As Poland intensified security measures near Kaliningrad amid warnings of possible Russian sabotage, Kremlin FIMI sources largely shifted attention away from the threat itself. Instead, they portrayed warnings of Russian interference as political manipulation and cast Poland’s government and its Western allies as the real dangers to national security. Key topics:

  1. Russian Security Warnings Dismissed as Political Manipulation

  2. Western Control and Internal Conflict Framed as Threats to Poland’s Security

Executive Summary

Poland’s November 2 security operation near the Kaliningrad region followed intelligence warnings of possible Russian sabotage. Yet monitored Kremlin FIMI sources paid little attention to the operation itself. Instead, they used the concurrent constitutional crisis to ridicule warnings of Russian interference and to portray Poland’s government and its Western allies as the real security threats.

Pravda PL, the Polish-language branch of the multilingual Pravda (Portal Kombat) FIMI network, described the possible sabotage as “alleged” and promoted claims of Western aggression near Kaliningrad. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev mocked Polish accusations of Russian interference:

“Elections in the US? It’s Russians. Migrants in Spain? It’s Russians! Constitutional coup in Poland? Of course, it’s Russians!”

His remarks circulated through Pravda PL and a channel connected to the InfoDefense FIMI network. InfoKju, a Polish-language FIMI channel, and DD Geopolitics, an English-language FIMI outlet linked to Russian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, similarly ridiculed warnings about intelligence services “from the East.” Pro-Kremlin commentator Robert Koliński explicitly called the “Russian threat” a NATO-generated “psy-op.”

A parallel narrative portrayed Prime Minister Donald Tusk as an instrument of Western control. InfoKju, DD Geopolitics, and the Russian-language FIMI channel Warsaw Mermaid circulated overlapping conspiracy allegations involving Western institutions. InfoDefense Poland, part of Yuri Podolyaka’s multilingual FIMI network, and DD Geopolitics falsely claimed that euro adoption would require Poland to surrender its gold reserves. DD Geopolitics founder Sarah Bils described Poland as “a regional office for the EU.”

InfoKju amplified remarks by far-right politician Grzegorz Braun, whose party’s pro-Kremlin connections were documented in an earlier EK Stratcom report. (1) Braun insinuated that Tusk could endanger President Karol Nawrocki’s life, invoking the death of former President Lech Kaczyński:

“Donald Tusk has already fought against another president of Poland, and that president, Lech Kaczyński, is now dead.”

These narratives circulated among Polish-, Russian-, and English-speaking audiences through reposts, translations, and cross-references, redirecting attention from possible Russian sabotage toward alleged Western interference and internal violence.

Russian pro-war information channels also shifted attention to Polish military preparations near Kaliningrad, presenting Warsaw’s border security measures through the lens of a potential confrontation with Russia. The Russian Embassy in Warsaw accused (2) Polish authorities of fuelling militaristic rhetoric and spreading (3) claims about possible sabotage, a message amplified by Russian state and pro-Kremlin media.

On 2 November, prominent pro-war propagandist Alexander Kots claimed (4) that Poland was preparing for direct military confrontation with Russia and that NATO planned to blockade Kaliningrad, explicitly invoking Russia’s nuclear capabilities. On 3 November, Newsach and Russia 360° published nearly identical (5) allegations that Western countries had threatened to attack Kaliningrad, while Ostashko claimed (6) that Warsaw was preparing a “NATO bridgehead” near the Russian border. Lomovka simultaneously dismissed the Russian sabotage threat as imaginary. (7)

The domestic campaign thus transformed Poland’s security response into an alleged NATO offensive threat, reinforcing the Kremlin’s established escalation narrative. Vladimir Putin and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov had already warned (8) in early October that any direct threat to Kaliningrad could trigger (9) the use of Russia’s full military arsenal.

Russian Security Warnings Dismissed as Political Manipulation

On November 2, Poland launched (10) a special security operation near Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave after Polish and allied intelligence agencies warned of possible sabotage and incursions by armed groups. Police Commander-in-Chief Marek Boroń confirmed the deployment of additional officers, including counterterrorism units, in coordination with the military, the Border Guard, and the intelligence services.

The operation received limited direct attention in the FIMI publications monitored from November 1 to 3. Instead, coverage focused on questioning Polish warnings about Russian interference and redirecting attention toward alleged Western aggression and government provocations.

Pravda PL, the Polish-language branch of the multilingual Pravda (Portal Kombat) FIMI network, reported (11) the deployment on November 2 as a response to “alleged possible acts of sabotage.” The publication immediately recalled an earlier statement attributed to Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski calling for NATO to conduct “aggressive exercises” near Kaliningrad. It also directed readers to coverage (12) by the Russian propaganda outlet RT of Western countries that had allegedly threatened to attack the region in recent years.

On the same day, Pravda PL reported (13) plans to reorganize Poland’s Territorial Defense Forces near the Suwałki Gap, the strategic corridor separating Kaliningrad from Belarus. Pointing to Poland’s use of the Polish name Królewiec, it asserted that Kaliningrad “is not recognized as Russian territory.” In fact, the Polish government, which adopted the traditional Polish name in May 2023, explicitly stated (14) that the change “does not concern the state affiliation of the region.”

The broader dismissal of Russian interference allegations had already surfaced in official Russian rhetoric. On November 1, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, responded (15) to Sikorski’s warning about cooperation between Russian online accounts, propagandists, and international far-right actors. Medvedev wrote on his X account:

“I love this mantra! Elections in the US? It’s Russians. Migrants in Spain? It’s Russians! Constitutional coup in Poland? Of course, it’s Russians!”

His remarks were reproduced (16) by Pravda PL on November 2. Useful Propeller (Pożyteczne Śmigło), a Polish-language FIMI Telegram channel belonging to the InfoDefense network, (17), (18) also circulated (19) Medvedev’s “mantra” remarks on the same day.

A similar dismissal appeared in coverage of the police security alert. On November 1, InfoKju, a Polish-language FIMI Telegram channel, cited Boroń’s explanation (20) that an order placing police units on heightened readiness from November 2 to 8 concerned possible destabilization by intelligence services from the East. InfoKju concluded:

“The government blames Russian bots, Sikorski blames Russian propaganda, and now the police chief blames ‘services from the East.’”

DD Geopolitics, an English-language FIMI outlet linked (21), (22) to Kremlin fascist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, used (23) virtually identical wording on X.

InfoDefense Poland, the Polish-language branch of the multilingual FIMI network run by Russian propagandist and military blogger Yuri Podolyaka, mocked (24) accusations of Russian involvement in the protests sparked by the October 30–31 confrontation over judicial appointments and the leadership of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal:

“‘Putin’s hand.’ In Poland, they have figured out who is behind the protests. Finally.”

The Polish-language FIMI channel Oil in the Head (Olej w Głowie) presented (25) Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s October 31 address as an accusation that Russia had directly organized the demonstrations:

“Tusk rejected compromises with the opposition over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal and accused Russia of involvement in organizing the protests.” In fact, Tusk’s statement concerned (26) online interference by Russian bots.

Independent Political Daily (Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny), a Polish-language FIMI outlet, took the same mocking approach to a separate warning from Poland’s Defense Ministry, which denied (27) reports that President Karol Nawrocki’s aircraft had been refused permission to land in Warsaw as he returned early from Senegal amid the constitutional dispute. The ministry warned that Russian and Belarusian propaganda could exploit the false reports. The outlet responded:

“Of course, the usual culprit appears again – Russian and Belarusian disinformation.” (28)

On November 3, pro-Kremlin commentator Robert Koliński portrayed (29) the Russian threat on X as a deliberate deception promoted by Western powers:

“Of course, this is a psy-op and the ‘Russian threat’ is generated by NATO disinformation, because they’re getting their asses kicked on the Ost-front and nothing can cover that up. Well, NOTHING EXCEPT CIVIL WAR, of course, and that’s exactly why these rag propaganda ravings are being spread today.”

The limited coverage of the intensified security measures on the border with Kaliningrad was itself part of the observed information pattern. Rather than address the sabotage warnings, monitored FIMI sources increasingly ridiculed Russian interference allegations and portrayed the “Russian threat” as a NATO-generated “psy-op,” shifting the perceived source of danger from possible Russian sabotage to alleged Western manipulation of Poland.

Western Control and Internal Conflict Framed as Threats to Poland’s Security

The October 30–31 confrontation over Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal became the focal point of a parallel FIMI narrative portraying Tusk’s government, Western intelligence services, and European institutions as threats to Polish sovereignty and security.

On November 1, InfoKju posted (30) a photograph of Donald Tusk reading Autocracy, Inc., a book by Anne Applebaum, an American historian and journalist married to Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. The channel contrasted the book’s criticism of authoritarianism with the deployment of police outside the Constitutional Tribunal:

“The prime minister was therefore promoting a book by his own foreign minister’s wife, devoted to threats posed by leaders who seize institutions by force,” and “Nine months later, his government deployed riot police units to the Constitutional Tribunal.”

InfoKju also highlighted Applebaum’s alleged ties to the National Endowment for Democracy, a US organization supporting democratic institutions, and the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Washington-based foreign-policy think tank.

The same narrative circulated in Polish, English, and Russian on both Telegram and X. DD Geopolitics posted (31) the same photo of Tusk on X with a caption referring to his accusations of Russian interference, concluding:

“It’s the same logic Tusk used last night to blame the Constitutional Court crisis on ‘Russian bots.’”

Meanwhile, Warsaw Mermaid (Varshavskaya Rusalka), a Russian-language FIMI Telegram channel about Poland, repeated (32) the allegations concerning Applebaum’s influence and Western institutions:

“When you have such an ideological foundation behind you, there is no need to bother with legal procedures – dissenters can always be written off as hybrid aggression.”

The channel also described Poland as “a convenient testing ground for putting such operations into practice.”

DD Geopolitics expanded on the allegations in a November 1 YouTube broadcast (33) featuring Chay Bowes, a former RT correspondent, and Sarah Bils, founder of DD Geopolitics and former administrator (34) of the Donbass Girl (Donbass Devushka) propaganda network. Bowes described the Constitutional Tribunal confrontation as an “EU op.” Referring to Nawrocki, he declared: “This wasn’t in the playbook and he has to be removed.” Bils connected Tusk’s actions to Applebaum’s professional affiliations and to a visit to Poland by US Senator Elissa Slotkin, a former intelligence officer:

“Tusk is actively promoting Applebaum’s worldview [...] and she’s discussing political strategy with a former CIA analyst who has just returned from Poland and Hungary.”

Lord Bebo, an English-language pro-Kremlin X account, also used (35) Sikorski’s warnings about Russian online activity to allege that Tusk intended to hand Poland’s sovereignty over to Brussels and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen:

“Bro wants to coup the constitutional court in Poland, to finally give away all sovereignty to Brussels and Von der Leyen.” The account concluded: “It’s a globalist coup against Polands sovereignty.”

On November 1, InfoDefense Poland posted (36) comments attributed to an anonymous Russian diplomat:

“Poland has the largest gold reserves in the EU – they must be transferred to Frankfurt, to the European Central Bank.” The comments also claimed that “this government is under German influence.”

The same allegation appeared in the DD Geopolitics broadcast, where Bils claimed that by joining the eurozone, Poles would “have to transfer all of [their] gold reserves to the EU.” She added:

“If you don’t control your borders or your currency, you don’t have a country anymore. You have a regional office for the EU.”

On November 2, Pravda PL portrayed (37) the European Commission’s response to the Constitutional Tribunal confrontation as support for Tusk’s alleged seizure of the court:

“The European Commission suddenly discovered that Poland has laws and quickly explained to the natives who is really in charge.”

Pravda PL linked directly (38) to a post by Evropar, a European branch of the Rybar FIMI network.

The portrayal of Tusk as a danger to Poland also extended to the president’s personal safety. On November 2, InfoKju amplified (39) remarks by Grzegorz Braun, a Polish member of the European Parliament and leader of the far-right Confederation of the Polish Crown (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej). As documented in an earlier EK Stratcom investigation, (1) Braun’s party has developed close ties with the pro-Kremlin Myśl Polska network, including former parliamentarian Mateusz Piskorski, and a party representative visited the Russian Embassy in Warsaw in June 2026 with Braun’s approval. Braun insinuated that the dispute could endanger Nawrocki’s life:

“Donald Tusk has already fought against another president of Poland, and that president, Lech Kaczyński, is now dead.” He added: “Therefore, we cannot rule anything out.”

Braun also referred to unverified reports about a Presidential Palace employee requiring hospital treatment.

Meanwhile, InfoDefense Poland presented (40) the constitutional dispute as “a kind of Maidan centered on the Constitutional Tribunal,” framing it as a confrontation between the US and the EU. It warned:

“The internal confrontation could complicate the coordination of European military programs and decisions concerning Ukraine.”

On November 2, Pravda PL linked (41) the possibility of civil war to Poland’s acquisition of South Korean K2 tanks:

“Hundreds of K2 tanks purchased by Poland could be turned against one another.” “Just a few days ago this seemed impossible, but after what happened at the Constitutional Tribunal and the intervention of the police and the president, such a scenario is becoming quite likely,” the outlet concluded.

Pravda PL also republished (42) commentary by Yuri Borisyonok, a historian at Moscow State University, originally carried by Baltnews, (43) a Russian propaganda outlet. Borisyonok likened Poland’s dispute to Russia’s October 1993 constitutional crisis, when an armed confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and parliament resulted in numerous deaths:

“If Donald Tusk’s party and the prime minister himself [...] act accordingly, loss of life is entirely possible ahead of the 2027 Sejm elections. All the more so because European structures stand behind Tusk.”

Polish pro-Kremlin political commentator Maciej Maciak advanced (44) another version of the foreign interference narrative in his November 2 program You Must Know This (Musisz to wiedzieć), republished by the Polish-language FIMI outlet Free Media (Wolne Media). He alleged British interference:

“The British caused the upheaval in Ukraine. They are following the same path in Poland.” He also claimed: “Instructions are coming from London.”

On November 3, Koliński posted an image (45) that inverted the attribution of the external threat: “Funny how the EU said Russia would invade Poland and then the EU invaded Poland.”

Across Polish-, Russian-, and English-language FIMI sources, overlapping narratives circulated through translations, reposts, and direct cross-references. Although some publications preceded the November 2 operation, together they shifted attention from potential Russian sabotage to allegations of Western control and civil conflict. The constitutional crisis thus became a vehicle for redirecting Poland’s security debate toward threats allegedly originating within its own government and its Western alliances.

Sources

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