The Kremlin continues its war despite a sustained majority demand for peace. Mounting economic problems and growing social tensions are turning this disconnect into its principal source of vulnerability. October alone saw 38+ antiwar actions and 75+ actions against political repression in Russia, alongside dozens of protests of varying scale over other issues across the country. Key topics:

  1. War: Fatigue Without Hope as the Main Source of Vulnerability

  2. Economy: Tightening Controls Amid Depletion and Deteriorating Expectations

  3. Society: Intensifying Domestic Conflicts

Executive Summary

The Kremlin’s primary vulnerability is public fatigue with a war that offers little hope of ending. Nearly two-thirds of Russians (65%, according to the independent Levada Center) favor peace negotiations over continued fighting, a share that has not fallen below 58–59% since January 2025, while support for the Russian military has declined from 78% to 69% since September 2025.

More Russians recognize that ending the war depends on Vladimir Putin and seek to protect themselves by shifting responsibility for the decision to make peace onto the president: 81% would support his decision to stop it, including 35% even if it meant returning occupied territories, while only 26% favor continued fighting. Yet the lack of progress in negotiations is deepening frustration, with a record 55% expecting the war to last more than another year.

The Kremlin’s historical narratives about Western attempts to weaken Russia increasingly struggle against citizens’ lived experience, and the demand for peace surfaces whenever an opening appears.

Support for the pro-peace Yabloko party reportedly reached 10% nationwide and 20% in Moscow during the parliamentary campaign before the authorities excluded it from the elections. Even as the regime purges the protest space, October saw at least 38 antiwar actions, including 23 acts of sabotage and defacement of military recruitment advertising, along with at least 75 actions against political repression.

Fear of general mobilization has risen to 58% across all age groups, and coercive recruitment raids documented in at least 34 regions are provoking their own forms of resistance. In Omsk, relatives of detained men flooded online reviews of a local recruitment center with complaints of violence and coercion until the authorities removed or hid many of them. Video appeals against forced contract signing, at least 13 in October alone, remain a persistent form of protest.

Cuts to payments for wounded soldiers and bereaved families in at least 12 regions expose strains in the financially driven recruitment model and alienate constituencies whose loyalty the Kremlin relies on.

In Engels, residents issued a collective appeal demanding the resignation of Saratov region Vice-Governor Mikhail Isaev, citing among other grievances a tenfold cut in payments to families of soldiers killed in Ukraine.

Economic deterioration and inflation constitute the second major source of vulnerability. The Kremlin presents the situation as normal and keeps the economy and the war apart in its propaganda, but Russians increasingly draw the connection themselves, linking the war to higher prices, fuel shortages, job losses, and internet disruptions. For the first time since 2021, negative expectations about the future exceed positive ones (52% versus 44%). The 2027 budget gives these expectations concrete grounds, cutting social policy spending by 15.2% while raising defense spending by 41%.

At least 24 regions are reducing public sector staffing by 10–20%, and 208,500 organizations closed in the first nine months of 2026, nearly twice the number that opened.

Discontent is increasingly taking collective form. In October, at least 31 actions over housing, utilities, roads, and transport took place in 20 regions, the highest monthly figure in this category in 2026, ranging from single-person pickets to video appeals and petition drives. During the election campaign, the Kremlin-controlled A Just Russia party claimed to have gathered more than one million signatures for a utility tariff freeze. Entrepreneurs in Novosibirsk and St. Petersburg have petitioned against the abolition of simplified tax regimes.

Yet the authorities respond nervously even to the safest forms of protest: police threatened participants in a collective video appeal against a hospital closure in Krasnoyarsk region with administrative charges.

Growing pessimism is also intensifying social conflicts, with at least 243 protest actions recorded in October, mostly over local issues, up from 224 in September. Labor disputes have risen by 13.5%, with 16 demonstrations and 6 strikes since January, and have spread to 12 regions where none were recorded in 2025, while overdue wage arrears have reached a five-year high.

The authorities’ anti-migrant campaign is increasingly at odds with public attitudes: the share opposing administrative barriers for migrants has risen from 21% to 28%.

Tensions are also growing around the expanding privileges of war veterans and their families in education and employment. As competition for state-funded university places intensifies, the authorities are seeking to redirect applicants’ discontent away from veterans, who took about 6.7% of such places, and toward winners of academic olympiads, who took just 2%. These preferences intensify competition for limited opportunities, while employers respond to applications from volunteer war participants approximately one-third less often than to comparable candidates with only compulsory military service.

The gap between veterans’ state-sponsored privileges and their reception in civilian society creates another potential fault line.

Rising protest activity, growing support for calls to end the war and mounting social tensions expose the Kremlin’s vulnerability and force it to devote more resources to containing dissent.

Once wars abroad and manufactured enemies can no longer contain unrest and keep it in power, the Kremlin will seek real de-escalation, presenting it as a foreign-policy success while easing pressure at home.

For now, it still intimidates the public with the threat of a wider war. Strengthening public resistance inside Russia is therefore essential to deterring escalation beyond Ukraine, constraining the Kremlin if it chooses war with the West, and leaving it in the weakest possible position in postwar negotiations.

The priority is to promote an alternative agenda and figures who can help Russia find a way out of the crisis. Campaigns should use concrete examples to show the real consequences of the war, the regime’s failures from security to social welfare, and how the authorities have betrayed veterans and their families by failing to pay them.

Specific, feasible proposals in each area should come from more neutral figures whom different audiences can identify with and trust.

Campaigns should reach beyond the liberal-minded audiences that Russia’s exiled opposition primarily addresses and actively engage citizens across the political spectrum through right-wing, left-wing and centrist voices.

War: Fatigue Without Hope as the Main Source of Vulnerability

Asked to choose between continuing military operations and beginning peace negotiations, nearly two-thirds of Russians (65%) consistently favor negotiations, according to the latest figures from the independent Levada Center. (1)

This preference has proved remarkably durable: it has not fallen below 58–59% in the past two years, since January 2025. Over the past year, the share favoring continued fighting has fluctuated within a narrow range of 25–31%, standing at 26% in October 2026.

Meanwhile, a new trend unfavorable to the authorities has emerged since September 2025: support for the Russian military’s actions in Ukraine has declined from 78% to 69%, while the share expressing opposition has risen from 17% to 21%.

The depth of public fatigue with the active phase of the war, and the recognition that ending it depends on one person, Vladimir Putin, are also evident in responses to the possibility that he might decide to stop the conflict.

Fully 81% would support such a decision without conditions, while 35% would support it even if the occupied territories were returned. (2) Both figures exceed the 26% who favor continued fighting. Yet the absence of tangible progress in negotiations is profoundly affecting expectations and deepening public frustration.

Between January 2025 and August 2026, the share convinced that the war would continue for more than another year rose by 23 p.p., reaching a record 55% for the entire period of the full-scale invasion. (3)

Over the same 20 months, the proportion of optimists who believed the fighting would end within a year fell from 43% to a record low of 21%.

The Kremlin is working systematically to close the narrative gap between the public’s clear desire to end the war and its own escalatory course.

Domestic propaganda repeatedly returns to the war’s ideological framing, attempting to fill that gap with historical narratives about “the West’s attempts to use Ukraine to weaken Russia and inflict a strategic defeat on it” and the “root causes of the conflict.” Such material stands out from the Kremlin’s usual media agenda, which largely consists of propagandistic interpretations of current events, but it recurs with notable regularity.

For example, the November 8 edition of the weekly Sunday news program on the nationwide Channel One aired a 13-minute segment titled “One of the attempts to weaken our country: Turning once-fraternal Ukraine into an ‘anti-Russia’ project.” (4) It assembled a confused historical narrative spanning the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the collapse of the Soviet Union, church disputes, excerpts from speeches by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and passages from Putin’s 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.”

The purpose of such segments is to convince domestic audiences that continuing the war is supposedly unavoidable:

Russia is portrayed as a historical victim of Western intrigue and therefore as bearing no responsibility for the war, unable to stop it or begin negotiations until the “root causes” have been eliminated.

Yet the figures cited above indicate that this Kremlin narrative is steadily losing its force. The lived consequences of the aggression, including the deaths of relatives and acquaintances, the lack of rotation for mobilized personnel, strikes on facilities far from the front line, and mounting economic difficulties, have a much stronger influence on public attitudes than historical narratives intended to justify and explain the continuation of the war.

According to the Levada Center, the war has affected 61% of Russians in one way or another. (3) The actual extent of its impact is almost certainly greater: since 2022, the proportion claiming that the war has “not affected them at all” has steadily increased, suggesting preference falsification and a tendency to give socially acceptable responses. The reach of pro-peace political campaigns when lawful political participation becomes possible offers another indication.

According to EK Stratcom sources, support for the pro-peace Yabloko party rose to as much as 10% nationwide and 20% in Moscow during the parliamentary campaign in late July and early August, before the party was excluded from the elections. This is perhaps the clearest example of the underlying demand for peace.

Antiwar protests also continue despite the regime’s systematic suppression of public dissent. In October 2026, at least 75 actions against political repression were recorded, approximately half of them marking the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression on October 30 and the 20th anniversary of journalist Anna Politkovskaya’s murder.

At least 38 protests against Russia’s military aggression were also documented, including 23 acts of direct action involving sabotage and the defacement of military recruitment advertisements.

More immediate Kremlin vulnerabilities in public attitudes toward the war arise from policies directly affecting servicemen and the prospect of mobilization. According to the Levada Center, (5) fear of a general mobilization has risen steadily since early 2024, when only 34% of Russians expressed such concern. By October 2026, the figure had reached 58%, compared with 65–66% immediately after the announcement of partial mobilization in September 2022.

One important finding is that, unlike in many other surveys showing clear generational divides, fear of mobilization is shared across age groups: 60% of those aged 18–24 and 25–39 express concern, compared with 58% of those aged 40–54 and 54% of those aged 55 and older.

A similar consensus emerges on whether mobilization is necessary. The distribution of answers is nearly identical across groups defined by age, education, settlement size, and sources of information. (6)

Against this backdrop, the expansion of covert mobilization through raids targeting men is especially consequential. Independent human rights groups documented forced detentions and coercion to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense in at least 34 regions between August 12 and October 12. (7)

These practices were particularly visible in Omsk in late October, (8) when relatives of detained men flooded the 2GIS mapping service with complaints about the Sirius-55 military recruitment center, alleging unlawful detentions, violence, and coercion to sign military contracts. Following media coverage and widespread attention on social media, many negative reviews were removed or hidden, while recruitment operations continued. (9)

Collective video appeals remain another recurring form of public resistance to coercive recruitment practices, with at least 13 such cases documented in October. (10)

Nevertheless, covert mobilization has yet to become a nationwide focus of public discontent. The risks have nonetheless increased markedly: the raid-monitoring index maintained by the human rights project Get Lost recorded a sharp rise in the threat level from November 8 to 14. (11)

Unpopular Kremlin policies affect not only potential recruits but also Russians already fighting. In 2026, at least 12 Russian regions reduced, postponed, or eliminated payments to those wounded in the war and the families of those killed. (12) Some regions have also begun reducing signing bonuses for contracts with the Ministry of Defense.

On the one hand, these developments indicate serious strains in the current financial-incentive recruitment model, as regional budgets responsible for death benefits and one-time enlistment payments face resource shortages. On the other, they risk intensifying resentment toward the authorities among families whose relatives are serving or have died in the war, further aggravating perceptions of social injustice.

For example, in October, residents of Engels in Saratov region issued a collective appeal demanding the dismissal of Vice-Governor Mikhail Isaev, citing, among other grievances, his decision to cut regional payments to families of soldiers killed in Ukraine tenfold. (13) The appeal included explicit demands to “reverse the reduction in regional benefits, restore the previous payment amount, and extend the application deadline,” as well as to “review the legality and justification of the decision on payments and publicly explain the regional government’s position.”

Economy: Tightening Controls Amid Depletion and Deteriorating Expectations

Budgetary problems extend beyond Russia’s regions to the national budget as a whole. Along with inflation, these problems constitute the second most important concern for Russian citizens after the war.

What distinguishes this cluster of issues is the Kremlin’s lack of a substantive public response or a narrative explaining events. Propaganda has traditionally ignored such issues or framed them as routine and under control, seeking to reassure worried citizens without giving the problems much prominence.

Moscow’s most visible vulnerability here is the potential to link the worsening economic crisis to the continuation of the war.

In its messaging, the Kremlin carefully separates the economy from the war, as though the two were parallel phenomena with no effect on each other. International sanctions are presented exclusively as proof of the ineffectiveness of Western policies and the resilience of a Russian economy supposedly capable of growing despite them.

Yet Russians can identify causal connections despite this messaging. Among the 61% who say the war has affected them, 14–26% report that it has caused “prices to rise” and “financial hardship”; 4–9% cite “gasoline problems and higher prices”; 2–6% describe a “difficult” economic situation and report “job losses”; 2–5% mention “sanctions”; and 1–3% cite “internet shutdowns,” according to the Levada Center. (3)

These groups have clear potential to grow, particularly if the war becomes more closely associated with specific problems. The scale of that potential is evident in other findings: in August 2026, 65% of Russians had encountered gasoline shortages or closed gas stations, 63% had experienced problems with messaging services, and 68% had faced disruptions to mobile internet access. (14)

Moreover, the share expecting unemployment to rise over the following year has doubled over the past three years, from 16% in early 2024 to 33% in August 2026, gradually approaching prewar levels. (15)

These developments are significantly affecting assessments of both the present and the future. Half of Russians describe the political situation as “tense,” and another 11% call it “critical” or “explosive.” (16)

Expectations for the future have also deteriorated markedly: 30% anticipate a worsening political situation, while the share of optimists has fallen by 22 p.p. since early 2025, from 71% to 49%. (17) Assessments of the economy follow a similar pattern. One-quarter describe current economic conditions as “bad,” and 39% expect the economic situation to worsen, while the share expressing optimism about its future is only slightly higher, at 44%.

All these negative indicators have reached their highest levels since late 2022, reflecting a pronounced trend toward public pessimism. A recent Levada Center report offers further confirmation: for the first time since 2021, negative expectations about respondents’ own futures and Russia’s future exceed positive ones.

Some 52% view their personal future and that of the country with fear and concern, compared with 44% who are optimistic. (18)

Polling organizations close to the Kremlin record a similar pattern. For example, a recent survey of household finances by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) found that only 5% expect their financial situation to improve in the coming year, the lowest figure since 2015. (19)

Worsening expectations coincide with concrete Kremlin plans to cut social spending in favor of record expenditures on the war and national security. The draft 2027 federal budget provides for reductions of 15.2% in social policy spending, 4.6% in health care, 4.6% in national economic development, and 10% in housing and utilities. (20) At the same time, spending on national defense and on national security and law enforcement is set to increase by 41% and 12%, respectively.

These decisions will contribute to the further deterioration of social and municipal infrastructure, directly affecting public sector employment and the quality of government services. Regional budgets are undergoing their own “spending optimization.”

At least 24 Russian regions are currently reducing public sector staffing by 10–20%, affecting teachers, doctors, kindergarten employees, cultural institution staff, lower-level officials, and other social service workers. (21) At least 210 instances of staff or institutional cuts in the social sector have been recorded since the beginning of 2026. (22)

Even relatively low-risk forms of public protest can provoke a coercive response from the authorities.

For example, police in Krasnoyarsk Krai threatened participants in a collective video appeal against a hospital closure with administrative charges for allegedly violating the rules governing public assemblies. (23)

The same process of staffing cuts is underway in federal government bodies. On November 5, for example, reports emerged that the administrative staffs of the State Duma and the Federation Council would also be cut by 10–20%. (24)

Similar developments are underway at major Russian companies. Over the past year, 49% of large companies surveyed across six industry groups (construction, property development, and real estate management; IT and technology; retail and fast-moving consumer goods; industry and agriculture; consulting and professional services; and finance and insurance) reduced staffing, most often by approximately 10–20% of their workforces. (25)

A further factor amplifying these effects is the tightening of fiscal policy and increases in regulated tariffs, introduced in several waves throughout 2026, as EK Stratcom examined in detail in earlier reports. (26), (27) Increases in housing and utility tariffs, for example, have provoked widespread public criticism, which Kremlin-controlled parliamentary parties actively sought to capitalize on during the election campaign.

In mid-September, A Just Russia party announced that its petition campaign had attracted “more than one million people who supported the demand to freeze housing and utility tariffs and launch a comprehensive audit of the sector.” (28)

In October, at least 31 protest actions related to housing and utilities, roads, and transport were recorded across 20 Russian regions, the highest monthly figure in this category in 2026. These included individual pickets, collective video appeals, and signature campaigns. (10)

Tax increases have also coincided with a faster pace of business closures. According to Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), (29) 208,500 organizations ceased operations between January and September, while only 109,000 new organizations were registered, barely more than half as many.

This is the second consecutive year in which closures have outnumbered openings, but closures are accelerating and new registrations are slowing. Over the same nine months of 2025, approximately 206,000 organizations closed and around 140,000 opened, 31,000 more openings than in 2026. The pattern had previously been reversed: in the comparable period of 2024, 170,500 companies closed and 172,700 opened; in 2023, the figures were 154,000 and 183,800, respectively.

In 2026, the number of new companies exceeded the number of closures in only one industry, mineral extraction. The number of companies declined in all other sectors.

A recent survey of 23,000 small business owners conducted by the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry highlights the effects of tighter fiscal policy: 27% have considered downsizing or even closing their businesses, 26% plan to restrain growth, 24% intend to split their businesses into smaller entities, and only 23% plan no operational changes. (30)

Entrepreneurs are also beginning to take collective action. In Novosibirsk, members of the regional branch of OPORA RUSSIA, a nationwide association of small and medium-sized businesses, appealed to the organization’s leadership in Moscow “not to support proposals to abolish the simplified and patent-based taxation systems.” (31) Similar appeals to the authorities have been documented in St. Petersburg. (32)

These fiscal measures also fuel inflation, as higher taxes feed directly into consumer prices for goods and services, and encourage businesses to move into the informal economy, including greater reliance on cash transactions.

The Kremlin, in turn, is seeking tighter control over these channels. On November 12, for example, it emerged that bank customers “suspected of conducting questionable transactions” would face a monthly limit of 30,000 rubles (~$360) on cash deposits and incoming transfers from other individuals. (33)

Society: Intensifying Domestic Conflicts

Growing public pessimism and increasingly negative assessments of both present circumstances and the future, whether personal or national, are gradually intensifying conflicts among social groups and between certain groups and the authorities.

Tensions are rising around issues associated with both sides of the political spectrum, the left as well as the right.

Protest activity also persists, primarily around local grievances: at least 243 protest actions were recorded in October 2026, (10) compared with at least 224 the previous month. (34)

On the left, the number of labor disputes between workers and employers is increasing. At least 109 labor-related social conflicts were recorded between January and September 2026, up 13.5% from the corresponding period in 2025. (35)

A defining trend is the substantial rise in disputes involving direct violations of labor law by employers, including unpaid wages, bonuses, supplements, and compensation, as well as unlawful layoffs.

There were at least 61 such unlawful cases, compared with 50 a year earlier. The number of worker protest actions also rose by 15% compared with 2025. Between January and September, researchers recorded 22 instances of public action, including 16 demonstrations and 6 strikes, alongside 95 instances of nonpublic action, such as collective worker petitions and threats of protest. (36)

The geographic spread of labor unrest is also widening: in 2026, labor disputes were recorded in 12 Russian regions where none had been registered in 2025, including Moscow, Vologda, and Kurgan regions, as well as Yakutia. (35)

Meanwhile, total overdue wage arrears reached 2.424 billion rubles (~$30 million) by the end of September, the highest level in five years of monitoring and 19% above the figure at the beginning of the year.

This trend matters because it illustrates employers’ declining ability to meet their most basic obligations as the Russian economy cools, a development likely to fuel further public discontent.

On the right, a conflict is becoming increasingly visible between the authorities’ anti-migrant campaign, pursued as part of their conservative political course, and shifts in public attitudes. The SOVA Research Center, which specializes in studying xenophobia in Russian society, reports that by June at least 52 Russian regions had introduced bans on employing migrants in various sectors, while a new law that took effect in July substantially tightened income and employment requirements for foreign nationals. (37)

These decisions have been enthusiastically welcomed by pro-government Russian far-right and nationalist groups, the overwhelming majority of which function as Kremlin proxies, including Russian Community, Tsargrad, Northern Man, Mnogonatsional, and Vladislav Pozdnyakov, among others. As SOVA researchers note, the state is increasingly “taking over the far right’s initiative” and rhetoric.

Yet public attitudes are moving in the opposite direction despite the authorities’ anti-migrant campaign. Since 2025, the share believing that the government should not impose administrative barriers on migrants but should instead make use of their contribution to the country has increased by 7 p.p., from 21% to 28%.

Rejection of immigration nevertheless remains widespread: 64% believe the government should seek to limit the inflow of migrants. Even this figure, however, has fallen over the past year, by 6 p.p. from 70% in 2025. (38)

At the same time, tensions between servicemen returning from the war and the civilian population are deepening. These stem both from rising violence and crime among veterans, as EK Stratcom has previously documented, and from the institutionalization of their privileged status in society. Russian authorities are steadily expanding preferences for war participants, granting them priority access to education, employment, and government positions.

In 2026, 56,900 state-funded university places were allocated to war participants and their children, of which 41,800 were ultimately filled, 46% more than in 2025.

Beginning in 2026, universities were also authorized to reallocate unfilled places from targeted admissions quotas to these applicants, further increasing competition with other categories of students for state-funded higher education. (39) At the same time, the authorities appear to be channeling growing frustration among applicants and their parents away from war veterans and their families, who filled the equivalent of approximately 6.7% of all state-funded university places, (40) and toward academic olympiad winners, who accounted for just 2%. (41) Proposals to introduce restrictions on olympiad-based admissions are already being discussed at the institutional level. (42)

Preferences in the labor market are also expanding. By November, mandatory veteran employment quotas were in place in at least 50 Russian regions, and in some regions employers were required to reserve up to 4% of jobs for veterans, including positions in educational and cultural institutions. (43)

Yet the state’s policy of preferential employment is at odds with employers’ actual attitudes. One recent study found that applicants who disclosed voluntary participation in the war received approximately one-third fewer employer responses than comparable candidates who reported only having completed compulsory military service. (44)

A pronounced gap is therefore emerging between the special status the state grants veterans and the way they are perceived in civilian life, creating another point of vulnerability.

Expanding educational and employment preferences sets the stage for competition with the rest of the population over limited opportunities, while violence and difficulties reintegrating returning servicemen into civilian society further increase the potential for social conflict.

Sources

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