: "the Scandinavian peninsula is being turned into an anti-Russian staging ground for strikes against Russia" (17). To substantiate the alleged "Russophobia" of Scandinavia, extensive coverage was devoted to Zelensky's official visit to Norway and the Swedish King's visit to Ukraine, while Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Sweden of supplying strategic materials to the Third Reich, "making the Holocaust and the genocide of the Soviet people possible" (18). The Telegram channel Two Majors, which is close to the security services, meanwhile described (19) a declaration by several European countries on the movement of military cargo via the North Sea–Baltic corridor as a deliberate "provocation" aimed at disrupting logistics with Kaliningrad Oblast.
Finland and Poland have also been drawn into the scope of official escalatory rhetoric: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared (20) an "outright revival of Nazism" in Finland, and additionally accused (21) Poland of providing its airspace for strikes against the north of the Russian Federation. This was echoed by (22) former Defence Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, who stated that "there has been an increase in cases where Ukrainian drone strikes are being carried out via Finland and the Baltic states," making them "open accomplices in aggression against Russia" — to which Russia may respond by exercising "the inherent right of states to self-defence." The same message was delivered by former Security Council Secretary and Maritime Board Chair Nikolai Patrushev, who described the Baltic states and Finland as "accomplices in Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian ports in Leningrad Oblast" (23).
Particularly significant in the course of this campaign are accusations implicating European countries in a nuclear threat: allegations of possible nuclear weapons deployment in Finland, with contradictory narratives appearing on the same dates (24), (25), (26), (27), accusations that Poland is being nuclearised (28) through its inclusion in the French nuclear deterrence framework, alongside Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece (29) — all of which has been characterised as a "dangerous trend" (30) and Europe's preparation for nuclear war (31). On 23 April, Russian pro-war Z-channels (32), (33) and propaganda outlets (34) were actively circulating reports of simulated nuclear warhead strikes against Russia and Belarus and the rehearsal of nuclear strikes against Russia — specifically against St Petersburg (35), prompting State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Chepa to call for "punching the West in the teeth" (36).
However, at this stage of the escalation the Kremlin has not confined itself to rhetoric alone: since the beginning of the year, the number of provocations in international airspace over the Baltic region has increased substantially. The most recent and striking provocation was a demonstration of force on 20 April, when two Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and ten fighter jets (Su-30s and Su-35s) flew over the Baltic Sea (37). According to (38) the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, in the first three weeks of April alone, Russian military aircraft were intercepted by NATO aviation near the borders of the Baltic states on 13 occasions (March: 19; February: 10; January: 6).
Belarus as a Potential Partner in Escalation
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also actively participated in the escalation propaganda campaign in the Baltic region, declaring on 14 April: "We need to mobilise now to get through this difficult time. A murky time. As President, I don't know what to prepare you for" (39). The day after this wide-ranging statement, a joint session of the collegiums of the Russian SVR and the Belarusian KGB was held in Kaliningrad "to coordinate responses to the West's aggressive policy" (40), at which SVR Director Sergei Naryshkin delivered the narrative of impending aggression against Russia: "The situation on the Union State's border is extremely tense; the Baltic states and Poland have intensified the militarisation of their economies" (41).
On 20 April, an interview with Alexander Lukashenko was published by the Russian propaganda media group RT, in which the Belarusian dictator echoed the Kremlin's narrative of Western countries preparing aggression against Russia and Belarus: "My task is to warn my neighbours: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and perhaps Ukraine to some extent. God forbid they commit aggression against Belarus. We don't want war; we have no intention of fighting them <…> We won't do so unless we are drawn into this war and forced to respond" (42). Against this backdrop, according to former Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba, there are "clear signs of Belarus preparing for military escalation" (43): (1) continuous military exercises conducted under the supervision of Russian military instructors, in which the Belarusian army has been engaged without interruption for five years; (2) an emphasis by the leadership on nationwide mobilisation readiness; (3) command-and-staff exercises held in March to rehearse coordination at headquarters and unit level; (4) the strengthening of air defence systems; (5) deepening integration between the Belarusian and Russian armed forces.
The Kremlin's Overarching Escalation Narrative
All statements by Russian officials feed into the overarching narrative that Sergei Lavrov articulated clearly on 20 April: "on the western front, we see a persistent build-up towards assembling new armies for yet another attempt to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on the Russian Federation" (44). This camouflage of the Kremlin's own escalation course as a response to "Europe's preparations for war" is aimed primarily at conditioning domestic public opinion for the possibility of direct escalation or hybrid provocations in the Baltic Sea — actions that could be routinely framed as a "pre-emptive strike" or "defence against European aggression." Beyond official spokespersons, this narrative is actively promoted by domestic propaganda. On 19 April, for example, in the Sunday television news program — which traditionally serves as a digest of all the Kremlin's principal narratives for a domestic audience — propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov declared (45) that "nobody is attacking Europe — it is increasingly turning itself into the attacking party," adding pointedly that legitimate grounds for a retaliatory strike by Moscow already exist: "if countries not involved in the conflict host military production in support of a state in conflict on their territory, their neutrality is forfeit." The propaganda campaign "Europe is preparing aggression against Russia" is concurrently operating on multiple tracks: the overarching narrative is accompanied by subsidiary lines of messaging, pitched at the same register but targeting different domestic audiences:
Within the pro-war Z-community, the case for escalation is made (46), (47) on the grounds that action must come before Europe is ready for war — with 2030 cited as the deadline.
The current moment is framed as a "window of opportunity": Dmitry Medvedev, former President of Russia and a prominent pro-war voice, develops the narrative of internal conflict within NATO against the backdrop of the war in the Middle East, arguing that the United States "will not go to bat for Europe" in the event of a conflict with Russia and will not come to the aid of "the deranged European leaders who are drumming up a war with our country" (48).
New emphases are also being introduced: the narrative of an aggressive NATO bloc is now accompanied by a narrative casting European countries' Russophobia as inherent — irrespective of their alliance membership. "Europe is trying to forge a new military bloc out of the EU, Britain, Norway, and Ukraine, once again ‘trying to unite European armies under the banners of Nazism’," declares (49) Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Yet all these narratives converge on one point: the probability of a direct confrontation between Russia and Europe is growing markedly, while the Kremlin is signalling its readiness to raise the stakes through provocations — in airspace over the Baltic Sea and along the borders of the Baltic states, through the naval frigate escort of shadow fleet tankers (50) and through direct threats directed at European countries. A particularly striking development was the publication (51) by the Russian Ministry of Defence on 15 April of a list of potential targets — European manufacturers and suppliers of drones to the Ukrainian Armed Forces — with the statement that drone supplies to Ukraine constitute "a deliberate step leading to a sharp escalation of the military-political situation across the entire European continent and the gradual transformation of these countries into Ukraine's strategic rear." Dmitry Medvedev explicitly designated the production facilities listed in the Ministry of Defence's materials as targets on European territory.