The Kremlin needs an image of "cohesion and unity," not for the sake of legitimacy as such, but as a resource for escalating the war further. The 2026 Duma campaign shows plainly what that image costs to produce and how far it diverges from the actual public mood. Key topics:
Final party ratings before voting opens
The Kremlin's plans and tools
The anti-war opposition's response: Yabloko and political groups in exile
Executive Summary
The 2026 State Duma election campaign, held in the fifth year of the full-scale war, clearly reflects the mounting problems and imbalances within Russia's political system. Almost every Kremlin decision connected with the "electoral process" bears this out: the erratic back-and-forth over targets for turnout and for United Russia's result; Vladimir Putin's personal involvement in campaigning for the ruling party, the first time he has done so since 2007 (in previous cycles he deliberately kept his distance from its unpopular brand); and the initial registration of the pro-peace Yabloko party, followed by its swift exclusion and the subsequent purge of its candidates.
Taken together, these moves point not to a stable, systematic policy of "electoral management," but rather to damage control and a series of ad hoc responses both to accumulated problems now breaking into the open and to the continuing confrontation within the elite between the "strategic pause" and "perpetual war" parties.
The Kremlin's strategic objective for this parliamentary campaign is an ambitious one: to demonstrate the supposed "cohesion and unity" of society, total support for its aggressive course, and, in Putin's own words (1),
"the resilience of the state, the maturity of the political system, and its ability to withstand any external threat, blackmail, or aggression."
Moscow needs this propaganda image not only to confirm its current legitimacy, but also to underpin further escalation of the war against Ukraine and beyond. The next electoral cycle is four to five years away, in 2030–2031, which clearly frees the Kremlin's hands over the coming years, since, with no elections on the calendar, public opinion will carry markedly less weight in decision-making.
The current campaign is taking place amid an obvious crisis for the Kremlin. Ukraine's strike campaign against targets in the Russian rear has produced a fuel crisis in several successive waves and has hit a significant sector of Russian commerce: the online marketplaces Wildberries and OZON, which together control as much as three-quarters of online retail (2). Public sentiment has also been markedly affected by the Kremlin's repressive policies: internet shutdowns and the blocking of popular messaging services, coercing citizens into using state digital services, a tightening of fiscal policy, and an expanded recruitment drive for the Russian army that extends to forced mobilization. Against a backdrop of overwhelming and sustained public demand for peace and an end to the fighting (in 2026, depending on the month, between 59% and 67% of citizens favored peace, according to the independent Levada Center (3)), external shocks and the Kremlin's domestic policy have produced a record drop in the authorities' ratings, including in Vladimir Putin's personal rating. In his recent appearances he has regularly been obliged to acknowledge these problems and to state that the authorities are "working methodically to resolve them."
Under these conditions, delivering the required result has become far from straightforward for officials in the Presidential Administration, and they increasingly pursue it through coercive rather than political methods.
The final forecasts from state-controlled pollsters reflect the consensus that has formed inside Kremlin circles. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) puts United Russia at 51–53% in the party-list vote and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) at 47–49%, while the Agency for Political and Economic Communications (APEC), a think tank close to the Presidential Administration, gives 49–52%.
Across all three, expected turnout runs at 51–56%.
The real picture, without Kremlin adjustments, comes from a survey conducted by the independent project ExtremeScan on 4–10 September: 35.6% among decided voters and 23.9% among all voters. Among decided voters the party runs 12 to 17 p.p. below the state forecasts. The systemic parties that are the traditional beneficiaries of protest voting show markedly stronger results: among decided voters, the Communist Party (CPRF) stands at 23.9%, New People at 16.2%, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) at 11%. Tellingly, the Kremlin's own pollsters do not agree on the trend: VTsIOM records the ruling party's annual low of 27.3% in April and a rise to 37.4% by 6 September, while FOM contradicts that rise, showing a low of 32% at the end of August, 11 p.p. below the year's high. The same ExtremeScan survey also explains the decision on Yabloko: had the pro-peace party been on the ballot, 18% of all adult voters would have been prepared to vote for it, equivalent to 24.6% of decided voters; United Russia would have taken 31.8%, and Yabloko would have come second with 24.6%, ahead of the CPRF's 16.6%.
The Kremlin simply cannot allow citizens a legal, institutional means of declaring an anti-war position, and the subsequent purge of Yabloko's single-mandate candidates confirms this: 34 of its 137 candidates have been removed and 103 are continuing their campaigns.
Even the pro-government APEC concedes that Yabloko candidates may win in two districts.
Against this background, Presidential Administration officials abruptly raised the targets for United Russia in early September. According to the independent Russian outlet Meduza, the target for regions with average support for the authorities rose from 45% to 47%, and for regions with a "higher level of [political] mobilization" from 50% to 52–53%, while nationwide the party is now required to post "more than 50%." These targets had previously been revised three times in the opposite direction, from 55% down to 45%, as EK Stratcom has described in detail (4): with ratings falling, officials feared that overreach in falsifying results would consolidate protest after the vote.
The reversal follows Vladimir Putin's personal entry into the campaign, which officials themselves sum up in the phrase "the president has put his shoulder to it, we are working for him," and United Russia is publicly presenting itself as "the president's party" for the first time since 2007.
The gap between the official 47–53% and the independent 35.6% cannot be closed by political means alone, and officials say so openly: meeting the higher targets will require intensified "administrative and workplace mobilization," that is, coercing public-sector employees and staff of state corporations into voting, together with a larger share of outright falsification. To this end, the Presidential Administration has tested a mechanism of "mobilizers" or "brigade leaders": middle managers at state-dependent companies and institutions who are personally answerable for turnout and voting among the employees they supervise. Reports of coercion began to surface even before the voting days opened, far enough that the authorities in Kaliningrad region were forced to deny publicly that public-sector employees were being pressured into voting electronically under quotas issued to each organization.
At the same time, the Kremlin is working to suppress turnout among protest-minded voters: even pro-government candidates acknowledge how colorless the campaigning has been, and the systemic parties are deliberately keeping their campaigns restrained right up to the final weeks before the vote.
The anti-war opposition, both inside Russia and in exile, has diverged on details but not on the overall approach. On 9 September, having exhausted its options in the courts, Yabloko called for spoiling ballots in the party-list vote and in those districts where it has no candidates, on the grounds that every party admitted to the election is pro-war. On 14 September, Yulia Navalnaya's Anti-Corruption Foundation entered a tactical alliance with Maxim Katz, publishing a joint set of district-by-district recommendations built on the mechanics of Alexei Navalny's Smart Voting and supplemented by screening candidates on the war; in the party-list vote, Navalnaya urges a vote for any party other than United Russia, while Katz backs New People as the least pro-war of those remaining. Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Anti-War Committee of Russia has compiled dossiers on candidates in the single-mandate districts while stating explicitly that it is not calling on anyone to take part in the election. Ivan Zhdanov’s Progress movement supports the protest voting strategy adopted by all opposition groups, calling on Russians to vote at noon on September 20 as a demonstration of opposition to the war. The movement is also conducting exit polls abroad jointly with the Vesna movement and organizing protests by Russians in exile under the banner “Single Day of Resistance” in at least seven capitals. Garry Kasparov's Free Russia Forum has called for a boycott of the election.
Beyond these electoral appeals, the current cycle has been accompanied by information campaigns designed not only for voting day but also for the entire run-up to it.
EK Stratcom’s RESET (#Perezagruzka) campaign links internet shutdowns, rising prices, record military spending, and deteriorating infrastructure and social services to decisions made by the Kremlin and United Russia.
It presents a clear alternative: Russia can achieve peace, security, and a decent standard of living — and already has the resources to do so.
From February to August 2026 the campaign produced 5,686 units of content, 224.4 million views, 13.9 million reactions, 1.88 million shares, and 518,000 comments. Additionally, on VKontakte, 369,000 comments drew 1.14 million likes and generated 210,000 discussion threads, which shows that anti-war arguments work inside the censored information space as well.
Final party ratings before voting opens
After the Kremlin canceled the registration of the party list of the pro-peace Yabloko, the ratings of the other controlled systemic parties stabilized and reverted to the pattern the regime is accustomed to. Forecasts of the final result from state-controlled pollsters show the overwhelming advantage for United Russia that the Kremlin wants: in the party-list vote, the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) gives the ruling party 51–53% (5) and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) 47–49% (6). There is greater variation among the parties of the "systemic opposition." VTsIOM and FOM give the Communist Party (CPRF) 13–15% and 14–17% respectively, while their forecasts for third and fourth place differ markedly. FOM places the populist-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) third at 10–12% and New People fourth at 8–9%; New People is the least aggressive of the systemic parties but still a pro-war, pseudo-pro-democratic project of Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy head of the Presidential Administration. VTsIOM, by contrast, effectively equates the potential of the LDPR and New People, giving each 9–11%. Both pollsters put the patriotic A Just Russia in fifth place, at 6–7% according to FOM and 4–6% according to VTsIOM, though the latter notes that
"its electoral position is unstable, but it does have a chance of clearing the five-percent threshold."
One of the leading Kremlin think tanks, the Agency for Political and Economic Communications (APEC), gives (7) similar figures, which points to the managerial and expert consensus that has formed inside Kremlin circles: United Russia 49–52%, CPRF 13–15%, LDPR 9–11%, New People 8–10%, and A Just Russia 4–6%. Their expected turnout figures are almost identical: VTsIOM 51–53%, FOM 54%, and APEC 54–56%.
The picture set out above reflects primarily those Russians who have made up their minds and intend to go to the polls, and it is a product of the intensive propaganda campaign waged for United Russia in recent months, though even here the Kremlin's pollsters diverge. The ruling party's ratings fell steadily from the beginning of 2026: VTsIOM recorded (8) an annual low of 27.3% in April (down 7.7 p.p. since the start of the year), before the figure was inflated to 37.4% on 6 September. FOM's data show (9) no such upward trend in recent months, putting the party at a low of 32% at the end of August, 11 p.p. below its own high for the year.
The real situation, without Kremlin adjustments, is shown by the most recent survey (10), conducted on 4–10 September by the independent project ExtremeScan. United Russia's rating among all voters, according to the project's data, stands at just 23.9%, and at 35.6% among decided voters, markedly below the 47–53% range given by the state pollsters. Expected votes for the systemic parties, the traditional beneficiaries of protest voting, are considerably higher: among decided voters, the CPRF stands at 23.9%, New People at 16.2%, the LDPR at 11%, and A Just Russia at 5.9%. The survey also records that, had the pro-peace Yabloko been on the ballot, 18% of all adult voters would have been prepared to vote for it, and the final distribution would have differed radically from the one the Kremlin wants: United Russia would have taken 31.8% and Yabloko would have come second with 24.6%, followed by the CPRF at 16.6%, New People at 10.3%, and the LDPR at 8.6%, all among decided voters.
This distribution, drawn from independent data, plainly explains why Yabloko's list was struck from the election and why the party's candidates in single-mandate districts were subsequently purged, with 34 of 137 candidates removed and 103 continuing their campaigns (11): the Kremlin simply cannot afford to give citizens a legal, institutional means of declaring an anti-war position on a mass scale.
Even pro-government experts concede that some Yabloko candidates may win in their single-mandate districts; APEC, for example, considers (12) this possible in two of them.
The Kremlin's plans and the instruments for implementing them
In early September, the Presidential Administration officials responsible for overseeing electoral processes abruptly raised the targets set for United Russia, according to the independent Russian outlet Meduza (13):
"For regions with average support for the authorities, the KPI rose from 45% to 47%, and for regions with a 'higher level of [political] mobilization' from 50% to 52–53%. Nationwide, United Russia is now required to post 'more than 50%.'"
These targets had previously been revised downward three times, from 55% to 45%, as EK Stratcom has described in detail (14): with the authorities' ratings falling, officials feared that overreach in falsifying election results could consolidate protest after the vote.
The current increase in the targets follows Vladimir Putin's personal involvement in United Russia's campaign. Over the summer he addressed two party congresses (15, 16), made a series of trips to the regions (17), and on 5 September met the candidates heading the ruling party's list (18). Officials put it this way:
"the president has put his shoulder to it, we are working for him." (19)
For the first time since 2007, United Russia is publicly presenting itself during the campaign as "the president's party" (20).
The gap between the official forecasts of 47–53% for United Russia and the independent figure of 35.6% requires a large-scale campaign to coerce the dependent electorate into voting. Officials themselves admit (21) that meeting the higher targets set for United Russia will take an intensification of what they call "administrative and workplace mobilization" (that is, pressure on public-sector employees and staff of state corporations), along with a larger share of outright falsification. To that end, Presidential Administration officials have tested a new mechanism of "mobilizers" or "brigade leaders" (22): middle managers at state-dependent companies and public-sector institutions who will be responsible for turnout and voting among the employees they supervise. As usual, reports of coercion began to surface even before the voting days opened. The authorities in Kaliningrad region, for example, had to issue a public denial that
"employees of Kaliningrad public-sector organizations are being forced to vote electronically because each organization has been assigned a quota." (23)
Similar cases have been recorded in other regions (24). At the same time, the Kremlin is working to suppress turnout among protest-minded voters: the campaigning has been conspicuously colorless (25), as even pro-government candidates acknowledge (26), and the systemic parties are deliberately keeping their campaigns fairly restrained, even in the final weeks before voting begins (27).
The anti-war opposition's response: Yabloko and political groups in exile
After a series of unsuccessful attempts to challenge the exclusion of Yabloko's party list in court, and amid continuing pressure on its single-mandate candidates, on 9 September the party called (28) for the spoiling of ballots in the party-list vote, on the grounds that every party admitted to the election is pro-war, and for the same in those single-mandate districts where it has no candidate. Ivan Zhdanov's Progress movement also calls on voters to support and campaign for Yabloko's candidates (29).
Almost all the other opposition groups in exile have likewise called for a protest vote against United Russia and Vladimir Putin, while selecting individual candidates by how pro-war they are.
The exception is the Free Russia Forum, whose representatives have called for a boycott of the election (30).
Yulia Navalnaya's Anti-Corruption Foundation has formed a tactical alliance with the popular political blogger Maxim Katz: on 14 September they jointly published a single set of recommendations (31, 32) identifying the least pro-war candidates in each single-mandate district on the internationally recognized territory of Russia. The recommendations combine Alexei Navalny’s Smart Voting approach, which directs votes to the strongest challengers to United Russia candidates in each electoral district, with Maxim Katz’s assessment of candidates’ positions on the war. Through his iditena.org platform, Katz provided detailed profiles of candidates according to their level of support for the war, with those least supportive selected for recommendation. In the party-list vote, Navalnaya has urged a vote for any party other than United Russia, while Katz has backed New People as the least pro-war party remaining on the ballot. Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Anti-War Committee of Russia has launched (33) a similar initiative in a different form: a dossier of statements was compiled on every candidate in the single-mandate districts and analyzed against three criteria, namely "position on the war," "hands-on work with voters," and "chance of winning." All of this is presented purely for informational purposes, and the committee states explicitly that
"the Anti-War Committee of Russia does not call for participation in the election and does not endorse particular candidates."
Ivan Zhdanov's Progress movement has also announced an exit-poll campaign (34) abroad (jointly with the Vesna movement) and a "Single Day of Resistance" (35), a set of protest actions against the Kremlin, the war, and repression on 20 September, planned in at least seven capitals: Warsaw, Prague, Tallinn, Helsinki, Belgrade, Yerevan, and Tbilisi.
Opposition information campaigns aimed at the current electoral cycle are also under way. The EK Strategic Communications Center's election-period campaign #RESET (#Perezagruzka) traces the material conditions Russians face, including prices, wages, public services, and restrictions on the internet, back to decisions taken by the Kremlin and United Russia, and sets against them a simple counter-proposition: peace, security, and a decent standard of living are not out of reach for Russia, and the means to deliver them already exist. From February to August 2026 the campaign put out 5,686 items, which were seen 224.4 million times and drew 13.9 million reactions, 1.88 million shares, and 518,000 comments. The bulk of the output consists of infographic cards paired with short explanatory text, published on Telegram and in the YouTube Community tab: 4,356 items, 53.3 million views, 1.12 million reactions, 293,000 shares, and 186,000 comments.
These pieces argue from survey data, official figures, and side-by-side comparisons, tracing specific costs borne by the population back to specific decisions and to those who made them.
The same arguments are rebuilt as vertical video for YouTube and TikTok: 1,330 clips, 171.1 million views, 12.8 million reactions, 1.58 million shares, and 331,000 comments. This carries the campaign to viewers who rarely encounter political material in text form.
The campaign's distinguishing feature, however, is that it operates inside Russia's censored information space rather than around it.
Separately from the totals above, EK Stratcom posted 369,000 comments on VKontakte setting out documented criticism of the Kremlin, the war, and the authorities, which attracted 1.14 million likes and generated 210,000 discussion threads among Russian users. Regional outlets and affiliated channels extend the campaign's reach further, reposting and reworking its materials under the #Perezagruzka label.
The campaign promotes a consistent set of themes: internet censorship and shutdowns, rising prices and inflation, record wartime spending, deteriorating public services and infrastructure, declining support for United Russia and Vladimir Putin, and growing public demand for peace. Its central claim is that opposition to internet restrictions, to the war, and to the current political course is not marginal but increasingly mainstream, shared across a large part of Russian society.
Across platforms and formats this yields a single recognizable election narrative: the present situation is the result of political choices rather than an inevitability, those choices can be changed, and the demand for peace, freedom, and a normal life is far broader than the authorities admit.
Sources
Ibid.
How EK Strategies selects material, verifies sources and phrases attribution: Read our Research Methodology.