Russia’s Sovereign Internet Under Attack

Strikes on Data Centers and Their Consequences

The series of strikes on Russian data centers began on the night of October 7–8, when a Yandex facility in Ryazan Region was damaged. The company’s data center in Kaluga was hit on October 9, followed by its Vladimir facility on the night of October 10–11. Yandex is Russia’s largest technology ecosystem, accounting for 28% of the combined value of the country’s 30 largest internet companies, according to Forbes Russia. (1)

On October 14, reports emerged that Ukrainian forces had hit a fourth facility: a data center under construction in Saratov Region for Sber, Russia’s largest bank and an operator of a broader digital ecosystem. It was intended to become Europe’s largest data center by 2030. (2)

On the night of October 17– 18, a VK data center was attacked. The technology company’s services reach up to 95% of the Russian internet’s monthly audience, partly through state coercion.

VK developed the national messaging app MAX, and users have faced sustained pressure to move to it from the blocked Telegram and WhatsApp platforms.

Yandex’s official statement (3) confirmed that two of the three affected facilities, in Ryazan Region and Vladimir, had shut down following the strikes, while “some infrastructure failed” at the third, in Kaluga. In less than a week, three of the company’s five major data centers were damaged. (4) Sberbank did not disclose the nature of the damage, stating only that

“all the bank’s systems are operating normally.” (5)

Some units at its data center, which remains under construction, are already operational. (6) Publicly available information indicates that Sberbank has two other major data centers, in Moscow and Moscow Region. (7)

The impact on digital infrastructure clearly demonstrated the vulnerability created by the extreme concentration of digital resources under the Kremlin’s sustained drive for “internet sovereignty.” The attacks caused widespread outages across the Russian internet and temporarily disrupted most of Yandex’s everyday consumer services, including payments, ride-hailing, delivery, cloud storage, and office software. Numerous third-party businesses and services using the company’s infrastructure were also affected. (8)

Government services and other widely used systems relying on major providers’ cloud capacity were also disrupted. These included the Gosuslugi government services portal; public transportation ticketing systems in several regions; the Pravosudie and Moi Arbitr digital court systems; VetIS, the information system used by Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s agricultural and veterinary watchdog, to monitor products of animal origin; and major 1C accounting services. (9)

The affected Yandex data centers housed three of Russia’s six largest supercomputers: Chervonenkis and Lyapunov in Ryazan Region, and Galushkin in Vladimir. Specialists assess that the company’s computing capacity has been “severely affected” and that

“the resulting problems could delay the development of its AI technology, on which its core business depends, by months or years.” (10)

Industry specialists expect the global chip shortage to delay restoration of the facilities until at least 2028. (11) Sanctions restricting shipments to Russia of NVIDIA A100 graphics processing units, which power Yandex’s supercomputers, further complicate the task.

In an October 19 assessment, Nezygar, a Telegram channel that publishes insider claims and has ties to the Presidential Administration, blamed the security establishment for the facilities’ vulnerability. It stated that

“for the past decade, the security establishment has aggressively pushed for sovereignty over data and domestic database storage, yet the infrastructure itself was left critically unprotected.” (12)

Parts of that same establishment have nevertheless benefited from the strikes. According to the BBC Russian Service, (13)

“demand for mobile data centers, ready-to-use mobile storage facilities, had risen even before the October strikes.”

Suppliers of containerized data centers include Yadro, part of X Holding, which has links (14) to Boris Korolev. His father, Sergei Korolev, is first deputy director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and previously headed its Economic Security Service. Yadro’s containerized data center was unveiled in early October 2026, although sales had begun several months earlier. (13)

Official Propaganda Deflects and Assigns Blame

Kremlin propaganda followed its familiar practice of ignoring the data center strikes at the national level, even though most Russians experienced the consequences through internet service outages. A new pattern is also emerging. Alongside its silence on strikes against Russian facilities, official propaganda immediately highlights Russian attacks on the same types of facilities in Ukraine.

In the days after the strikes, television propaganda heavily promoted Russian attacks on Ukrainian data centers as “retribution” without specifying the cause, apparently assuming that Russians already knew about the attacks on Russia.

Since October 11, the national broadcaster Channel One has aired at least five reports (15) on strikes against Ukrainian data centers, and Russia 1 at least seven. (16) Almost all listed data centers first among the targets, followed by Ukrainian energy and military infrastructure, clearly revealing the Kremlin’s messaging priorities. (17), (18) The only report (19) reassuring viewers about the consequences of strikes on Russian data centers aired on October 12 and lasted just one minute. It focused on Yandex’s payment system:

“All customers’ money is safe. Records are stored in multiple copies at different sites, and none has been lost.”

One particularly notable propaganda article (20) was shared on the Telegram channel (21) of leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. It acknowledged the serious consequences of the strikes but blamed Yandex co-founder and former chief executive Arkady Volozh, who stepped down from all positions at the company in 2022 and condemned the war in Ukraine in 2023.

His current venture, Nebius, which emerged from Yandex’s international business, has a market capitalization of $41.23 bn. (22) It rents out computing capacity for training and running AI models, including through a strategic partnership with Palantir. (23) That partnership prompted an angry response from the propaganda outlet:

“Palantir is openly involved in providing technology to Ukraine’s military sector. […] This is the company with which Yandex’s former head is developing his business. It is a betrayal of the interests of the country where he built his career.”

Solovyov LIVE’s subsequent allegations were even more outlandish, suggesting that Volozh had directly helped identify targets:

“Volozh may well have passed the enemy information about how services operate in Russia, the locations of critical infrastructure and data centers, and other important details. He made his name and fortune at Russia’s Yandex, then became a partner of a company whose technologies help the Ukrainian armed forces plan operations and select targets.”

The Z Community Criticizes Officials and Yandex

As in previous rounds of Ukrainian attacks on new categories of Russian infrastructure, most commentators in the pro-war Z community criticized the political leadership and military command for failing to anticipate that the target list could expand. Svarshchiki, a channel linked to the security services, expressed this most bluntly. On October 9, it wrote:

“Damn it, we warned Yandex to get ready. There was enough time. You ignored us again. Now face the consequences,” (24) referring to its warning as far back as August 5. (25)

Svarshchiki continued its criticism, turning to officials responsible for the digital sector:

“Looking at you, colleagues, I worry about having to stand alongside you.” It concluded ironically: “You really need to reach a deal and make peace as soon as possible, on any terms, before things go badly wrong :)” (26)

Other Z channels repeatedly made the same criticism. “Asking why critical facilities in the rear still have no protection is less a rhetorical question than a pointless one. […] That still leaves the question of why no one is even trying to defend important facilities,” wrote the Release the KrakenZ! channel. (27) The Sladkov+ channel asked:

“Are the data centers privately owned? Why aren’t they underground? Why aren’t they protected? […] Someone needs to invent binoculars for the officials in charge so they can look ahead rather than down at their feet. […] If important facilities are left without the slightest attempt to protect them, so the enemy can simply fly in and strike, then the question is: what is going on?” (28)

War correspondent Roman Alekhin wrote: “There is still no plan B, nor even any explanation of what business owners should do. […] This is now about how quickly management decisions are made and whether citizens are being looked after, rather than enemy strikes on data centers.” (29) Military Informant argued: “They should have thought about protecting them and the consequences of strikes beforehand, rather than looking for culprits after the fact and shifting the blame onto those who are not at fault.” (30)

Other commentators criticized the Kremlin’s handling of information about the strikes. On the morning after the first data center was hit, almost all state propaganda outlets called the attack an “incident.” War correspondent Romanov mocked this wording:

“Official media report that the enemy has deployed a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle called an ‘INCIDENT.’” (31)

Ultranationalist commentator Yulia Vityazeva wrote: “The khokhols [a derogatory term for Ukrainians] have been circulating footage of the ‘incident’ since two in the morning. From different angles. And with every detail.” (32) She also called for escalation in response: “Why does that backwater [Ukraine] still exist?” (33)

An important theme runs through this coverage. Z channels linked to the security services have repeatedly suggested that external management could help protect Yandex’s facilities, while accusing the company itself of disloyalty. Two Majors, a channel linked to the security establishment, asked:

“Who actually owns Yandex? How has it behaved in the past? Where does it stand now? Are we even sure it is on our side?” (34)

In another post about the strikes, the channel recalled that Putin had signed a decree allowing businesses that own critical infrastructure and fail to protect it to be placed under temporary management. It added that

“judging by its public conduct, Yandex does not currently look like an organization contributing to Victory.” (35)

Rybar, which has ties to the Defense Ministry, also lent legitimacy to this argument, while dismissing the prospect of external management at the company for now:

“Could Yandex be placed under temporary management for failing to take sufficient measures to protect its data centers? Unlikely: there have been no precedents, and the law is probably intended more to prompt action from those who still refuse to think about protection even after the fifth strike.” (36)

The Older than the Edda channel also hinted at the company’s disloyalty and possible penalties: “There was a decree from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, after all. […] And yes, lyrics from songs by Agata Kristi [a popular Russian rock band] have been scrubbed on Yandex Music, yet ‘Chervona Kalyna’ [a Ukrainian patriotic song that became a symbol of resistance after 2022] is available in a dozen different versions.” (37)