The Kremlin portrays protests across Europe as evidence of Europe’s failure while denying any involvement. Russian state propaganda depicts European cities engulfed in unrest, and some pro-war Z commentators interpret the crackdown on demonstrators as preparation for a future war with Russia. Key topics:

  1. Official Responses: “Europe Is in Chaos, but We Have Nothing to Do with It”

  2. Propaganda: “Schools Are Falling Apart, Yet the Government Finds €7 Billion for Ukraine”

  3. The Z Community: “A Rehearsal for Suppressing Protests in the Event of Mobilization”

Executive Summary

Mass demonstrations across France, Italy, Spain, Albania, and several other European countries in October 2026, some of which escalated into riots, offered Russian propagandists another opportunity to reinforce their traditional narrative of a “Europe in crisis.” Three distinct responses emerged in Russia: a conspicuous effort by officials to deny involvement, openly gleeful coverage by state television, and a more detached, observational interest among much of the pro-war Z community.

The protests presented the Kremlin with a dual challenge: to exploit Europe’s turmoil as evidence of Western governments’ failures and to deflect allegations of interference without openly endorsing the unrest. In a carefully staged October 25 interview with Kremlin propagandist Pavel Zarubin, Vladimir Putin dismissed the allegations as “clearly over the top.” Targeting an American audience to reinforce a narrative that divides the West, Putin highlighted what, as he put it, had surprised him:

“The initial reaction was not anti-Russian at all; it was anti-American.”

He added that questions had allegedly arisen about whether events in Europe were the result of the US administration’s actions and its support for right-wing movements. “I found that somewhat strange,” he said. He attributed the protests to European governments’ “own mistakes” in migration, economic, and foreign policy, while urging restraint:

“I don’t think we should celebrate this, or take advantage of it in any way, or rub salt into the wound.”

Other officials adopted a harsher tone than the Kremlin leadership. Senator Alexey Pushkov claimed that France was in a state of “civil war” because “this is where their experiment with unrestricted migration has led.” Pyotr Tolstoy, chair of the State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, attributed the crisis to the “impotence of the French authorities” and their inability to recognize differences in civilizational ways of life.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the protests to spending on Ukraine. Zakharova claimed that Paris had chosen guns and shells over desks and textbooks. Lavrov called European leaders “political masochists” for asking their citizens to sacrifice wages and social benefits to secure Russia’s defeat.

Russia’s national television channels depicted European capitals in a state of uninterrupted chaos. Even brief news items focused on arson, clashes with police, and looting. Three national propaganda TV channels (Channel One, Russia 1, and NTV) devoted more than an hour of airtime to the French protests on October 18 and the morning of October 19. On the News of the Week program, propagandist Yevgeny Popov asked whether the Fifth Republic would survive another revolution, saying that

“Macron has pushed ordinary French people to breaking point,” yet “the government finds €7 billion for Ukraine.”

Major Russian TV channel NTV depicted French cities transformed into “a battlefield,” while Channel One described the protests and rioting as “the death throes of Macronism.” Channel One also aired remarks by Marine Le Pen, who condemned the violence but called the protesters’ anger “often justified.” Shortly beforehand, she had pledged to end funding for Ukraine.

The protests remained on the news agenda a week later. On October 25, NTV devoted two of its six segments to the protests. One mocked allegations of Russian involvement by invoking “the omnipotence of the Russian president, who can make clouds of smoke rise over European cities without even intervening directly,” and referred to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as “Frau Reichsführerin.”

For the pro-war Z community, the protests were a secondary but revealing topic, eliciting divergent responses. Over the course of a week, Two Majors, a channel linked to the security bloc, moved from mockery (“How France has flourished under Macron”) to accusing Paris of a “rare display of authoritarianism.” It subsequently interpreted the deployment of 70,000 police officers, army units, and armored vehicles as

“a rehearsal for suppressing broader protests in the event, for example, of mobilization.”

Rybar, a Z channel linked to the Defense Ministry, urged readers to temper their expectations, noting with disappointment that “there is no sign of a pan-European revolution yet.” Russia’s leading Z blogger, Yuri Podolyaka, meanwhile, saw the unrest as “the execution of someone’s plan,” whose ultimate objective was “a major war in Europe” against Russia.

Official Responses: “Europe Is in Chaos, but We Have Nothing to Do with It”

For Russia’s leadership, the mass protests in Europe offered a political opportunity while creating a diplomatic challenge. The unrest in France provided another occasion to portray European governments as unable to manage internal divisions. Accusations of Russian interference, however, required a response that would avoid appearing to endorse the destabilization of European states.

This tension was particularly apparent in Vladimir Putin’s remarks on October 25. In a prearranged monologue presented as an interview with propagandist Pavel Zarubin, Putin dismissed accusations that Russia had incited unrest in Europe as “clearly over the top, as is obvious to the citizens of European countries,” adding that “Russia has always been blamed for every conceivable sin.” (1) He also noted, with professed surprise, that some European accusations had initially targeted the United States. His remarks continued his efforts to deepen divisions between Washington and Europe:

“The initial reaction was not anti-Russian at all; it was anti-American. Questions immediately arose about whether events in Europe were the result of the US administration’s actions, its support for right-wing movements, and so on.”

Putin attributed (2) the protests to European governments’ “own mistakes,” particularly in migration, economic, fiscal, and foreign policy. He invoked high public debt and difficulties assimilating migrants, both recurring narratives in Russian domestic propaganda. At the same time, he sought to distance himself from overt gloating:

“I don’t think we should celebrate this, or take advantage of it in any way, or rub salt into the wound.”

A week earlier, on October 19, presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov had described a major crisis (3) in France, characterizing the unrest as bordering on chaos in its largest cities and “spreading to Italy and other countries.” Peskov nevertheless insisted that the events were internal affairs of the countries concerned, publicly distancing Moscow from accusations of involvement.

Lower-ranking officials adopted a more confrontational tone. Federation Council senator Alexey Pushkov listed (4) French cities affected by violence and described the country as being in a state of “civil war,” claiming that “this is where their experiment with unrestricted migration has led.” He advised President Emmanuel Macron to “look for enemies somewhere other than Russia.” Pyotr Tolstoy, chair of the State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, argued (5) that

“the impotence of the French authorities stems from their inability, over the past 50 years, to acknowledge differences in the civilizational ways of life of different peoples. That’s all there is to it; this is, so to speak, where they will slip up.”

Tolstoy thus presented the problems of assimilating migrants as a cause of the protests.

Another strand of official messaging linked the European protests to spending on Ukraine. As early as October 16, commenting on demonstrations by French school students, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused (6) the French government of financing Kyiv at the expense of domestic social services. “Guns and shells instead of desks and textbooks – these are the current priorities of the French political establishment,” she said. She continued:

“France does not have enough money left for its own education and social services because (drum roll, as this may come as a surprise to some) its authorities prefer to squander it on fighting the ‘Russian threat’ they themselves have invented. And they squander billions and tens of billions on supporting the non-existent ‘democracy in Ukraine’ and directly sponsoring the terrorist regime on Bankovaya Street.”

On October 27, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov advanced (7) a similar argument, linking Europeans’ declining living standards to the cost of supporting Kyiv. In his words:

“The West has been seeking to ensure that its people continue to believe that they must sacrifice everything, including their salaries, jobs, healthcare services and social benefits for the sake of Ukraine defeating Russia. […] This is the kind of political masochists they are.”

Taken together, these statements reveal several core narratives that set the framework for both domestic propaganda and the FIMI. The protests were presented as evidence of Europe’s approaching collapse, driven by the failed migration and economic policies of weak European governments that continue their escalatory course against Russia and have traded their citizens’ interests and welfare for those of Ukraine. At the same time, officials sought to frame the unrest solely as the product of Europe’s internal contradictions, denying interference and stopping short of openly endorsing the riots.

Propaganda: “Schools Are Falling Apart, Yet the Government Finds €7 Billion for Ukraine”

The clashes accompanying the October 17 protests provided ideal material for Russian propaganda. Although many demonstrations remained peaceful and the protest movement brought together diverse groups, Russian propaganda outlets consistently focused domestic audiences’ attention on violence and rioting. (8), (9) The resulting coverage depicted European capitals in a state of perpetual chaos.

Russia’s three largest national television networks (Channel One, Russia 1, and NTV) devoted more than an hour of airtime to the French protests on October 18 and the morning of October 19. Russia 1’s News of the Week aired a report (10) titled “France in Flames: Revolt and Destruction in the Streets,” focusing on riots and threats to “behead President Macron.” “Will the Fifth Republic survive another revolution?” asked propagandist Yevgeny Popov. He claimed:

“Macron has pushed ordinary French people to breaking point: living standards have fallen to a record low, fuel prices rise every day, schools are falling apart, but the government finds €7 billion for Ukraine.”

NTV (11) offered a similarly dramatic account: “This is how France’s history goes up in flames as protesters smash and burn it. […] French cities shrouded in black smoke have turned into a battlefield.” Its report drew historical parallels with the French Revolution and the reign of Louis XVI.

Subsequent broadcasts placed even greater emphasis on the crisis of presidential authority. On October 19, Channel One aired (12) a nearly four-minute report on Macron’s address to the nation, describing the protests and riots as the “death throes of Macronism.”

The unrest was thus presented both as a breakdown of public safety and as a sign of the incumbent French leadership’s evident political collapse. Even short news items concentrated on the most visually dramatic episodes: fires, clashes with police, and looting.

Notably, the same Channel One report included (12) an excerpt from a speech by Marine Le Pen on the protests. She criticized the current French leadership for its weakness but also opposed the chaos and violence, while acknowledging that “such anger is often justified, given the succession of crises unfolding without any decisions being made.” Shortly before, on October 14, Le Pen had pledged (13) to stop financing Ukraine if she won the 2027 presidential election, arguing that France could no longer afford such assistance to Kyiv.

The protests remained a prominent subject in Russian domestic propaganda a week after the first major wave of unrest. Particularly revealing was NTV’s October 25 Sunday program Weekly Review, which devoted (14) two of its six segments to the European protests. The first, “We Won’t Simply Go Away: Who Is Behind Europe’s ‘Faceless’ Protests?” portrayed far-left groups as responsible for the chaos. The second, “Paris Is Burning, Putin Is to Blame: Why Russia Has Been Cast as the Cause of Europe’s Troubles,” ridiculed allegations of Russian involvement, referred to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as “Frau Reichsführerin,” and sarcastically invoked

“the omnipotence of the Russian president, who can make clouds of smoke rise over European cities without even intervening directly.”

Similar themes featured (15) in Russia 1’s October 25 edition of News of the Week. Alongside reports on European politics and support for Kyiv, the program covered renewed demonstrations in Paris and police violence:

“That’s how it always goes in Paris. People were already dispersing, but the police fire the first volley.”

The broadcast also promoted a narrative of state repression, amplifying the perceived scale of the crisis through the claim (16) that

“since Hitler’s occupation and the Vichy government, the Élysée Palace has resorted to such measures twice: during the Algerian War in 1961 and during the coronavirus pandemic.”

The Z Community: “A Rehearsal for Suppressing Protests in the Event of Mobilization”

Unlike federal television, parts of the pro-war Z community treated the European protests as a secondary story. Reactions, however, varied. Some channels mocked European governments, while others offered detailed accounts of the protests’ causes or criticized the police for their harsh treatment of demonstrators. Despite these differences, both approaches fed into the broader narrative of chaos and European authorities’ loss of control.

For example, Two Majors, a Z channel linked to the security bloc, citing the channel Belarusian Security Officer, responded to reports of an arson attack on the town hall in Limoges with a single sarcastic line: “How France has flourished under Macron.” (17) In a subsequent, more detailed post (18), the authors outlined the socioeconomic causes of the unrest, emphasizing its organic origins, but concluded by reproaching Macron for continuing to support Ukraine’s armed forces “at the expense of the French.”

Later posts incorporated other familiar propaganda narratives. Discussing curfews and restrictions on demonstrations, Two Majors accused (19) the French government of suppressing a social movement, describing the measures as a “rare display of authoritarianism.” On October 25, the channel went further, unexpectedly linking (20) the crackdown to Europe’s preparations for war with Russia:

“Macron personally oversaw preparations for a forceful crackdown on mass protests. On October 24, 70,000 police officers and gendarmes were mobilized, 10,000 more than the previous week. Army units from Operation Sentinelle, the RAID, GIGN, and BRI special forces, armored vehicles, water cannons, and helicopters have been brought in. Curfews and bans on gatherings have been imposed in several cities. A very convenient rehearsal for suppressing broader protests in the event, for example, of mobilization.”

Meanwhile, Rybar, a Z channel linked to the Defense Ministry, was skeptical about the protests’ prospects and warned (21) readers against excessive expectations:

“There is no sign of a pan-European revolution yet. […] The nearest-term scenario, therefore, is not a single wave but a series of national crises, each unfolding at its own pace.”

On October 18, Russia’s leading Z blogger, Yuri Podolyaka, published a lengthy post (22) titled “A Migrant Revolution (in France and Beyond): Some Unpleasant Thoughts Out Loud.” He described the protests as “not merely a series of coincidences, but the execution of someone’s plan,” suggesting that

“its outcome is supposed to be a major war in Europe; ideally, as I understand it, for whoever commissioned it, Europe against Russia.”

In his account, the tactically logical culmination of the protests would be the emergence of “right-wing dictatorships” in European countries and the “elimination of the left,” immediately followed by “a campaign of conquest to the east,” since local populations “will be made to understand ‘very clearly’ that Russia and Putin personally were to blame for all their previous troubles.” Podolyaka concluded:

“And the timing fits very well with military preparations in European countries.”

By contrast, pro-war writer Zakhar Prilepin was more inclined to defend (23) the demonstrators, blaming French and European elites for the crisis. In an October 20 post, he shared a screenshot of a tweet by Haz Al-Din, chairman of the American Communist Party, which stated:

“The French elite want war with Russia. The French people should bring war against the rotten French elite instead.”

Prilepin responded: “That very ‘Western leftist,’ an American who has visited Donbas repeatedly and is hated by our neo-monarchists and communists, is a hundred times smarter than all those card-carrying would-be Russians of ours who now want to save ‘white France.’”