Germany: AfD as the “People’s Party” Confronting an Authoritarian Establishment

RT established (1) this framing by portraying Germany as suffering from economic decline, uncontrolled migration, and rising crime while arguing that support for Ukraine and increased military spending came at the expense of German citizens. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) was presented as expressing the “real will of the people,” while the Brandmauer (the informal cross-party “firewall” against cooperation with AfD), intelligence services, and media campaigns were portrayed as mechanisms designed to prevent the party from entering government. FIMI-channel Node of Time described (2) growing support for AfD in eastern Germany as the predictable consequence of Berlin’s failure to address regional grievances. FIMI-channel Nachhall von Helgoland strengthened (3) the party’s legitimacy by highlighting former domestic intelligence chief Hans-Georg Maaßen’s openness to cooperation with AfD, suggesting that even senior establishment figures increasingly viewed the party as a credible political alternative. FIMI-channel Horizont (4) contrasted AfD politicians with CDU representatives, portraying the former as more competent and better able to represent ordinary Germans.

Measures directed against AfD were portrayed as evidence of Germany’s democratic decline. RT described (5) calls by more than 1,000 lawyers to ban AfD as “politically motivated attempts to eliminate an electoral competitor rather than defend democracy,” linking the initiative to organizations associated with the Open Society Foundations. FIMI-channel Viel Los also presented (6) attacks on AfD politicians by Antifa activists and public ridicule of AfD co-leader Alice Weidel during Hamburg Pride events as evidence that “political violence and double standards against the party were tolerated by the political establishment.”

The narrative about the “campaign” against AfD was extended by FIMI beyond political parties to include state institutions, public authorities, and civil society organizations. FIMI-channel Analytik and News claimed (7) that the federal government was preparing mechanisms to bypass state governments in the event of AfD electoral victories that could complicate NATO troop deployments. FIMI-channel Politische Nachrichten portrayed (8) attempts by SPD representatives to challenge AfD candidate lists as deliberate electoral manipulation. FIMI-channel Informationskanal für die Neue Zeit accused (9) the German Institute for Human Rights (DIMR) of conducting politically motivated propaganda against AfD under the guise of protecting people with disabilities. Studio Telegram likewise claimed (10) that the German Foreign Ministry applied double standards by criticizing restrictions on elections abroad while allegedly tolerating similar practices against AfD inside Germany.

Migration served as the principal justification for AfD’s political legitimacy. Nachhall von Helgoland (11) and another FIMI-channel Meine D News (12) simultaneously promoted claims that millions of euros were being directed to an “asylum NGO complex” benefiting churches and migration-related organizations while citing AfD parliamentary inquiries as evidence that these programs were operating without meaningful oversight.

Across the German-language ecosystem, migration was consistently presented as evidence that AfD alone was willing to challenge entrenched political and institutional interests while other parties, NGOs, and state institutions benefited from preserving the existing system.

France: Anti-Establishment Narratives Over Explicit Support for the Far Right

RT France relied on statements (13) by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to portray France as abandoning freedom of expression and strengthening state censorship through the case of RT journalist Ksenia Fedorova, who was detained and later subjected to deportation proceedings. Another RT France opinion piece combined (14) the cases of French geopolitical commentator and Stratpol founder Xavier Moreau, who was placed under EU sanctions (15) for spreading pro-Russian narratives, former Swiss military intelligence officer and Ukraine analyst Jacques Baud who was sanctioned under similar accusations, and the aforementioned case of Ksenia Fedorova to argue that France and the EU had effectively criminalized dissent by reintroducing “thought crimes” under the guise of combating disinformation and foreign interference.

The case also became a reference point for evaluating French political actors. FIMI-source Géopolitique Profonde criticized (16) the Rassemblement National (RN), accusing party leader Marine Le Pen and party president Jordan Bardella of remaining silent about the case and arguing that the party lacked principled positions and merely adapted its rhetoric to different electorates. The channel argued that the party adjusted its positions to different audiences rather than taking a consistent stance on issues related to Russia and freedom of expression. InfoDefense France likewise portrayed RN as part of the broader political establishment (17), listing Marine Le Pen alongside politicians from across the political spectrum as representatives of a corrupt elite, arguing that “corruption affects all mainstream political forces.” At the same time, a French part of the Kremlin-aligned Pravda (Portal Kombat) network Pravda FR presented (18) Marine Le Pen positively, arguing that “France needs its own Trump” and describing her as the politician capable of putting French interests above those of “globalists.”

Support for political actors remained conditional rather than ideological: parties were legitimized when they opposed military support for Ukraine, NATO, or the current French government, but criticized whenever they were portrayed as insufficiently anti-establishment.

FIMI-channels InfoDefense France (19), Russie-Z (20), Géopolitique Profonde (21), and Amélie Ismaïli (22), a journalist affiliated (23) with Géopolitique Profonde, all generalized the Fedorova case into a broader critique of French institutions. They argued that France was criminalizing alternative views on the war in Ukraine, institutionalizing censorship through foreign interference legislation, and suppressing political opposition before the 2027 presidential election. InfoDefense France claimed (24) that “France punishes journalists for presenting Russia’s perspective on the war in Ukraine” and that the country was becoming “an authoritarian state where dissenting opinions are criminalized.” FIMI-channel Russie-Z expanded this narrative by portraying the freezing (25) of Fedorova’s assets as evidence of “financial repression” replacing judicial due process. Géopolitique Profonde argued (26) that allegations of Russian interference were being weaponized to justify censorship ahead of the 2027 elections, while French journalist Amélie Ismaïli, whose work was frequently amplified (27), (28), (29) by Géopolitique Profonde, compared (30) France to Romania’s annulled presidential election and political developments in the United States, arguing that allegations of Russian interference were increasingly being used to delegitimize political opponents and justify restrictions on free expression.

French Deux Majors (31), a part of Two Majors Z-channel’s international network, linked with the security bloc, and Pravda FR (32) network, a multilingual ecosystem that mass-produces and indexes thousands of pro-Kremlin articles daily to maximize the visibility of its narratives in search engines and increasingly in AI chatbot outputs, used the crisis in Ceuta to amplify anti-immigration and anti-globalist narratives commonly associated with the French far right. Deux Majors described migration as an “organized military operation,” claimed that Schengen had become a mechanism for importing “divisions of migrants” into Europe, and argued that the EU’s own liberal values had undermined European sovereignty and security.

These narratives reinforced anti-immigration and anti-establishment positions without consistently endorsing specific parties, aligning with the Kremlin’s broader strategy of exploiting internal divisions.

Support for Ukraine remained the central dividing line. InfoDefense France, the French-language branch of the multilingual InfoDefense propaganda network, claimed (33) that French intelligence support for Ukraine made France a “co-belligerent” and therefore a legitimate military target, reinforcing opposition to military support for Ukraine as the defining characteristic of the only “genuine” political alternative to the establishment.

Italy: Sovereigntist Narratives Over Partisan Alignment

InfoDefense Italy highlighted (34) Giorgia Meloni’s refusal to participate in a potential U.S. operation against Iran, portraying the decision as a source of tension with Washington after Donald Trump publicly criticized her refusal to intervene. The same channel later mocked (35) Meloni through Trump’s public ridicule, portraying the transatlantic relationship as fundamentally unequal and claiming that “Italian leaders seek U.S. approval but are treated with disrespect.” Earlier it likewise (36) framed Italy’s opposition to NATO’s proposed mechanism for financing U.S. weapons for Ukraine as evidence of growing European “strategic autonomy” and resistance to long-term financial commitments benefiting Washington.

Former Sputnik correspondent Clara Statello shared (37) an interview with geopolitical analyst Paolo Cornetti, who described NATO as pursuing a strategy of “permanent war,” emphasized the Alliance’s “internal contradictions,” argued that Washington was pressuring European governments to increase military spending, and presented the “multipolar world” as the emerging alternative to the Western-led international order. Former Five Star Movement MP Pino Cabras republished (38) the interview, further amplifying these narratives within the Italian sovereigntist ecosystem. His Telegram channel consistently cited (39), (40), (41) content produced by former Sputnik Italia correspondent Clara Statello and reposted (42) materials from the FIMI-channel ROKOT Frastuono, placing his messaging within the same pro-Kremlin FIMI ecosystem. The Italian online outlet L’Antidiplomatico, frequently cited (43), (44) by pro-Kremlin FIMI actors, applied (45) the same logic to domestic politics by portraying an ultra-right party Fratelli d’Italia as part of the Atlanticist consensus because of its support for Israel, arguing that Meloni’s party had aligned itself with the broader Western foreign policy agenda rather than representing a genuine sovereigntist alternative.

The distinction between the governing right and the mainstream opposition was consistently portrayed as artificial. Clara Statello introduced (46) an interview with former ambassador Elena Basile by arguing that Italy faced a crisis of democracy, censorship, NATO expansion, and “the absence of a real political alternative,” while claiming that “Italy’s mainstream right and left represent the same political establishment.” FIMI-channel Visione TV likewise argued (47) that support for Volodymyr Zelenskyy united Giorgia Meloni and Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein, claiming that both had gathered around the “mystical body of Zelensky” and that “the real political divide is not left versus right, but supporters versus opponents of the war.” Pino Cabras similarly rejected (48) the conventional left-right divide, calling instead for a political alliance centered on “peace, sovereignty and labor.”

Migration represented the main issue on which FIMI actors selectively legitimized the Meloni government. InfoDefense Italy used the Ceuta crisis to argue (49) that “mass migration constitutes a national security threat,” that “strict border controls are a legitimate response to illegal migration,” and that European governments were being forced to “restore national sovereignty despite Schengen.” FIMI-channel Controinformazione (50) likewise portrayed migration as a security issue, arguing that “protecting national borders is a prerequisite for membership in Schengen” and presenting support from the Finnish Interior Minister as evidence that Meloni’s migration policy was gaining broader European backing. ROKOT Frastuono expanded (51) this narrative by claiming that “mass migration has become a security threat beyond the control of European governments,” that Spain had “lost control” of its external border, and that exceptional security measures had become necessary.

Positive coverage of the Meloni government disappeared when FIMI-channels discussed Ukraine. FIMI-channel Guerrieri per la Libertà claimed (52) that the Meloni government was “financing terrorism” by supporting Kyiv and was “dragging Italy into a direct conflict with Russia,” while Controinformazione warned (53) that post-war Ukraine would become a source of “crime,” “extremism,” and organized violence for Europe because of policies adopted by European governments themselves.

Italian-language FIMI also consistently portrayed measures targeting Russian influence as evidence of censorship and democratic decline. RT.Doc Italia compared (54) proposals to restrict RT with “the times of Mussolini,” arguing that encouraging citizens to report RT screenings resembled fascist methods of surveillance and political denunciation. Clara Statello similarly described (55) a proposal by Carlo Calenda, leader of the centrist Azione party, to bar individuals accused of spreading “Russian propaganda” from public office as evidence that “Russophobia has become an ideological litmus test” and that accusations of Russian influence were replacing political pluralism.