Kremlin Ratings Tracker: Russian Political Ratings and Public Mood

Approval ratings of the Russian authorities changed little in the week to September 6. VTsIOM put Putin's job approval at 67.4%, up from 66.9% a week earlier, while FOM recorded 70%, one point lower than in its previous survey.

The largest weekly movement was in FOM's measure of public mood: 48% of respondents described the mood among their family and acquaintances as anxious, compared with 52% a week earlier.

Party ratings were broadly unchanged. VTsIOM put United Russia at 37.4%, against 37.2% a week earlier, and FOM at 33%. VTsIOM's protest potential indicator rose from 15% to 16%.

VTsIOM's monthly indices put negative assessments of the situation in the country at 45% in August, down from 47% in July. Levada Center figures remain those of its August survey.

Approval ratings of the Russian authorities remain stable, as they have through the previous weeks of August. Their stability is sustained by the active propaganda phase of the election campaign and by the vacation season, when respondents' moods are typically more positive than at other times of the year.

Most interesting is the widening divergence between the ratings of the Kremlin's systemic parties published by the pollsters it controls. The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Putin's favorite pollster, shows the familiar picture: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the populist-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are competing for second place, at 9% and 11% respectively.

New People, whose rhetoric is the least hawkish among the systemic parties but is pro-war nonetheless, takes only 4%. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) shows the exact opposite picture: New People has nearly caught up with the CPRF, at 11.5% and 11.6% respectively, while the LDPR's rating has declined steadily and now stands at 8.7%.

Beyond differences in polling methodology, this gap can also be explained by how the LDPR's and New People's relations with officials of the Presidential Administration have evolved, and by dynamics within the Administration itself.

According to a recent report by the independent outlet Meduza, LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky has come into conflict with the group of Administration officials responsible for domestic politics, headed by First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, which he blames both for failing to deliver on promises guaranteeing the party second place and for the party's falling ratings.

The LDPR has meanwhile adjusted its image and now publicly presents itself as the "party of the siloviks," and its supervising official within the Administration has changed from Kiriyenko to Andrei Yarin, head of the Domestic Policy Directorate, who is traditionally close to the security bloc.

At the same time, New People is Kiriyenko's personal project and serves as the voice of the civilian wing of the bureaucracy, campaigning on modernization slogans.

The divergence in ratings may therefore be an indirect indicator of a possible internal conflict within the Administration over the outcome of the State Duma campaign and over the guarantees of second and third place for the systemic parties.

Current approval ratings for the authorities continue to hold steady, buoyed by the active phase of the election campaign and by the vacation season, when public sentiment is consistently better than at other times of the year.

The removal of the antiwar Yabloko party from the elections, however, has left a clear mark on the current ratings. According to the Kremlin-aligned Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the combined rating of the systemic parties fell by 9 p.p. in a single week, while the share of voters who have decided to stay away from the polls or have yet to decide whom to support rose by the same 9 p.p.

The rating of New People, a systemic pseudo-liberal party created by the Presidential Administration, also rose by 3 p.p., as part of Yabloko's electorate shifted to it. The Kremlin-aligned Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) shows much the same picture: the share of respondents prepared to vote for non-parliamentary parties (Yabloko among them) fell by 6.4 p.p. over the week, while other forms of protest voting (choosing New People, spoiling the ballot, not turning out, and being undecided) together rose by 6.3 p.p.

Even the Kremlin's own pollsters thus make clear that Yabloko had the potential not only to clear the 5% threshold but to take a significant share of the vote. The party's removal from the elections shifted the declared preferences of between 6% and 12% of Russians, which is itself an indication of its minimum potential.