Russia Watch | Explainer
Russian Propaganda:
How the Kremlin’s Propaganda System Works
Last updated: Sources last checked: Draws on: 24 EK Stratcom reports, 2025–2026Curated by: Evgenii Liamin
Russian propaganda is the Russian state’s effort to shape what people at home and abroad believe about the war, the West and the Kremlin itself.
Much of its agenda is set in the Presidential Administration. First Deputy Chief of Staff Alexei Gromov oversees domestic propaganda, and his fellow first deputy Sergei Kiriyenko oversees domestic policy and, since August 2025, a directorate for work with foreign audiences. State television and state-funded internet and film projects produce the content. It reaches people through TV, Telegram, the state messenger Max, schools and cinemas, and abroad through state media, local proxies and fake news sites.
The content is produced and spread by many outlets and contractors, so our research documents each link case by case. What it shows is a system that is well funded and adaptable, yet increasingly reactive when events outpace the script.
Propaganda or disinformation? Propaganda can use accurate, selective or misleading information to promote a political view. Disinformation is the narrower case of content that is deliberately false. Russia uses both; this page covers the propaganda system as a whole.
From EK Stratcom research
At a glance
₽146 bn
for state propaganda in Russia’s draft 2027 budget, about $1.72 bn. ₽100 bn had been planned earlier.
224+
sites in the Pravda (“Portal Kombat”) network by April 2024, publishing at least 3.6 million articles a year.
56%
of Russians name television as a news source (Levada Center, June 2026).
64%
of Russians support peace talks despite years of war messaging (Levada Center, September 2026).
33.5%
of answers from 10 AI chatbots included false pro-Kremlin claims in a NewsGuard test (March 2025).
How it fits together
The system at a glance
Propaganda moves through four functions. Each item links to the EK Stratcom report where we document it.
Stage 1
Direct
Sets narratives, tests them, allocates money.
Stage 2
Produce
Turns direction into content.
Stage 3
Carry
Delivers content to people.
Stage 4
Reach
The audiences it is built for.
The stages describe functions, not a fixed hierarchy. Shared messaging alone does not prove coordination, so each link on this map rests on a specific EK Stratcom report.
Direction and money
Who runs Russian propaganda
Agenda-setting runs through the Presidential Administration. Our reporting points to signs of the Administration testing narratives, and a leaked plan on which voices to amplify or sideline. The money comes from the federal budget and other affiliated sources. Below the top, links are looser: state institutions abroad, foundations and media outlets keep campaigns going even when local operators are prosecuted.
“Moscow retains the funding, media infrastructure and personnel to sustain campaigns from abroad.”
Ceasefire as Victory: Presidential Administration narrative testing and Kremlin expert debate
A leaked plan, reported by Russian independent outlets, shows how the Administration prepared to sell a halt in fighting as “a tremendous victory” for Putin. The playbook: buy off some Z-bloggers, amplify moderates, repress radicals. Signs of the same narratives being promoted appeared from May 18.
By Evgenii Liamin
Estonia’s Kremlin-Linked Influence Ecosystem
The Administration’s Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation oversees a Baltic portfolio covering Rossotrudnichestvo, the sanctioned foundation Pravfond and Baltnews. Estonia has prosecuted several local operators, but these institutions keep campaigns running from Russia ahead of the March 7, 2027 election.
By Václav Malík, Anton Mikhalchuk, Egor Kuroptev
The Kremlin Shifts More of the War’s Cost onto Russians
The draft 2027 budget sets propaganda funding at ₽146 bn ($1.72 bn), against ₽100 bn planned earlier and ₽148 bn for 2026. Defense takes 35% of planned spending, up from 17% in 2022, while social policy, education and health care are cut. Propaganda outlets, which usually ignore inflation, began urging Russians to order New Year gifts now.
By Evgenii Liamin, Egor Kuroptev
Kremlin's Soft Power Offensive: New Strategy for Diaspora and Foreign Influence
In August 2025 a Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation was created under Kiriyenko. An MGIMO document for a Presidential Administration directorate sorts the Russian diaspora into four groups. Rossotrudnichestvo’s budget grew from a pre-war $52M to $72M in 2025; Africa is a focus, with 14 of 26 new Russian Houses.
By EK Stratcom
Domestic audience
How it works inside Russia
At home, propaganda works on three levels: television and outlets for the mass audience, films, series and online content for younger viewers, and the education system for children. Officials and television often split roles: leaders deny involvement or stay restrained, while broadcasters push the harder line. Inconvenient reports are deleted or labelled fakes.
“Russia’s national television channels depicted European capitals in a state of uninterrupted chaos.”
European Protests in the Kremlin’s Domestic Propaganda
Channel One, Russia 1 and NTV aired over an hour of French protest coverage on October 18–19, and Channel One called the unrest the “death throes of Macronism.” Putin and Peskov meanwhile denied any Russian involvement. Z-bloggers split, from mockery to support for the protesters.
By Evgenii Liamin, Egor Kuroptev
TV Series and Films: Effective Kremlin's Propaganda Tool
Series and films made with the support of the Internet Development Institute (IRI), led by Alexey Goreslavsky, formerly of the Presidential Administration, aim to inject Kremlin-approved ideas and narratives into mass audiences. Constantinople, rated 8.3 on Kinopoisk, was the most successful series of 2025. The melodrama Lilies of the Valley ends with its hero sent to fight in Ukraine.
By EK Stratcom
The Kremlin on the Warpath
“Conversations about Important Things” lessons reached kindergartens in September 2025, with a pilot in 22 regions, including annexed territories of Ukraine. “Fundamentals of Safety and Defense of the Motherland” has been taught nationwide since 2024, alongside Zarnitsa 2.0 games and drone classes. On the state-created “Bear Den” platform, schoolchildren perform real tasks for sanctioned companies.
By EK Stratcom
“Plague in Siberia”: Another Kremlin Communications Failure
A familiar pattern: silence, then denial, then “fake.” After an Irkutsk laboratory worker died on October 1–2, People of Baikal counted five deleted REN TV Telegram posts, and reports in Izvestia, AiF, MK and Kommersant disappeared. Officials spoke of “pneumonia of undetermined etiology” while TV stayed almost silent. Most Z posts followed the official line.
By Evgenii Liamin, Egor Kuroptev
Foreign audiences
How it works abroad
Abroad, messages travel through state outlets such as RT, local partners, language-specific Telegram networks and fake news sites. They target elections and public debate in the United States and Europe, and increasingly the AI chatbots that learn from the open web. The same event often gets different explanations for different audiences.
“This cacophony of competing narratives created confusion rather than a coherent account of events”
A Chorus of Contradictions Across Europe
Kremlin-aligned channels presented October protests in France, Italy, Spain, Germany and Albania as one Europe-wide crisis. Different channels blamed police, migrants or provocateurs, often contradicting each other. Yet the protests were linked by a common accusation: governments put military spending and Ukraine ahead of their own citizens.
By Sasha Starost, Egor Kuroptev
Building a fake reality
The Pravda network, also known as Portal Kombat, is linked to the Crimea-based firm TigerWeb and Evgeny Shevchenko. It ran at least 224 sites by April 2024. Its sites automatically translate and republish material from RIA, TASS, RT and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. In a NewsGuard test, 7 of 10 chatbots cited its sites.
By EK Stratcom
Russia’s US Midterm Messaging Campaigns and American Amplifiers
Ahead of the midterms, the Matryoshka operation circulated fabricated videos, and in September researchers identified 16 clips with counterfeit CNN branding. Doppelgänger accounts made about 150,000 quote-posts on elections in the US, Israel and France on October 7–9. Storm-1516 and a US branch of the Pravda network were also active.
By Sasha Starost, Egor Kuroptev
Kremlin Malign Information Influence in Latin America
RT en Español supplies content that local partners and online proxies recirculate across the region. After 2022, amid sanctions and restrictions on RT and Sputnik in a number of jurisdictions, influence moved to “alternative” outlets and personal brands such as Canal Red and former RT en Español presenter Inna Afinogenova. The study traces how these outlets connect and how messages move between platforms.
By Anton Mikhalchuk, Egor Kuroptev
Updated with each report
Core narratives we track
The main storylines of Kremlin propaganda, who they are aimed at, and the latest EK Stratcom evidence for each.
“Despite addressing different issues, the core narratives remained consistent”
| Narrative | Main audience | Tracked since | Latest EK Stratcom evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Europe and NATO are preparing for war with Russia |
| | Sabotage attempt in Estonia | |
| Russia is ready for war with Europe |
| | From threats to “ready for war” | |
| Europe is failing, chaotic and authoritarian |
| | Shenzhen summit | |
| European governments put Ukraine before their citizens |
| | Spain’s general strike | |
| Russia wants peace; the West wants war |
| | Shenzhen summit | |
| Sanctions do not work and only hurt Europe |
| | Ukraine and Iran | |
| “Eurofascism”: today’s Europe as heir to Nazi Germany |
| | The Kremlin on the warpath | |
| Bad news is a fake |
| | Plague in Siberia | |
| Russia as a partner against Western dominance |
| | Kremlin influence in Latin America |
Swipe the table sideways to see all columns.
“Tracked since” is the date of the earliest EK Stratcom report in which the narrative appears. Rows are updated when a new report adds evidence.
Methods
Techniques, with examples from our research
- Testing before rollout
- New lines appear to be trialled through friendly channels before they go national. Signs of the “ceasefire as victory” narrative being promoted appeared from May 18, 2026. Source
- Contradictory explanations
- The same event gets competing, even incompatible explanations from different channels. The effect is confusion and distrust rather than belief in one story. Source
- Silence, denial, “fake”
- Bad news is first ignored, then denied, then branded disinformation, as with the reports of a plague death in Irkutsk in October 2026. Source
- Deleting the record
- Off-message material disappears. An MK column published May 24, 2026 was removed a few days later (source), and five REN TV Telegram posts on the Irkutsk hospitalizations disappeared, as counted by People of Baikal (source).
- Selective amplification
- The leaked plan provides for buying off Z-bloggers, amplifying moderates and repressing the most radical voices. Source
- Imitation media and proxies
- Fake outlets, spoofed brands and local partners lend credibility, from Pravda-network sites to CNN-branded clips. Source
- Flooding search and AI
- The Pravda network publishes millions of auto-generated articles a year and aims to saturate search results and the data AI models learn from. Source
Effect
Does Russian propaganda work?
Partly. Television still reaches most Russians, and its viewers are more hawkish than the rest of the population. Yet the core message has not taken hold. In September 2026, 64% of Russians supported peace talks, and 81% said they would back Putin if he ended the war without conditions.
Acceptance of nuclear use fell from 34–39% in 2024 to 24% in 2025, then rose to 29% in 2026. Victory Day’s significance for Russians fell from 69% to 59% since 2021, according to VTsIOM data we cite.
Reach abroad is uneven too. In our monitoring of Estonia-related Telegram content, Pravfond-linked channels and Baltnews produced about a quarter of the posts but drew only 1–6% of the views; most attention went to large military blogs. Distribution, reach and changes in opinion are separate questions, and we report them separately.
TV viewers vs all Russians, June 2026
- 34–39%2024
- 24%June 2025
- 29%June 2026
Levada Center data as cited in EK Stratcom, Jul 29, 2026. Scale 0–100%.
Recent research
Latest from EK Stratcom
- The Shenzhen Summit as Proof of Russia’s Restored Global Standing
Format alone was framed as victory, whatever the outcome.
- Sabotage Attempt in Estonia and the Kremlin’s Baltic Narratives
State TV ignored the sabotage; Z commentators could not.
- War and Society: The Kremlin’s Vulnerabilities in Late 2026
Most Russians want talks, yet the Kremlin keeps fighting.
- Spain’s General Strike, Two Opposing Narratives
One strike, two narratives, both aimed at Sánchez’s government.
- Framing the Abu Dhabi Talks as a Diplomatic Victory for Russia
Moscow as winner, Europe as spoiler, Kyiv as saboteur.
- The Kremlin Shifts From Threatening Europe to Declaring Russia Ready for War
At least 22 statements about an alleged European and NATO threat to Kaliningrad from at least 14 individuals in October.
Questions
Frequently asked questions
What is Russian propaganda?
It is the Russian state’s effort to shape public opinion at home and abroad. It combines news media, entertainment, education and online networks, with much of the agenda set in the Presidential Administration and funded from the federal budget and other affiliated sources.
Who runs Russian propaganda?
The Presidential Administration sets much of the agenda, with Alexei Gromov overseeing domestic propaganda and Sergei Kiriyenko overseeing domestic policy and a directorate for foreign audiences. State broadcasters, state-funded bodies such as IRI and ANO Dialog, and foreign proxies produce and spread the content.
How much does Russia spend on propaganda?
Russia’s draft 2027 budget allocates ₽146 billion (about $1.72 billion) to state propaganda, compared with ₽148 billion for 2026. Separately, Rossotrudnichestvo’s budget rose from a pre-war $52 million to $72 million in 2025.
How is propaganda different from disinformation?
Propaganda can use accurate, selective or misleading information to promote a political view. Disinformation is content that is deliberately false, usually spread covertly. Russia uses both.
Does Russian propaganda work?
Only in part. TV viewers are more hawkish, but in September 2026 most Russians still supported peace talks, and acceptance of nuclear use is lower than in 2024. In one EK Stratcom case study on Estonia, Kremlin-linked outlets drew far fewer views than their volume of posts would suggest.
About this page
Methodology and sources
This page brings together findings from EK Stratcom’s published research on Russian state propaganda. Figures link to the report where they are documented, and each report keeps its original date and authors. Short quotes are reproduced verbatim; card summaries are our own. Polling data come from the Levada Center and VTsIOM as cited in those reports.
Each case is bounded by its observation period. Shared messaging alone does not prove coordination, and distribution, reach and opinion change are different findings. FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference. We update the page when new reports add evidence.