Russian Propaganda: The Bus Strike As A Casus Belli

The central story in the propaganda campaign pressuring Minsk was a strike, allegedly by a Ukrainian drone, on a bus carrying a children's football team from Belarus in Bryansk region on June 17. Russian propaganda covered the event in detail while calling for revenge: the story led the weekly Sunday news roundup on the nationwide broadcaster Channel One on June 21 (28), which clearly demonstrates how much priority the Kremlin gave this topic relative to other events. A week later, on June 28, the story about the strike (29) again became one of the topics of the Sunday news roundup. At the same time, propaganda outlets deliberately ignored Lukashenko's conciliatory tone in response to the incident, cutting his remarks so that they would look like a call for escalation. "If someone is provoking us and trying to drag us into the war, I think it will go badly for whoever tries to do that," he said on June 18 (30), before shifting to more measured language: "we are waiting for the truth, or for a real, fair, honest response from Ukrainian officials, military personnel, and people" (31), and "we need to be busy playing football and doing other activities here. [...] Listen, do we really lack the land to play football on?" (32).

Resources linked to the leading Russian propagandist Vladimir Soloviev actively amplified this story, framing it within the narratives of "Ukrainian aggression against Belarus" and "Kyiv's terrorism." On June 19, on SolovievLive, Vadim Gigin, a member of the Belarusian House of Representatives and a frequent Belarusian voice in Russian propaganda materials, said that "it must be kept in mind that a terrorist regime sits south of our borders" (33). Also widely circulated was Sergei Lavrov's June 17 statement about "the Kyiv regime's deliberate tactic of striking civilian targets, particularly children" (34). Especially notable was a remark by Alexander Lukashevich, Russia's permanent representative to the CIS based in Minsk, who called the attack "an assault on the security of our Union State of Russia and Belarus" (35) and effectively called for a military response from Belarus:

"I hope our military, including the Belarusian military, will find an adequate response to this horrific tragedy" (36).

The same narrative was echoed (37) by Sergei Glazyev, the Union State's state secretary, who called the bus strike "a fact of deliberate escalation of this conflict [...] by the Russophobic Banderite regime," and stated that "the increasingly frequent provocations [...] will meet an adequate rebuff."

Against this backdrop, according to several sources (38), (39) cited by the Telegram channel Nezygar, known for its controlled leaks from the Presidential Administration, concern over the provocations was clearly visible within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): "Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan expressed concerns about being drawn into the Ukrainian conflict [...] The CSTO apparatus is urging against hasty decisions and is asking Lukashenko to find ways to avoid conflicts." According to the same sources, "Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will not send military contingents to defend Belarus, and raising the question at all could lead to the organization's collapse."

Reaction To The Pressure: Lukashenko's De-Escalation And Propaganda's Response

On June 20, Volodymyr Zelensky issued a demand (40) that Belarus dismantle the relay stations in its border regions that the Russian army was using to strike Ukrainian territory. Russian propaganda widely cited this statement within the narrative "Usurper Zelensky threatens Belarusian President Lukashenko" (41), (42), adopting a register aimed at escalation and circulating claims along the lines of "Belarus does not bend": "Everyone knows perfectly well that threats, blackmail, and various ultimatums simply do not work on Belarus. It's pointless" (43). It is highly telling that, unlike its Russian counterparts, Belarusian propaganda gave this story fairly limited attention, indicating that Lukashenko decided not to complicate the situation by refraining from commenting on it personally or covering it widely in the media. The state news agency BelTA did not publish a single item about Zelensky's statement (44), and the state Belarusian Television and Radio Company (BTRC) (45), which includes at least 21 major propaganda outlets of the Lukashenko regime, published only five items on the topic over the past week and a half. Amid Minsk's silence, Zelensky stated on June 24 that the relay stations had stopped operating as of June 22 (46).

The most visible public expression of Lukashenko's position came at a meeting (47) on June 25 with Moscow region governor Andrei Vorobyov, who arrived accompanied by Russia's ambassador to Belarus, Boris Gryzlov. According to the Telegram channel VChK-OGPU (48), which has ties to the security bloc, Vorobyov was compelled to ask Lukashenko to "help resolve the gasoline shortage." At this meeting, the Belarusian dictator disclosed a recent secret visit by Zelensky's representatives to Minsk, commenting on it in conciliatory, measured terms:

"Come on, guys, let's negotiate. We need to negotiate seriously [...] No need to kick up dust, no need to shout, no need to try to punch someone in the face the Russian way and so on. Let's do this like human beings, understanding what Russia is and what we are. There's understanding on that too."

Immediately afterward, he loudly accused Moscow of trying to drag Belarus into the war, attributing direct responsibility for this to Ambassador Gryzlov, who was sitting across from him:

"And there's no need to push us toward the idea that Boris Vyacheslavovich is organizing a process to drag us into the war. President Putin and I have discussed this a thousand times. How are we supposed to fight the Ukrainians here, when the forces on the other side are mostly territorial defense troops? Are we really going to shoot these machine operators, milkmaids, and working guys who don't want to fight Belarusians? We don't want to fight the Ukrainians either."

Ilya Remeslo, a previously pro-government blogger who was committed to a psychiatric hospital in March 2026 for criticizing Putin, reports that, with regard to this quote and Lukashenko's other remarks,

"a strict ban on their mention was imposed across all Russian state media" (49).

Indeed, the accusations against Gryzlov were simply ignored by propaganda outlets.

Literally the next day, Lukashenko made an unscheduled two-day visit to Russia, meeting with Putin at his Valdai residence "in an informal setting." No details of the talks were disclosed, however. Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, offered only general remarks (50) about a discussion of "strategic issues and attempts to provoke Belarus," and he denied earlier reports (51) that Lukashenko had passed on to Putin a proposal from Kyiv to begin peace talks. A diplomatic source cited by the insider channel Nezygar claims that "following the Putin-Lukashenko meeting at Valdai, Belarus confirmed its non-involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict [...] Putin allowed that possible talks on Ukraine could be held in Belarus, should the process reach that stage" (52). Nezygar also commented (53) on Lukashenko's subsequent visit to Beijing, during which Xi Jinping voiced support for Belarus "in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity" (54): "Lukashenko received Xi Jinping's 'blessing' to secure his autonomy and independence [...] This allows Lukashenko to carry himself with equal confidence in his dealings with both Putin and Zelensky. For the Kremlin, this outcome of Lukashenko's Beijing visit means a further rise in the unpredictability of Lukashenko's behavior, and this unpredictability becomes most dangerous of all as Kyiv plays a game of raising the stakes." In this way, Lukashenko's balancing act between different centers of power continued. In this context, it became known on July 1 (55) that 32 convicts had been pardoned, 28 of them political prisoners, something the Belarusian dictator traditionally uses as a gesture of "goodwill" and a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West.

Meanwhile, Russian propaganda continued its campaign of pressuring Minsk toward escalation. On the nationwide broadcaster Channel One on June 28, a segment aired (56) titled "The leader of the Kyiv regime had earlier issued threats against Minsk." It effectively set out the narrative frame of Ukraine preparing an "imminent" invasion of Belarus as the narco-Führer's reaction to the "relentless" advance of Russian forces: "Kyiv had clearly planned a multi-step operation. [...] First, a Ukrainian drone struck a bus carrying children from Belarus in Bryansk region [...] Two days later Zelensky comes out with threats against Belarus, openly stating that he intends to violate the Belarusian-Ukrainian border [...] Yet the reports this week of village evacuations in Chernihiv region suggest that Ukrainian provocations are being prepared on the border with Belarus." Vladimir Soloviev's Telegram channel circulated the same narratives:

"The growing geopolitical insolence that he [Zelensky] displays in every direction is part of a deliberate strategy" (57).

Z-Community: Hope For Escalation And Another Disappointment

Pro-war Z-bloggers actively covered the Belarus-related agenda. All of them framed the drone strike on the bus in escalatory terms: military blogger Alexander Kots wrote that "Kyiv may well have calculated cynically that the strike on children would serve as a casus belli for Belarus" (58), while the major Z-channel Readovka, which has ties to the Ministry of Defense, dressed up escalatory rhetoric as an expert's statement: "Belarus reserves the right to strike Ukraine" (59). The military volunteer Alexey Zhivov echoed the same logic: "the only hope is that Lukashenko won't put up with it" (60), while the ultra-radical Z-blogger Yulia Vityazeva got ahead of events and voiced disappointment with Belarus's expected response: "Minsk's reaction can already be predicted: condemnation, but no sharp moves. It was made clear the day before yesterday that Belarus will not go to war" (61). Z-authors reacted to Zelensky's ultimatum on the relay stations with fury: "This creature, drunk on its own impunity, gets more insolent by the day!" (62), "Just strangle this louse already!" (63), "The expired narco-Führer repeated his ultimatum against Belarus" (64).

Beyond emotional statements on the topic, most Z-authors pushed a unified line: escalation around Belarus is inevitable because "it is part of the West's preparations for aggression against Russia, in which Kyiv is merely a puppet". The Telegram channel Two Majors, which has ties to the security bloc, wrote that "Zelensky is carrying out the task the West has set him: to drag Minsk into the war" (65), and that his "demands [...] are not aimed at a settlement, since they are in essence ultimatums" (66). Alexander Sladkov, a military blogger for the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), said that "Minsk and Moscow are trying as hard as they can to keep Belarus from being dragged into the war. But if the Anglo-Saxons give Zelensky the order, and everyone understands this, he will attack" (67). Oleg Tsarev, a former Ukrainian politician, claimed that the decision to draw Belarus into the war was made by the West during Zelensky's visit to the United Kingdom: "If I were in Lukashenko's place, I would prepare Belarus for war around the clock [...] On June 6-7, Zelensky flies to London, meets with Starmer, Macron, and Merz, and discusses further tightening the pressure on Russia and security issues. Attacks on Belarus begin immediately after the meeting. [...] It's not the relay stations they want to take down. It's Batka [a colloquial, paternalistic nickname for Lukashenko] they want to take down" (68). The Z-analyst and military blogger Yuri Kotenok wrote about the prospects of the hypothetical conflict spreading: "The West has convinced the Khazar junkie that now is a convenient moment to terrorize both Russians and Belarusians at once. [...] With Kyiv's strikes and a probable response from the Belarusian army, the risk of the Poles and the contingents stationed in the Baltic dwarves being drawn into the conflict rises sharply. I rate the probability of provocations and attempted strikes on Belarusians by Poland and the dwarves as very high" (69). In the view of the Z-channel WarGonzo, "The only one who could benefit from escalation is Zelensky. Thanks to a new conflict he could boost his political standing in the West and request more money and weapons from there" (70). This same narrative was later echoed (71) by Belarusian deputy foreign minister Igor Sekreta in an interview with RT.

Military bloggers commented on Lukashenko's de-escalation tactics reluctantly, either calling it part of a "Kyiv information operation" (72) or indulging in sarcasm amid their disappointment that escalation had failed to materialize. The Telegram channel Svarshchiki, which has ties to the security bloc, stated that "Lukashenko asked for the Oreshnik to be withdrawn so as not to spoil the sheds of Ukrainian mushroom pickers. Just a joke." (73) Some Z-channels, meanwhile, reacted with considerable suspicion to Lukashenko's meeting with Putin and the information blackout that accompanied it. The channel MIG of Russia wrote that "the main subject of this difficult conversation is whether we're in the same boat as Belarus, or whether, although we're sailing alongside each other, our boats are different ones, and at a certain historical moment our courses may diverge" (74). At the same time, the Z-blogger Romanov Light voiced disappointment with the authorities, suggesting that the subject of the talks might be a peace settlement: "Minsk-3? Surely they won't get fooled again this time?" (75). The outcome of Lukashenko's subsequent visit to Beijing was ironically commented on by Alex Parker Returns, a Z-blogger critical of the authorities:

"China supports Belarus in defending its sovereignty [...] So annexing Belarus and folding it into Russia within the Union State isn't going to happen" (76).

Sources