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Kremlin Ratings Weekly Update

Kremlin Ratings Tracker:
Russian Political Ratings and Public Mood

Track Vladimir Putin's approval rating, Russian party support, protest potential and public mood. EK Strategies compares VTsIOM, FOM and Levada Center data and explains what meaningful changes may reveal about Russian domestic politics.

Last updated: Sources last checked: Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

Current Russian Political Ratings

Latest available figures from the three pollsters. Publication periods may differ, so each value is shown together with its source period rather than treated as a single synthetic “Putin rating”.

Latest available figure, its period and change since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp), by pollster
IndicatorVTsIOMFOMLevada Center
Putin's job approval69.4%−8.4 pp YTDVTsIOM release71%−9 pp YTDFOM release76%−9 pp YTDLevada Center release
United Russia rating33.4%−0.7 pp YTDVTsIOM release31%−11 pp YTDFOM release34%earlier periodNo dataLevada Center release
Protest potential16%+4 pp YTDVTsIOM release16%+2 pp YTDFOM releaseNo data
Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities39%+10 pp YTDVTsIOM release25%+4 pp YTDFOM release26%+6 pp YTDLevada Center release
Predominance of anxious moods23%earlier period0 pp YTDVTsIOM release46%+8 pp YTDFOM release25%+5 pp YTDLevada Center release

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Periods differ between pollsters: a figure marked “earlier period” covers an older period than the latest figure in its row.

What Changed This Week

Readings of the week to October 11, from VTsIOM's review and FOM's issue 41, both published on October 16. Levada Center published no new ratings this week, and its figures are carried from September and August.

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 69.4% (+0.8 pp WoW; −8.4 pp YTD), FOM 71% (−2 pp WoW; −9 pp YTD), Levada Center 76% (unchanged MoM; −9 pp YTD) as of September.

  • United Russia: VTsIOM 33.4% (+1.5 pp WoW; −0.7 pp YTD), FOM 31% (−7 pp WoW; −11 pp YTD), Levada Center 34% as of August; Levada published no party ratings in January, so no year-to-date figure is given for it.

  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (unchanged WoW; +4 pp YTD), FOM 16% (unchanged on the previous reading two weeks earlier; +2 pp YTD).

  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 39% (−6 pp MoM; +10 pp YTD) as of September, FOM 25% (−2 pp on the previous point of this series, on September 6; +4 pp YTD) as of October 4, Levada Center 26% (−1 pp MoM; +6 pp YTD) as of September.

  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (unchanged YTD) as of July, FOM 46% (−1 pp WoW; +8 pp YTD), Levada Center 25% (unchanged MoM; +5 pp YTD) as of September.

Putin Approval Rating Trend in 2026

VTsIOM vs FOM vs Levada Center

Putin's job approval as published by each pollster. Weekly figures are placed on the last day of fieldwork, monthly figures in the middle of their month. The chart shows published figures only, with no averaging across pollsters.

  • VTsIOM — 69.4%
  • FOM — 71%
  • Levada Center — 76%
Putin's job approval in 2026 by pollsterLatest: VTsIOM 69.4% (Oct 5–11, 2026); FOM 71% (Oct 9–11, 2026); Levada Center 76% (September 2026). All data points are in the table below.0102030405060708090%JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctVTsIOM · January 2026 · 77.8%VTsIOM · fieldwork Aug 10–16, 2026 · 65.8%VTsIOM · fieldwork Aug 24–30, 2026 · 66.9%VTsIOM · fieldwork Aug 31 – Sep 6, 2026 · 67.4%VTsIOM · fieldwork Sep 7–13, 2026 · 70.1%VTsIOM · fieldwork Sep 14–20, 2026 · 68%VTsIOM · fieldwork Sep 21–27, 2026 · 68%VTsIOM · fieldwork Sep 28 – Oct 4, 2026 · 68.6%VTsIOM · fieldwork Oct 5–11, 2026 · 69.4%VTsIOM 69.4%FOM · January 2026 · 80%FOM · fieldwork Aug 14–16, 2026 · 70%FOM · fieldwork Aug 28–30, 2026 · 71%FOM · fieldwork Sep 4–6, 2026 · 70%FOM · fieldwork Sep 11–13, 2026 · 73%FOM · fieldwork Sep 25–27, 2026 · 72%FOM · fieldwork Oct 2–4, 2026 · 73%FOM · fieldwork Oct 9–11, 2026 · 71%FOM 71%Levada Center · January 2026 · 85%Levada Center · July 2026 · 74%Levada Center · August 2026 · 76%Levada Center · September 2026 · 76%Levada Center 76%
Putin's job approval, % of respondents. Filled markers: weekly figures, dated by the last day of fieldwork. Hollow markers: monthly figures, placed in the middle of their month. Source: VTsIOM, FOM, Levada Center. Full data in the tables below.
Putin's job approval: start-of-year reference, latest available figure and change since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp)
PollsterStart of 2026LatestYTD changeSource / period
VTsIOM77.8%69.4%−8.4 pp · VTsIOM release
FOM80%71%−9 pp · FOM release
Levada Center85%76%−9 pp · Levada Center release

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Share of respondents who approve of Vladimir Putin's performance as president (VTsIOM, Levada Center) or say he is doing a good job (FOM). FOM asks whether the president is doing a good or a bad job rather than whether respondents approve, and the pollsters differ in survey mode and timing.

All data points (21)
Putin's job approval in 2026: every figure shown on the chart
PollsterPeriodValueSource
VTsIOMStart-of-year reference77.8%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM65.8%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM66.9%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM67.4%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM70.1%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM68%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM68%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM68.6%VTsIOM release
VTsIOM69.4%VTsIOM release
FOMStart-of-year reference80%FOM release
FOM70%FOM release
FOM71%FOM release
FOM70%FOM release
FOM73%FOM release
FOM72%FOM release
FOM73%FOM release
FOM71%FOM release
Levada CenterStart-of-year reference85%Levada Center release
Levada Center74%Levada Center release
Levada Center76%Levada Center release
Levada Center76%Levada Center release

Russian Party Ratings

Party ratings as published by VTsIOM and FOM. Question wording and survey method differ between the two, so levels are best compared within each pollster over time.

Party ratings by pollster: latest available figure, change against the previous release and since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp)
PollsterValuePeriodvs previous releaseYTDSource
United Russia rating
VTsIOM33.4%+1.5 pp vs Sep 28 – Oct 4−0.7 ppVTsIOM release
FOM31%−7 pp vs Oct 2–4−11 ppFOM release
Levada Center34%No dataNo dataLevada Center release
CPRF rating
VTsIOM18.8%+5.7 pp vs Aug 31 – Sep 6+8.9 ppVTsIOM release
FOM15%+6 pp vs Aug 28–30+8 ppFOM release
Levada Center10%No dataNo dataLevada Center release
LDPR rating
VTsIOM9.3%−0.6 pp vs Aug 31 – Sep 6−1.6 ppVTsIOM release
FOM9%−2 pp vs Aug 28–300 ppFOM release
Levada Center9%No dataNo dataLevada Center release
New People rating
VTsIOM11.6%+1.2 pp vs Aug 31 – Sep 6+3.9 ppVTsIOM release
FOM8%+4 pp vs Aug 28–30+4 ppFOM release
Levada Center5%No dataNo dataLevada Center release

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United Russia rating: Share of all respondents who say they would vote for United Russia in a State Duma election. Shares are of all respondents, so undecided voters and non-voters are in the base; question framing differs between VTsIOM and FOM.

CPRF rating: Share of all respondents who say they would vote for the CPRF in a State Duma election. Shares are of all respondents, so undecided voters and non-voters are in the base; question framing differs between VTsIOM and FOM.

LDPR rating: Share of all respondents who say they would vote for the LDPR in a State Duma election. Shares are of all respondents, so undecided voters and non-voters are in the base; question framing differs between VTsIOM and FOM.

New People rating: Share of all respondents who say they would vote for New People in a State Duma election. Shares are of all respondents, so undecided voters and non-voters are in the base; question framing differs between VTsIOM and FOM.

See EK Strategies analysis of United Russia and the 2026 State Duma campaign →

Protest Potential and Public Mood in Russia

Protest potential, negative assessments and anxious moods are separate indicators, each based on its own question. They are not interchangeable measures of the same attitude.

Protest potential

Protest sentiment. VTsIOM asks how likely mass protests are where the respondent lives; FOM asks whether the respondent would personally take part.

Protest potential: latest figure by pollster, change against the previous release and since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp)
PollsterQuestion wordingValuePeriodvs previous releaseYTDSource
VTsIOMHow likely are mass protests right now in your town or district against falling living standards, unjust actions by the authorities, or in defence of people's rights and freedoms? Share answering “quite possible”.16%0 pp vs Sep 28 – Oct 4+4 ppVTsIOM release
FOMIf protest actions took place where you live in the next month or two, would you personally take part? Share answering that they would take part.16%0 pp vs Sep 25–27+2 ppFOM release

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VTsIOM measures the perceived likelihood of protests, FOM measures personal readiness to take part; the two differ in level and meaning.

Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities

Negative views of the situation in the country or of the authorities. Each pollster measures this with its own question; see the wordings.

Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: latest figure by pollster, change against the previous release and since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp)
PollsterQuestion wordingValuePeriodvs previous releaseYTDSource
VTsIOMHow do you assess the situation in the country as a whole? Sum of the published shares for “rather bad”, “bad” and “very bad” (monthly).39%−6 pp vs August 2026+10 ppVTsIOM release
FOMOver the past month, have the actions of the Russian authorities caused you personally discontent or indignation? Share answering that they have.25%−2 pp vs Sep 4–6+4 ppFOM release
Levada CenterAre things in the country going in the right direction, or is the country on the wrong path? Share answering “on the wrong path”.26%−1 pp vs August 2026+6 ppLevada Center release

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The pollsters ask different questions: about the situation in the country (VTsIOM), personal discontent with the authorities (FOM) and the country's direction (Levada Center). Levels are not comparable across pollsters.

Predominance of anxious moods

Prevalence of anxious or negative moods. Each pollster measures mood differently; see the wordings.

Predominance of anxious moods: latest figure by pollster, change against the previous release and since the start of 2026 in percentage points (pp)
PollsterQuestion wordingValuePeriodvs previous releaseYTDSource
VTsIOMEmotional tonometer: respondents say which of 12 emotions describe their mood over the last two or three days; share assigned to the “anxious” group in VTsIOM's cluster analysis.23%0 pp vs January 20260 ppVTsIOM release
FOMWhat mood prevails today among your family, friends, colleagues and acquaintances: calm or anxious? Share answering “anxious”.46%−1 pp vs Oct 2–4+8 ppFOM release
Levada CenterRespondents describe their own mood in recent days; share reporting tension or irritation, or fear or anguish.25%0 pp vs August 2026+5 ppLevada Center release

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VTsIOM groups respondents by their own emotions, FOM asks about the mood of people around the respondent, and Levada Center asks about the respondent's own mood. Levels are not comparable.

EK Strategies Assessment

Kremlin Ratings Weekly Updates

Latest update

October 16, 2026 — United Russia Falls Seven Points at FOM as Non-Parliamentary Support Climbs

United Russia fell 7 pp to 31% at FOM, and VTsIOM recorded a 5.5 pp drop a week earlier, while VTsIOM's non-parliamentary bloc gained 6.1 pp over five weeks. Putin's job approval stood at 69.4% at VTsIOM and 71% at FOM; Yabloko holds at 3% in FOM's card.

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Polls released today show a continued shift in party support. The Kremlin-controlled Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) recorded a drop of 7 pp in support for United Russia over the past week. The state-run Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) reported a similar decline a week earlier, with support falling by 5.5 pp.

VTsIOM also recorded an increase of 6.1 pp in combined support for non-parliamentary parties. A similar pattern emerged this summer before the pro-peace party Yabloko was excluded from the elections. FOM data, for example, show that support for other non-parliamentary parties remains within its usual historical range. Yabloko, by contrast, polled at 0–1% before the State Duma election campaign began, but its support has now stabilized at no less than 3%, according to FOM.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 69.4% (−8.4 pp); FOM 71% (−9 pp); Levada Center 76% (September 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 33.4% (−0.7 pp); FOM 31% (−11 pp); Levada Center 34% (August 2026).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (+4 pp); FOM 16% (+2 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 39% (September 2026; +10 pp); FOM 25% (+4 pp); Levada Center 26% (September 2026; +6 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 46% (+8 pp); Levada Center 25% (September 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. VTsIOM. Ratings of the President, the Government and political parties, 16 October 2026

  2. FOM. Dominants. Field of opinions, issue 41, 16 October 2026

  3. VTsIOM. Indices of social assessments, accessed 16 October 2026

Polling data

  • VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, published . Combined sample of 1,600 (half telephone «Sputnik», half route survey), margin of error 2.5%. Approval is approval of performance, not trust: trust in the same review is 74.7%. Protest potential is the «quite possible» reading from the standing page wciom.ru/ratings/protestnyi-potencial (16% on 4 and 11 October); that page carries no publication date of its own. Party readings in the same review: CPRF 17.4%, LDPR 10.3%, New People 8.9%, A Just Russia 4.1%, non-parliamentary parties 10.5% combined — the model has no fields for these.
  • VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок, published . «Situation in the country», September 2026: the sum of «rather bad» 21, «bad» 8 and «very bad» 10 = 39; August 45, January 29. The standing page carries no publication date of its own, so the date of the issue in which the figure first appears is used, as for VTsIOM 2026-07 and 2026-08.
  • VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок, published . Negative assessments: VTsIOM social assessment indices, July 2026 (rather bad, bad and very bad assessments of the situation in the country). Anxious moods: «Эмоциональный тонометр российского общества: летний замер», published 29 July 2026 (https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/ehmocionalnyi-tonometr-rossiiskogo-obshchestva-letnii-zamer). Reported in EK Strategies' update of 21 August 2026.
  • FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 41, published . FOMnibus of 9–11 October, 1,500 respondents, 97 settlements, 51 regions, margin of error up to 3.6%. Approval is the «works rather well» question (71%); trust the same week is 70% and is not taken into the tracker. Protest potential is the «would you personally take part» series (16%, previous point 16% on 27 September; FOM measures it fortnightly); the other FOM question, «would many people take part», also stands at 16%. Yabloko 3%, A Just Russia 4% — no fields in the model. Issue 41 has no section on dissatisfaction with the authorities.
  • FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 40, published . Fieldwork 2–4 October 2026, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities (51 regions), margin of error up to 3.6%. Job approval: «работает скорее хорошо». Negative assessments: actions of the authorities over the past month personally caused discontent or indignation (previous point 6 September: 27%). Anxious moods: anxious mood prevails among family and friends (calm 46%). Parties: shares of all respondents; Yabloko 3% and A Just Russia 3% have no fields. No protest figure in this issue. Issue page dated 9 October, PDF dated 8 October.
  • Levada Center — Партийные рейтинги в августе 2026 года и состав электората основных партий, published . Second release for August: party ratings published 8 October. Fieldwork 18–28 August 2026, 1,600 respondents, face-to-face, before the State Duma election, so not comparable with the post-election VTsIOM and FOM readings. Shares of all respondents; among those who had decided: United Russia 47%, CPRF 13%, LDPR 12%, New People 6%, A Just Russia 7%, Yabloko 7%. The sample excludes the new regions and closed territories. Yabloko (5% of all respondents) was on the list although removed from the ballot shortly before the survey. No comparison with earlier readings.
  • Levada Center — Рейтинги сентября 2026 года: настроения, оценки положения дел в стране и одобрение органов власти, published . Fieldwork 23–30 September 2026, 1,616 respondents aged 18+, 137 localities (50 regions), face-to-face. Negative assessments: only the share saying the country is on the wrong path (right direction 60%, undecided 14%). Anxious moods: share reporting negative emotions (tension, irritation, fear, anguish); normal, even state 57%. No party or protest figures in this release.

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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October 9, 2026 — Party Ratings Return as the CPRF Gains and United Russia Falls at VTsIOM

Party ratings returned after a three- to four-week gap: VTsIOM has United Russia at 31.9% and the CPRF at 18.8%, FOM 38% and 15%. Putin's job approval edged up to 68.6% at VTsIOM and 73% at FOM. Party changes are EK calculations; VTsIOM published no dynamics.

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Party ratings returned on October 9 for the first time since the State Duma vote. At VTsIOM, support moved sharply from United Russia to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF); FOM shows the same direction on a smaller scale, and Putin's job approval changed little.

The state-run Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published its release on October 9, and the Kremlin-aligned Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) posted its issue 40 the same day; the PDF is dated October 8. For VTsIOM it was the first party release since September 11, a gap of four weeks. FOM's previous party reading in its series comes from its survey of September 11–13, three weeks earlier by fieldwork dates. VTsIOM's release states that it suspended its party measurements for the weeks of September 14–20 and September 21–27 because of the election "week of silence" and the transition period that followed. FOM's issue carries no explanation of its own pause.

VTsIOM's survey of September 28 – October 4 (combined sample of 1,600, half telephone and half face-to-face, margin of error 2.5%) puts United Russia at 31.9%, the CPRF at 18.8%, New People at 11.6%, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) at 9.3%, A Just Russia at 4.6%, and non-parliamentary parties combined at 6.5%. For parties the release gives no week-on-week changes: a footnote states that party ratings are presented without dynamics because of the new composition of the State Duma. Measured by EK against VTsIOM's last previously published party figures, from the week to September 6, United Russia is down 5.5 pp, the CPRF up 5.7 pp, New People up 1.2 pp and the non-parliamentary bloc up 2.1 pp.

The same release's data table also contains party figures for the week of September 7–13 that VTsIOM had not published at the time: United Russia 36.5%, the CPRF 13.5%, New People 11.6%, the LDPR 10.0%, A Just Russia 4.9% and non-parliamentary parties 4.9%. Against that week the shifts are smaller: United Russia −4.6 pp, the CPRF +5.3 pp, New People unchanged, non-parliamentary parties +1.6 pp.

FOM's issue 40 (fieldwork October 2–4, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities across 51 regions, margin of error up to 3.6%) puts United Russia at 38%, the CPRF at 15%, the LDPR at 9%, New People at 8%, A Just Russia at 3% and Yabloko at 3%. Against its survey of September 11–13, United Russia is up 1 pp, the CPRF up 5 pp, New People up 2 pp and the LDPR down 1 pp. The antiwar party Yabloko is back in FOM's card for the first time since the survey of August 9, when it stood at 4%; a footnote in the PDF records that the party was absent from the card from August 16 through September 13, five waves.

Putin's job approval moved little. VTsIOM recorded 68.6%, up 0.6 pp on 68.0% a week earlier, with trust in Putin at 72.5%. FOM put the share assessing his work as "rather good" at 73%, one point above the previous week. The Levada Center's September survey (September 23–30, 1,616 respondents, published October 2) puts approval at 76%, the same as a month earlier, with disapproval at 19%.

Levada published party ratings on October 8, but from fieldwork of August 18–28, before the Duma vote. Among all respondents, United Russia stood at 34%, the CPRF at 10%, the LDPR at 9%, and New People, A Just Russia and Yabloko at 5% each; recalculated for those who had made a choice, United Russia is at 47%, the CPRF at 13%, the LDPR at 12%, A Just Russia and Yabloko at 7% each and New People at 6%. The publication contains no comparison with earlier readings, and because the fieldwork predates the election these figures are not directly comparable with the post-election readings of VTsIOM and FOM. Yabloko was offered on the respondent list although it had been removed from the ballot shortly before the survey.

On protest, VTsIOM's public indicator — the share who consider mass protests in their own city or district quite possible — stood at 16% in the week to October 4, unchanged on the week before. This indicator is published on a standing page rather than in the weekly release; VTsIOM measures personal readiness to take part separately, at 14% in its September reading. FOM's protest figure comes from its issue 39 (fieldwork September 25–27) and did not reappear in issue 40, since FOM measures it every two weeks: 16% said they would personally take part in protests where they live, unchanged on September 13, and the share expecting many people to take part was also 16%.

On moods and assessments of the authorities, FOM recorded 25% saying the authorities' actions over the past month had personally caused them discontent or indignation, 2 pp below the previous point of this biweekly series on September 6, and 47% describing the mood of those around them as anxious, unchanged on September 27, against 46% describing it as calm. Levada recorded 26% saying the country is moving in the wrong direction, against 60% saying the right direction and 1 pp below its August reading, and 25% reporting negative emotions, the same share as in August. This update carries VTsIOM's August reading of negative assessments of the situation in the country, 45%, and its July reading of the predominance of anxious moods, 23%.

FOM's price question asks which products and services have noticeably risen in price over the past month, across 22 categories. Measured by EK against FOM's published readings, the share noticing increases rose by 2 to 6 pp in every category compared with September 27. That reading was itself low: it was below September 13 in 21 of the 22 categories and equal in housing and utility services. Against September 13, the last reading before it, the changes range from −3 to +5 pp, and in 13 of the 22 categories they are within 1 pp in either direction. The clearest increases against mid-September are meat and poultry and housing and utility services, both up 5 pp, while petrol (−3 pp) and clothing and footwear (−2 pp) are below their mid-September levels.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 68.6% (−9.2 pp); FOM 73% (−7 pp); Levada Center 76% (September 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 31.9% (−2.2 pp); FOM 38% (−4 pp); Levada Center 34% (August 2026).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (+4 pp); FOM 16% (+2 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 45% (August 2026; +16 pp); FOM 25% (+4 pp); Levada Center 26% (September 2026; +6 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 47% (+9 pp); Levada Center 25% (September 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, 9 October 2026 (fieldwork September 28 – October 4) — https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-pravitelstva-i-politicheskikh-partii-09102026

VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, 11 September 2026 (fieldwork August 31 – September 6; baseline for the party comparison) — https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-pravitelstva-i-politicheskikh-partii-11092026

VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, 2 October 2026 (fieldwork September 21–27; baseline for the weekly approval change) — https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-i-pravitelstva-02102026

VTsIOM — Протестный потенциал (standing indicator page, no publication date) — https://wciom.ru/ratings/protestnyi-potencial

VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок (August reading and January 2026 base for negative assessments) — https://wciom.ru/ratings/indeksy-socialnykh-ocenok

FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 40, 9 October 2026 (fieldwork October 2–4; PDF dated October 8) — https://fom.ru/Dominanty/15388

FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 39, 2 October 2026 (fieldwork September 25–27; source of the protest figure) — https://fom.ru/Dominanty/15386

Levada Center — Рейтинги сентября 2026 года: настроения, оценки положения дел в стране и одобрение органов власти, 2 October 2026 (fieldwork September 23–30) — https://www.levada.ru/2026/10/02/rejtingi-sentyabrya-2026-goda-nastroeniya-otsenki-polozheniya-del-v-strane-i-odobrenie-organov-vlasti/

Levada Center — Партийные рейтинги в августе 2026 года и состав электората основных партий, 8 October 2026 (fieldwork August 18–28) — https://www.levada.ru/2026/10/08/partijnye-rejtingi-v-avguste-2026-goda-i-sostav-elektorata-osnovnyh-partij/

Polling data

  • VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, published . Combined sample of 1,600 (half telephone, half face-to-face), margin of error 2.5%. Parties are published without dynamics because of the new composition of the State Duma; party measurements were suspended for 14–20 and 21–27 September. The table also shows 7–13 September, not published before: United Russia 36.5%, CPRF 13.5%, New People 11.6%, LDPR 10.0%. A Just Russia 4.6% and non-parliamentary parties 6.5% have no fields. VTsIOM protest potential: ratings page «Протестный потенциал» (https://wciom.ru/ratings/protestnyi-potencial, no publication date of its own), same fieldwork week.
  • VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок, published . VTsIOM social assessment indices, August 2026: rather bad, bad and very bad assessments of the situation in the country. Reported in EK Strategies' update of 11 September 2026.
  • VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок, published . Negative assessments: VTsIOM social assessment indices, July 2026 (rather bad, bad and very bad assessments of the situation in the country). Anxious moods: «Эмоциональный тонометр российского общества: летний замер», published 29 July 2026 (https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/ehmocionalnyi-tonometr-rossiiskogo-obshchestva-letnii-zamer). Reported in EK Strategies' update of 21 August 2026.
  • FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 40, published . Fieldwork 2–4 October 2026, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities (51 regions), margin of error up to 3.6%. Job approval: «работает скорее хорошо». Negative assessments: actions of the authorities over the past month personally caused discontent or indignation (previous point 6 September: 27%). Anxious moods: anxious mood prevails among family and friends (calm 46%). Parties: shares of all respondents; Yabloko 3% and A Just Russia 3% have no fields. No protest figure in this issue. Issue page dated 9 October, PDF dated 8 October.
  • FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 39, published . Fieldwork 25–27 September 2026, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities (51 regions). Protest potential: share answering that they would personally take part in protest actions where they live (16%); the share expecting many people to take part is also 16%. Measured every two weeks. No party ratings in this issue. Issue page dated 2 October, PDF dated 1 October.
  • Levada Center — Партийные рейтинги в августе 2026 года и состав электората основных партий, published . Second release for August: party ratings published 8 October. Fieldwork 18–28 August 2026, 1,600 respondents, face-to-face, before the State Duma election, so not comparable with the post-election VTsIOM and FOM readings. Shares of all respondents; among those who had decided: United Russia 47%, CPRF 13%, LDPR 12%, New People 6%, A Just Russia 7%, Yabloko 7%. The sample excludes the new regions and closed territories. Yabloko (5% of all respondents) was on the list although removed from the ballot shortly before the survey. No comparison with earlier readings.
  • Levada Center — Рейтинги сентября 2026 года: настроения, оценки положения дел в стране и одобрение органов власти, published . Fieldwork 23–30 September 2026, 1,616 respondents aged 18+, 137 localities (50 regions), face-to-face. Negative assessments: only the share saying the country is on the wrong path (right direction 60%, undecided 14%). Anxious moods: share reporting negative emotions (tension, irritation, fear, anguish); normal, even state 57%. No party or protest figures in this release.

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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October 2, 2026 — Government Ratings Drop as Post-Election Tightening Begins

Putin's job approval held at 68% (VTsIOM) and 72% (FOM), but the first post-election week hit the cabinet: VTsIOM's rating of the government fell 3.2 pp and Mishustin's 4.1 pp, FOM's government rating 5 pp. Anxious moods again outnumbered calm ones at FOM, 47% to 46%.

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Following the State Duma elections, approval ratings for the Russian authorities resumed their familiar downward trend. Putin's job approval remains stable.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) recorded a 3.2 pp drop in positive assessments of the Russian government's performance during the week of September 21–27, and a 4.1 pp drop for Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) reported a 5 pp decline in its own rating of the government over the same period.

That same week, FOM found that anxious respondents once again outnumbered calm respondents, at 47% and 46%, respectively. Two weeks earlier, the balance had been reversed for the first time since spring 2026: 47% reported feeling calm, compared with 45% who reported feeling anxious.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 68% (−9.8 pp); FOM 72% (−8 pp); Levada Center 76% (September 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 37.4% (Aug 31 – Sep 6, 2026; +3.3 pp); FOM 33% (Sep 4–6, 2026; −9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (+4 pp); FOM 16% (+2 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 45% (August 2026; +16 pp); FOM 27% (Sep 4–6, 2026; +6 pp); Levada Center 26% (September 2026; +6 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 47% (+9 pp); Levada Center 25% (September 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. VTsIOM, «Рейтинги Президента и Правительства», 2 October 2026

  2. VTsIOM, «Протестный потенциал», fieldwork week of 21–27 September 2026

  3. FOM, «Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 39», 2 October 2026

  4. Levada Center, «Рейтинги сентября 2026 года: настроения, оценки положения дел в стране и одобрение органов власти», 2 October 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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September 25, 2026 — Putin's Approval Eases in the Week of the Duma Vote

VTsIOM put Putin's job approval at 68% for the week Russians voted in the State Duma elections, 2.1 pp below the week before. The election blackout was in force throughout, so no party ratings were polled, and FOM published no data at all. Protest potential held at 15%.

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The ratings cover public sentiment during September 14-20, the week Russians voted in the State Duma elections. The blackout period was in force for the whole week, so neither Kremlin-aligned pollster measured party ratings or the standing of party politicians, and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) published no polling data at all.

The authorities' ratings held up, sustained by the intensive propaganda campaign that accompanied the vote. Putin's own job approval was the exception: the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) recorded 68%, down 2.1 pp on the week and 9.8 pp since the start of the year.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 68% (−9.8 pp); FOM 73% (−7 pp); Levada Center 76% (August 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 37.4% (Aug 31 – Sep 6, 2026; +3.3 pp); FOM 33% (Sep 4–6, 2026; −9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 15% (+3 pp); FOM 16% (+2 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 45% (August 2026; +16 pp); FOM 27% (Sep 4–6, 2026; +6 pp); Levada Center 27% (August 2026; +7 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 45% (+7 pp); Levada Center 25% (August 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. VTsIOM, «Рейтинги Президента и Правительства», 25 September 2026

  2. VTsIOM, «Протестный потенциал», fieldwork week of 14-20 September 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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September 18, 2026 — Calm Moods Overtake Anxious Ones Ahead of the Vote

Putin's job approval rose in the last polling week before the State Duma vote: VTsIOM 70.1% (+2.7 pp), FOM 73% (+3 pp). Neither pollster published party ratings on September 18, as voting and the blackout began. FOM recorded more calm than anxious moods for the first time since April.

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On September 18, Kremlin-aligned pollsters did not publish ratings of parties and party politicians: the day marked the start of both three-day voting for the State Duma and the election blackout period. The final stage of an election campaign traditionally brings intensified propaganda in support of United Russia and the authorities.

This has stabilized their ratings, a shift also reflected in other indirect indicators. For example, according to the Kremlin-aligned Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), calm moods prevailed over anxious ones for the first time since April 2026 (47% and 45%, respectively). However, this effect is temporary. Immediately after the vote, a number of unpopular decisions that the authorities have deliberately deferred to the post-election period will take effect: for instance, housing and utility tariff increases of up to 22%, depending on the region, have been moved to October 1.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 70.1% (−7.7 pp); FOM 73% (−7 pp); Levada Center 76% (August 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 37.4% (+3.3 pp); FOM 33% (−9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 15% (+3 pp); FOM 16% (+2 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 45% (August 2026; +16 pp); FOM 27% (+6 pp); Levada Center 27% (August 2026; +7 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 45% (+7 pp); Levada Center 25% (August 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента и Правительства, 18 September 2026

  2. VTsIOM — Протестный потенциал

  3. FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 37, 18 September 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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September 11, 2026 — Anxious Moods Ease in FOM Polling

Putin's approval held steady, with VTsIOM at 67.4% and FOM at 70%. FOM recorded the largest weekly shift: the share describing the mood around them as anxious fell from 52% to 48%. VTsIOM's August reading of negative assessments eased to 45%.

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Approval ratings of the Russian authorities changed little in the week to September 6. VTsIOM put Putin's job approval at 67.4%, up from 66.9% a week earlier, while FOM recorded 70%, one point lower than in its previous survey.

The largest weekly movement was in FOM's measure of public mood: 48% of respondents described the mood among their family and acquaintances as anxious, compared with 52% a week earlier.

Party ratings were broadly unchanged. VTsIOM put United Russia at 37.4%, against 37.2% a week earlier, and FOM at 33%. VTsIOM's protest potential indicator rose from 15% to 16%.

VTsIOM's monthly indices put negative assessments of the situation in the country at 45% in August, down from 47% in July. Levada Center figures remain those of its August survey.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 67.4% (−10.4 pp); FOM 70% (−10 pp); Levada Center 76% (August 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 37.4% (+3.3 pp); FOM 33% (−9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (+4 pp); FOM 15% (+1 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 45% (August 2026; +16 pp); FOM 27% (+6 pp); Levada Center 27% (August 2026; +7 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 48% (+10 pp); Levada Center 25% (August 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. VTsIOM — Рейтинги Президента, Правительства и политических партий, 11 September 2026

  2. VTsIOM — Протестный потенциал

  3. VTsIOM — Индексы социальных оценок

  4. FOM — Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 36, 11 September 2026

  5. Levada Center — Рейтинги августа 2026 года, 28 August 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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September 4, 2026 — LDPR and New People Ratings Diverge

Putin's approval remained stable, but VTsIOM put New People almost level with the CPRF while FOM continued to show LDPR in second place — an unusually wide divergence between major Russian pollsters.

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Approval ratings of the Russian authorities remain stable, as they have through the previous weeks of August. Their stability is sustained by the active propaganda phase of the election campaign and by the vacation season, when respondents' moods are typically more positive than at other times of the year.

Most interesting is the widening divergence between the ratings of the Kremlin's systemic parties published by the pollsters it controls. The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Putin's favorite pollster, shows the familiar picture: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the populist-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are competing for second place, at 9% and 11% respectively.

New People, whose rhetoric is the least hawkish among the systemic parties but is pro-war nonetheless, takes only 4%. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) shows the exact opposite picture: New People has nearly caught up with the CPRF, at 11.5% and 11.6% respectively, while the LDPR's rating has declined steadily and now stands at 8.7%.

Beyond differences in polling methodology, this gap can also be explained by how the LDPR's and New People's relations with officials of the Presidential Administration have evolved, and by dynamics within the Administration itself.

According to a recent report by the independent outlet Meduza, LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky has come into conflict with the group of Administration officials responsible for domestic politics, headed by First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, which he blames both for failing to deliver on promises guaranteeing the party second place and for the party's falling ratings.

The LDPR has meanwhile adjusted its image and now publicly presents itself as the "party of the siloviks," and its supervising official within the Administration has changed from Kiriyenko to Andrei Yarin, head of the Domestic Policy Directorate, who is traditionally close to the security bloc.

At the same time, New People is Kiriyenko's personal project and serves as the voice of the civilian wing of the bureaucracy, campaigning on modernization slogans.

The divergence in ratings may therefore be an indirect indicator of a possible internal conflict within the Administration over the outcome of the State Duma campaign and over the guarantees of second and third place for the systemic parties.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 66.9% (−10.9 pp); FOM 71% (−9 pp); Levada Center 76% (August 2026; −9 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 37.2% (+3.1 pp); FOM 33% (−9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 15% (+3 pp); FOM 15% (+1 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 47% (July 2026; +18 pp); FOM 28% (+7 pp); Levada Center 27% (August 2026; +7 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 52% (+14 pp); Levada Center 25% (August 2026; +5 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. EK Strategies on X, September 4, 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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August 21, 2026 — Yabloko's Removal From the Ballot Reshapes Party Preferences

Current approval ratings held broadly steady this week, buoyed by the election campaign and the vacation season, but Yabloko's removal from the ballot visibly reshaped party preferences: combined systemic-party support fell and New People's rating rose as some Yabloko voters shifted to it.

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Current approval ratings for the authorities continue to hold steady, buoyed by the active phase of the election campaign and by the vacation season, when public sentiment is consistently better than at other times of the year.

The removal of the antiwar Yabloko party from the elections, however, has left a clear mark on the current ratings. According to the Kremlin-aligned Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the combined rating of the systemic parties fell by 9 p.p. in a single week, while the share of voters who have decided to stay away from the polls or have yet to decide whom to support rose by the same 9 p.p.

The rating of New People, a systemic pseudo-liberal party created by the Presidential Administration, also rose by 3 p.p., as part of Yabloko's electorate shifted to it. The Kremlin-aligned Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) shows much the same picture: the share of respondents prepared to vote for non-parliamentary parties (Yabloko among them) fell by 6.4 p.p. over the week, while other forms of protest voting (choosing New People, spoiling the ballot, not turning out, and being undecided) together rose by 6.3 p.p.

Even the Kremlin's own pollsters thus make clear that Yabloko had the potential not only to clear the 5% threshold but to take a significant share of the vote. The party's removal from the elections shifted the declared preferences of between 6% and 12% of Russians, which is itself an indication of its minimum potential.

Key ratings of the week (change since the start of the year)

  • Putin's job approval: VTsIOM 65.8% (−12.0 pp); FOM 70% (−10 pp); Levada Center 74% (July 2026; −11 pp).
  • United Russia rating: VTsIOM 36% (+1.9 pp); FOM 33% (−9 pp).
  • Protest potential: VTsIOM 16% (+4 pp); FOM 13% (−1 pp).
  • Negative assessments of the situation in the country and of the authorities: VTsIOM 47% (July 2026; +18 pp); FOM 30% (+9 pp); Levada Center 29% (July 2026; +9 pp).
  • Predominance of anxious moods: VTsIOM 23% (July 2026; 0 pp); FOM 51% (+13 pp); Levada Center 28% (July 2026; +8 pp).

Sources for this weekly update

  1. EK Strategies on X, August 21, 2026

Polling data

Analysis: Evgenii Liamin

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Why VTsIOM, FOM and Levada Center Polls Differ

VTsIOM, FOM and Levada Center use different survey modes, samples and question wordings, and publish on different schedules: VTsIOM and FOM weekly, Levada Center monthly. Their figures for the same indicator therefore differ in level, and changes are most meaningful within one pollster's series. The table below shows how each pollster works.

How each pollster asks, surveys and publishes
PollsterApproval question wordingFieldwork / modeSamplePublication cadenceNotes
VTsIOMMethodology of VTsIOMOverall, do you approve or disapprove of the work of the President of Russia? Share answering “approve”.Telephone (VTsIOM-Sputnik); since May 2026 half telephone, half face-to-face at homeAbout 1,600 respondents aged 18+; weekly figures average seven days of fieldworkWeekly ratings, usually on Fridays; monthly social indices

Founded in 1987; a joint-stock company since 2003. Its board of directors has included representatives of government bodies and the Presidential Administration.

Weekly averages from mixed telephone and face-to-face fieldwork. Its protest indicator measures how likely respondents think protests are, not their own readiness to take part.

FOMMethodology of FOMIs Vladimir Putin doing a rather good or a rather bad job as president? Share answering “rather good”.Face-to-face interviews at respondents' homes (FOMnibus)1,500 respondents aged 18+ in 97 settlements across 51 regionsWeekly (Dominanty), on Fridays; fieldwork over the preceding weekend

Public Opinion Foundation (Fond «Obshchestvennoye mneniye»), a Russian research foundation.

Weekend face-to-face surveys. Its protest indicator measures personal readiness to take part in protests; its negative assessments measure personal discontent with the authorities' actions over the past month.

Levada CenterMethodology of Levada CenterOn the whole, do you approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin's performance as president of Russia? Share answering “approve”.Face-to-face interviews at respondents' homesAbout 1,600 respondents aged 18+ in 137 settlements across 50 regionsMonthly

Yuri Levada Analytical Center, a non-governmental research organisation; designated a “foreign agent” by the Russian Ministry of Justice in 2016.

Monthly face-to-face surveys, so its figures change less often than the weekly series. Its negative assessments measure the share saying the country is on the wrong path.

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Sources, Methodology and Limitations

Figures are shown exactly as each pollster published them, without rounding or adjustment.

  • Change since the start of the year is the difference, in percentage points (pp), between the latest figure and the pollster’s start-of-year reference value.

  • Change against the previous release compares two consecutive releases of the same pollster.

  • Weekly figures are dated by the last day of fieldwork, monthly figures by their month. Pollsters publish at different times, so every value is shown with its own period.

  • If a published figure is corrected, the correction and its date are shown next to it.

Limitations

  • Surveys in Russia are conducted under restrictions on political expression, which may affect how respondents answer questions about the authorities.

  • Pollsters differ in survey mode (telephone and face-to-face), sample and question wording, so levels are not directly comparable across pollsters.

  • Weekly figures are subject to sampling error of about 2.5–3.6 percentage points, so small week-to-week changes are not necessarily meaningful.

  • Start-of-year reference values are those used in EK Strategies' weekly updates; where a pollster's own January figure differs, this is noted with the release.

Primary sources: VTsIOM

Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM)Survey methodology

All primary releases (10)

Primary sources: FOM

Public Opinion Foundation (FOM)Survey methodology

All primary releases (8)
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 41 — , published . FOMnibus of 9–11 October, 1,500 respondents, 97 settlements, 51 regions, margin of error up to 3.6%. Approval is the «works rather well» question (71%); trust the same week is 70% and is not taken into the tracker. Protest potential is the «would you personally take part» series (16%, previous point 16% on 27 September; FOM measures it fortnightly); the other FOM question, «would many people take part», also stands at 16%. Yabloko 3%, A Just Russia 4% — no fields in the model. Issue 41 has no section on dissatisfaction with the authorities.
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 40 — , published . Fieldwork 2–4 October 2026, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities (51 regions), margin of error up to 3.6%. Job approval: «работает скорее хорошо». Negative assessments: actions of the authorities over the past month personally caused discontent or indignation (previous point 6 September: 27%). Anxious moods: anxious mood prevails among family and friends (calm 46%). Parties: shares of all respondents; Yabloko 3% and A Just Russia 3% have no fields. No protest figure in this issue. Issue page dated 9 October, PDF dated 8 October.
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 39 — , published . Fieldwork 25–27 September 2026, 1,500 respondents in 97 localities (51 regions). Protest potential: share answering that they would personally take part in protest actions where they live (16%); the share expecting many people to take part is also 16%. Measured every two weeks. No party ratings in this issue. Issue page dated 2 October, PDF dated 1 October.
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 37 — , published . Fieldwork 11–13 September 2026, 1,500 respondents. Job approval: «работает скорее хорошо» (73%); FOM’s separate trust question («скорее доверяю») stood at 71% the same week. This issue has no party ratings and no «Недовольство властями» section, both present in issue 36.
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 36 — , published
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 35 — , published
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 33 — , published
  • Доминанты. Поле мнений. Выпуск 3 — , published . Start-of-year reference values used in EK Strategies' weekly updates. Approval 80% and protest potential 14%: issue 3 of 23 January 2026 (this release). United Russia 42%, CPRF 7%, LDPR 9%, New People 4%, negative assessments 21% and anxious moods 38%: issue 4 of 30 January 2026 (https://fom.ru/Dominanty/15298), fieldwork 23–25 January.

Primary sources: Levada Center

Levada CenterSurvey methodology

All primary releases (5)
First launched
Last updated
Sources last checked
Analysis
Evgenii Liamin
Methodology
Sources, methodology and limitations of this tracker. How EK Strategies selects material, verifies sources and phrases attribution: Read our Research Methodology.
Corrections
Corrections policy. To report an error, write to corrections@ekstrategies.org.
Primary sources
VTsIOM, FOM, Levada Center