The Kremlin casts the diesel deal as a triumph for a “magnanimous” Putin and blames Kyiv for blocking peace. It stays silent on the energy ceasefire to avoid raising Russians’ hopes of an imminent end to a war Moscow clearly intends to prolong. Key topics:
“The Leaders of Two Superpowers Have Now Spoken Six Times”
“Russia Is Ready for Diplomacy, but Moscow Sees No Basis for Negotiations”
Z-Community: “I Hope We Got More Than Just Dollars in Return”
Executive Summary
Kremlin propaganda presents the October 9 diesel deal between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin as follows: the United States desperately needs Russian diesel, and Putin has generously accommodated Trump by agreeing to the deal and lifting the diesel export ban. State television portrayed the agreement as an unequivocal triumph for Russia and a sign that victory was drawing closer.
Sunday evening news programs emphasized that this was the sixth conversation this year between “the leaders of two superpowers” and acknowledged that Moscow and Washington had suddenly managed to reach an agreement without hidden conditions in the “fine print.” Even Nezygar, a Telegram channel close to Russia’s Presidential Administration, concluded that Putin had secured a political victory while doing almost nothing to earn it.
Propaganda cast Europe and Ukraine as the losers, claiming that Europe had become a hostage to its own sanctions policy. Meanwhile, a previously uncommon narrative is gaining traction: a widening rift between Brussels and Kyiv.
The deal was readily incorporated into the traditional narrative that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is illegitimate. Propaganda paired Trump’s statement that Ukraine needs a new leader with reminders of Washington’s “extensive experience” in changing governments in Kyiv.
A new element is the claim that Zelenskyy has leverage over Trump. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are now presented as an attempt to derail the deal and a direct attack on the American president ahead of the midterm elections.
Valentin Bogdanov, who heads the state television news program Vesti’s bureau in the United States, depicted a fuel pump nozzle in Zelenskyy’s hands as a weapon aimed at the midterm elections. The resulting argument is that, with Republican electoral prospects at risk, Trump is prepared to increase pressure on Kyiv by withholding weapons and intelligence.
State media said nothing about the energy ceasefire announced by Trump. This silence reflects both Moscow’s unwillingness to de-escalate and the sensitivity of the issue for Russian public opinion.
According to the independent Levada Center, the share of Russians who would support a decision by Putin to end the war while maintaining the current status quo has risen by 19 percentage points since May 2023, reaching 81%.
More than one in three would support such a decision even if it meant returning occupied territory to Ukraine (35%, up 5 percentage points). Instead of discussing the truce, propaganda focused on Zelenskyy’s offer to hold elections on condition of a 60-day ceasefire, dismissing it as a provocation and a pretext for a respite from the fighting. It claimed that elections could be held under any conditions, as Russia had supposedly just demonstrated.
Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, offered only the possibility of suspending strikes on election day, while Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Zelenskyy “has not earned a respite.”
Propaganda resorted to outright falsification to support its claim that Moscow is open to diplomacy but sees no basis for talks. Russia 1 attributed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio an admission that Kyiv was deaf to efforts to secure peace.
In his interview with the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, however, Rubio said only that there appeared to be no prospect of a negotiated settlement at present, without naming either side. What Putin is waiting for before returning to trilateral talks remains unexplained.
The pro-war Z community had no consistent response. Z blogger Anastasia Kashevarova feared that Russia would “be made a fool of again” if it demanded nothing in return. The RIA Katyusha channel criticized the “sect of methodologists,” a label commonly applied to Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration, and his team, for failing even to explain the deal to “a people at war.” Z analyst Yury Kotyonok recalled that Trump’s similar announcement on September 14 had proved empty. Skepticism soon gave way to familiar gloating at Trump’s expense.
According to Sergei Shilov, a propagandist for the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti, Trump had agreed to the deal out of desperation ahead of the congressional elections.
Nezygar offered the most unusual theory. It suggested that the detention in Montenegro and deportation to Serbia of Mikhail Zvinchuk, who owns the Defense Ministry-linked Rybar propaganda network, might have been staged to divert attention from the deal. It hinted that “the American authorities would not request his extradition to the United States and would even help secure his release.”
“The Leaders of Two Superpowers Have Now Spoken Six Times”
Kremlin state propaganda portrayed the diesel deal as an unequivocal triumph for Russia and a clear sign that victory was drawing closer. Sunday evening news programs, which bring together the Kremlin’s main narratives for domestic audiences, emphasized Moscow’s status by stressing the “great importance the American leader attached to these negotiations” (1) and declaring that “this was already the sixth conversation between the leaders of two superpowers since the start of the year, and neither wanted to end the call.” (2) In a fairly critical post about the deal, Nezygar, a Telegram channel close to Russia’s Presidential Administration, wrote that
“Russian propaganda is whipping up a huge ‘goyda’ [a nationalist battle cry used here as shorthand for pro-war triumphalism] celebration.” The channel added that “Putin secured a political victory while doing almost nothing to earn it.” (3)
Russian official propaganda thus made another complete about-face, declaring that “it suddenly turned out that Russia and the United States can agree to cooperate without additional conditions buried in the fine print.” It explicitly presented the deal as evidence that Trump was becoming more favorably disposed toward Putin and as
“part of the Trump administration’s return to accepting Russia’s position and applying more serious, systematic pressure on Zelenskyy to make him accept Russia’s terms for a settlement.”
The deal fit seamlessly into the established narratives of “Ukraine as the sole obstacle to peace” and “Europe as a warmonger.”
“Brussels is horrified because this undermines its plans to strangle Russia economically. Everyone wins except the Europeans and Ukrainians,” the Russia 1 TV channel told its national audience.
Channel One advanced the same line while promoting sympathetic European voices:
“European hawks predictably condemned the agreement, while more sensible politicians openly lament that Europe has become a hostage to its own utterly inflexible, if not pigheaded and pointless, sanctions policy.”
A previously uncommon narrative of growing tensions between Europe and Ukraine is also gaining traction: “Many in Europe have started talking down to Zelenskyy.” (4) This was presented alongside claims of an intensifying conflict between Washington and the European Union:
“A week ago, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent demanded that Europe provide additional fuel supplies, but crafty Brussels refused to tap its reserves.”
Russian propaganda completely ignored the energy ceasefire announced by Trump on Sunday. (5) This clearly reflects Moscow’s unwillingness to pursue any settlement, as well as the Kremlin’s sensitivity to public opinion on the issue.
Coverage of Trump’s proposed truce would have raised Russians’ hopes of a diplomatic resolution. Another refusal by Putin to take steps toward de-escalation could then have intensified public discontent.
Polling data support this assessment. A recent survey (6) by the independent Levada Center shows rising support among Russians for a decision by Putin to end the war. This holds both if the current status quo is maintained and if occupied territory is returned to Ukraine.
The scale of the increase is alarming for the Kremlin. Since May 2023, support for such a decision has risen by 19 percentage points to 81% under the first scenario and by 5 percentage points to 35% under the second. The proportions of Russians who would oppose such a decision have also fallen substantially: by 17 percentage points to 12% under the first scenario and by 11 percentage points to 51% under the second.
The demand for an end to the war is clear. More than one in three Russians would now support relinquishing the “new territories” to achieve it.
Against this backdrop, even a suggestion of progress toward peace is incompatible with the Kremlin’s course of escalation.
“Russia Is Ready for Diplomacy, but Moscow Sees No Basis for Negotiations”
Official narratives cast the diesel deal as an unequivocal triumph for Russia and further evidence of impending catastrophe for Ukraine. Propaganda folded the deal into its familiar narrative of Zelenskyy’s illegitimacy:
“What happened was indeed a shock for Kyiv. [...] Any goodwill [from the United States], if there ever was any, now seems to be gone. Trump is explicitly advising Ukrainians to replace their leader.”
Citing Trump’s subsequent statement that Ukraine needs a new leader, it pushed this narrative to its logical extreme:
“These statements can hardly be taken lightly. Washington has extensive experience with regime change in Ukraine.” (2)
A new argument stands out in the current coverage. Official media emphasize that the Ukrainian president has leverage over Trump, leaving “Trump furious” as “the conflict between Kyiv and Washington reaches a new level.” (7)
That leverage consists of Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil and gas facilities, which are explicitly linked to Trump’s political future and the midterm elections: “Any strike on a [Russian] oil refinery is a direct attack on Trump.” In his report for the state television propaganda program Vesti, Valentin Bogdanov, its bureau chief in the United States, declared:
“A fuel pump nozzle like this one is aimed at the midterm elections. Trump certainly does not want to see it in Zelenskyy’s hands.” He said the deal was “becoming crucial to Trump’s approval rating.” (8)
While ignoring the energy ceasefire, propaganda offered its usual response to Zelenskyy’s willingness to hold presidential elections in Ukraine on condition of a 60-day ceasefire: “a broken record,” (9) and
“more nonsense. Elections can be held under any conditions, and Russia has just proved it. All it takes is the will.”
The argument then fractured into a series of disparate claims that reveal Moscow’s actual attitude toward diplomacy. Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said that “in reality, Kyiv does not want to hold elections,” but that Putin would be prepared to order a suspension of strikes on election day. (10) Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “Zelenskyy has not earned a respite from the fighting.” (11) Propaganda recast this as: “Only a lasting peace. No one will fall for Zelenskyy’s provocations.”
The Kremlin’s propaganda then employed its familiar tactic of shifting blame, resorting to an outright lie. Russia 1 claimed that
“on Friday, the American secretary of state admitted that Kyiv was deaf to attempts to resolve the conflict through diplomacy,” (4) presenting this as a direct quotation from Marco Rubio’s interview with Kathimerini.
In the original interview, however, Rubio offered a general assessment of the conflict at its current stage without naming either side: “At the moment, there do not appear to be any prospects for a negotiated settlement.” (12) “Zelenskyy and his team have no ideas for achieving peace,” propaganda asserted. (13) It continued to blame Ukraine for derailing negotiations, even as it advanced contradictory claims:
“Ukraine has opted for escalation and is prolonging the conflict. Russia is ready for a diplomatic settlement, but after the Kyiv regime’s attempts to disrupt our elections, the Kremlin now views trilateral talks differently. Putin stressed that Russia would consider when they could resume.” (2)
No explanation was offered as to what might make Putin willing to return to negotiations.
Z-Community: “I Hope We Got More Than Just Dollars in Return”
The pro-war Z community had no consistent message on the “diesel deal” or the subsequent “energy deal.” Its commentators offered competing explanations, appearing initially bewildered. Some expressed considerable distrust of the diesel agreement between Trump and Putin. Z blogger Anastasia Kashevarova, for example, warned:
“If Russia simply supplies fuel and asks for nothing in return, it will be made a fool of again. [...] I hope we got more than just dollars in return.” (14)
The “patriotic” RIA Katyusha channel voiced similar skepticism. It criticized the Presidential Administration’s handling of communications about the deal, targeting the “sect of methodologists,” a label often applied to Sergei Kiriyenko, the administration’s first deputy chief of staff, and his team:
“What is sad, though, is how they communicate with the people. In fact, they do not communicate at all. They explain absolutely nothing. They do not even try to justify the decision. The people simply do not exist in their world. [...] Yet these are people at war, carrying the weight of everything that is happening now.” (15)
Z analyst Yury Kotyonok also expressed distrust, this time toward the supposed “energy ceasefire,” which both Russia and Ukraine denied:
“We should remember that almost a month ago, on September 14, Trump made a similar announcement, and it proved completely empty.” (16)
The Z commentators’ criticism and skepticism toward the Kremlin went no further. They reverted to the pro-war community’s familiar rhetoric. Responding to the diesel deal, Yulia Vityazeva wrote: “Very curious to see how the scumbag [Zelenskyy] reacts: will he swallow the humiliation, or step up attacks on our refineries, storage facilities, and tankers to spite Trump?” (17) She also remarked that “the gentleman [Trump] scouring the world for diesel to please his voters is a heartbreaking sight.” (18)
Other commentators likewise portrayed Trump as acting under duress and Putin as responding generously. Witnesses of Bayraktar published a post by one of its contributors, Sergei Shilov, a war propagandist for the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti. Linking the deal to the congressional midterms, he wrote:
“Trump did not agree to the deal out of the goodness of his heart. [...] No, this was a desperate plea from the president.” (19)
Rybar, which is linked to Russia’s Defense Ministry, suggested that “tacit understandings between representatives of the Kremlin and the White House may also involve delegitimizing Zelenskyy, whom the Americans would find much easier to pressure.” (20) It also argued that
“overall, this rhetoric from the United States is good for Russia. And, incidentally, it has only become possible because of changes in how the conflict is being fought. [...] The Ukrainian project will become less and less attractive to investors.” (21)
Nezygar, a channel known for its purported insider reporting, offered another theory about Mikhail Zvinchuk, owner of the Rybar network. He had been detained in Montenegro and subsequently deported to Serbia despite being on EU sanctions lists and attracting close attention from the United States Department of State. In 2024, the department’s Rewards for Justice program had offered up to $10 mn for information on Rybar employees. (22) Nezygar suggested that the episode “may have been deliberately staged to divert attention from the diesel deal.” It claimed that
“Zvinchuk may have provoked his own detention in Montenegro, knowing in advance that the American authorities would not request his extradition to the United States and would even help secure his release. [...] In any case, Russia’s diplomatic services were prepared for the incident involving Zvinchuk.” (23)
Two Majors, a Z channel linked to Russia’s security establishment, was the first to reject the claim of an energy ceasefire, once again demonstrating its insider ties:
“Trump is quite the master of writing sensational posts that bear no relation to reality. We are either waiting for confirmation from our officials or watching closely to see where the ‘Geran’ [drones] fly, or do not fly, in the near future.” (24)
Svarshchiki, another Z channel linked to the security establishment, pointed to an alleged decline in the intensity of Russian and Ukrainian strikes against each other. It commented, “As if someone had declared a truce :)” (25) and linked to its own September 12 post, which asserted that “wars end just as suddenly as they begin. According to our information, there is serious discussion of the need to bring all this to an end.” (26)
