Russia Watch | Explainer

Russian Propaganda:
How the Kremlin’s Propaganda System Works

Last updated: Sources last checked: Draws on: 24 EK Stratcom reports, 2025–2026Curated by: Evgenii Liamin

Russian propaganda is the Russian state’s effort to shape what people at home and abroad believe about the war, the West and the Kremlin itself.

Much of its agenda is set in the Presidential Administration. First Deputy Chief of Staff Alexei Gromov oversees domestic propaganda, and his fellow first deputy Sergei Kiriyenko oversees domestic policy and, since August 2025, a directorate for work with foreign audiences. State television and state-funded internet and film projects produce the content. It reaches people through TV, Telegram, the state messenger Max, schools and cinemas, and abroad through state media, local proxies and fake news sites.

The content is produced and spread by many outlets and contractors, so our research documents each link case by case. What it shows is a system that is well funded and adaptable, yet increasingly reactive when events outpace the script.

Propaganda or disinformation? Propaganda can use accurate, selective or misleading information to promote a political view. Disinformation is the narrower case of content that is deliberately false. Russia uses both; this page covers the propaganda system as a whole.

From EK Stratcom research

At a glance

How it fits together

The system at a glance

Propaganda moves through four functions. Each item links to the EK Stratcom report where we document it.

  1. Stage 1

    Direct

    Sets narratives, tests them, allocates money.

  2. Stage 2

    Produce

    Turns direction into content.

  3. Stage 3

    Carry

    Delivers content to people.

  4. Stage 4

    Reach

    The audiences it is built for.

The stages describe functions, not a fixed hierarchy. Shared messaging alone does not prove coordination, so each link on this map rests on a specific EK Stratcom report.

Direction and money

Who runs Russian propaganda

Agenda-setting runs through the Presidential Administration. Our reporting points to signs of the Administration testing narratives, and a leaked plan on which voices to amplify or sideline. The money comes from the federal budget and other affiliated sources. Below the top, links are looser: state institutions abroad, foundations and media outlets keep campaigns going even when local operators are prosecuted.

“Moscow retains the funding, media infrastructure and personnel to sustain campaigns from abroad.”

Estonia’s Kremlin-Linked Influence Ecosystem,

Domestic audience

How it works inside Russia

At home, propaganda works on three levels: television and outlets for the mass audience, films, series and online content for younger viewers, and the education system for children. Officials and television often split roles: leaders deny involvement or stay restrained, while broadcasters push the harder line. Inconvenient reports are deleted or labelled fakes.

“Russia’s national television channels depicted European capitals in a state of uninterrupted chaos.”

European Protests in the Kremlin’s Domestic Propaganda,

Foreign audiences

How it works abroad

Abroad, messages travel through state outlets such as RT, local partners, language-specific Telegram networks and fake news sites. They target elections and public debate in the United States and Europe, and increasingly the AI chatbots that learn from the open web. The same event often gets different explanations for different audiences.

“This cacophony of competing narratives created confusion rather than a coherent account of events”

A Chorus of Contradictions Across Europe,

Updated with each report

Core narratives we track

The main storylines of Kremlin propaganda, who they are aimed at, and the latest EK Stratcom evidence for each.

“Despite addressing different issues, the core narratives remained consistent”

Kremlin Propaganda Targeting Western Audiences: Ukraine And Iran,
Core narratives of Russian propaganda, their audiences and the latest EK Stratcom evidence
NarrativeMain audienceTracked sinceLatest EK Stratcom evidence
Europe and NATO are preparing for war with Russia
  • Domestic mass audience
  • Europe
| Sabotage attempt in Estonia
Russia is ready for war with Europe
  • Europe
| From threats to “ready for war”
Europe is failing, chaotic and authoritarian
  • Domestic mass audience
  • European publics
| Shenzhen summit
European governments put Ukraine before their citizens
  • European publics
| Spain’s general strike
Russia wants peace; the West wants war
  • Domestic mass audience
  • Western publics
| Shenzhen summit
Sanctions do not work and only hurt Europe
  • Western publics
| Ukraine and Iran
“Eurofascism”: today’s Europe as heir to Nazi Germany
  • Children and youth
  • Domestic mass audience
| The Kremlin on the warpath
Bad news is a fake
  • Domestic mass audience
| Plague in Siberia
Russia as a partner against Western dominance
  • Latin America
| Kremlin influence in Latin America

Swipe the table sideways to see all columns.

“Tracked since” is the date of the earliest EK Stratcom report in which the narrative appears. Rows are updated when a new report adds evidence.

Methods

Techniques, with examples from our research

Testing before rollout
New lines appear to be trialled through friendly channels before they go national. Signs of the “ceasefire as victory” narrative being promoted appeared from May 18, 2026. Source
Contradictory explanations
The same event gets competing, even incompatible explanations from different channels. The effect is confusion and distrust rather than belief in one story. Source
Silence, denial, “fake”
Bad news is first ignored, then denied, then branded disinformation, as with the reports of a plague death in Irkutsk in October 2026. Source
Deleting the record
Off-message material disappears. An MK column published May 24, 2026 was removed a few days later (source), and five REN TV Telegram posts on the Irkutsk hospitalizations disappeared, as counted by People of Baikal (source).
Selective amplification
The leaked plan provides for buying off Z-bloggers, amplifying moderates and repressing the most radical voices. Source
Imitation media and proxies
Fake outlets, spoofed brands and local partners lend credibility, from Pravda-network sites to CNN-branded clips. Source
Flooding search and AI
The Pravda network publishes millions of auto-generated articles a year and aims to saturate search results and the data AI models learn from. Source

Effect

Does Russian propaganda work?

Partly. Television still reaches most Russians, and its viewers are more hawkish than the rest of the population. Yet the core message has not taken hold. In September 2026, 64% of Russians supported peace talks, and 81% said they would back Putin if he ended the war without conditions.

Acceptance of nuclear use fell from 34–39% in 2024 to 24% in 2025, then rose to 29% in 2026. Victory Day’s significance for Russians fell from 69% to 59% since 2021, according to VTsIOM data we cite.

Reach abroad is uneven too. In our monitoring of Estonia-related Telegram content, Pravfond-linked channels and Baltnews produced about a quarter of the posts but drew only 1–6% of the views; most attention went to large military blogs. Distribution, reach and changes in opinion are separate questions, and we report them separately.

TV viewers vs all Russians, June 2026

Support peace talks

All Russians64%
TV viewers49%

Accept use of nuclear weapons

All Russians29%
TV viewers34%
  • 34–39%2024
  • 24%June 2025
  • 29%June 2026

Levada Center data as cited in EK Stratcom, Jul 29, 2026. Scale 0–100%.

Recent research

Latest from EK Stratcom

Questions

Frequently asked questions

What is Russian propaganda?

It is the Russian state’s effort to shape public opinion at home and abroad. It combines news media, entertainment, education and online networks, with much of the agenda set in the Presidential Administration and funded from the federal budget and other affiliated sources.

Who runs Russian propaganda?

The Presidential Administration sets much of the agenda, with Alexei Gromov overseeing domestic propaganda and Sergei Kiriyenko overseeing domestic policy and a directorate for foreign audiences. State broadcasters, state-funded bodies such as IRI and ANO Dialog, and foreign proxies produce and spread the content.

How much does Russia spend on propaganda?

Russia’s draft 2027 budget allocates ₽146 billion (about $1.72 billion) to state propaganda, compared with ₽148 billion for 2026. Separately, Rossotrudnichestvo’s budget rose from a pre-war $52 million to $72 million in 2025.

How is propaganda different from disinformation?

Propaganda can use accurate, selective or misleading information to promote a political view. Disinformation is content that is deliberately false, usually spread covertly. Russia uses both.

Does Russian propaganda work?

Only in part. TV viewers are more hawkish, but in September 2026 most Russians still supported peace talks, and acceptance of nuclear use is lower than in 2024. In one EK Stratcom case study on Estonia, Kremlin-linked outlets drew far fewer views than their volume of posts would suggest.

About this page

Methodology and sources

This page brings together findings from EK Stratcom’s published research on Russian state propaganda. Figures link to the report where they are documented, and each report keeps its original date and authors. Short quotes are reproduced verbatim; card summaries are our own. Polling data come from the Levada Center and VTsIOM as cited in those reports.

Each case is bounded by its observation period. Shared messaging alone does not prove coordination, and distribution, reach and opinion change are different findings. FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference. We update the page when new reports add evidence.

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