One month after the initial migration surge into Ceuta, Kremlin FIMI actors have renewed and expanded their coverage of the crisis. While the first wave primarily portrayed Ceuta as an “invasion” demonstrating Spain's inability or unwillingness to protect its borders, the new wave increasingly exploits the dispute over possible Moroccan involvement in the July 30–31 events, the Spanish government's attribution of disinformation activity to Russia and other foreign actors, and the protests surrounding Ceuta Day on September 2.
RT en Español established (1) one of the clearest new narratives, arguing that the Spanish government had focused on Russia, Israel, and the international far right as sources of disinformation while downplaying emerging indications of possible Moroccan involvement. RT acknowledged that foreign and far-right actors had amplified the crisis but challenged the government's alleged conflation of subsequent information manipulation with responsibility for the original events:
“Politically exploiting an event is one thing; explaining why it happened is quite another.”
InfoDefense Español subsequently reinforced (2) this framing, contrasting Pedro Sánchez's rejection of Moroccan involvement with his accusations against Russia and Israel, while describing the latter as merely “alleged.” The same counternarrative was reinforced among Russian-speaking audiences inside Spain. Europe Through a Lawyer's Eyes, a Telegram channel run by Kremlin-linked Madrid-based lawyer Oleg Gubarev, questioned (3) the logic of Sánchez's attribution and suggested that the prime minister was attempting to “shift responsibility onto someone else.”
Other Spanish-language actors, targeting both Spain and Latin America, pushed the ideas further by suggesting that Madrid may have concealed or ignored evidence of Moroccan involvement. Los Sombreros Blancos reposted (4) a publication by another pro-Russian channel, Lyudmila Z Patriotas Rusos (5), which draws an explicit political parallel with the aftermath of the March 11, 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks and asks whether police findings concerning Moroccan agents had reached the government before Sánchez publicly exonerated Rabat. Nuevos Paradigmas meanwhile amplified (6) claims that Morocco was exploiting Sánchez's “passivity” to pursue broader objectives involving Ceuta and Melilla, the waters around the Canary Islands, and Western Saharan airspace.
Across these messages, the emerging counter-narrative reverses Madrid's attribution: Sánchez is portrayed as exploiting accusations of Russian disinformation to divert attention from possible Moroccan responsibility and his government's own failures.
A second cluster presents Ceuta as the catalyst for a broader popular revolt against Sánchez and Spain's political establishment. Desinformador Ruso shared (7) footage presented as police violence against demonstrators and asked whether Ceuta had “awakened the Spanish people.” Ucraniando portrayed (8) demonstrations in Bilbao, Zaragoza, and Valencia as opposition to an alleged Moroccan “attempt to take control” of Ceuta and used footage of residents insulting Sánchez to depict the prime minister as deaf to public anger. Rokot Tormenta similarly claimed (9) that protests demanding Sánchez's resignation had spread to 200 cities and portrayed police use of force as evidence that the government represses Spaniards while failing to control irregular migration.
The mobilization narrative also intersects directly with Spanish nationalist organizations connected to Kremlin-aligned transnational networks. Falange Española de las JONS, which participated (10) in the September 2025 founding congress in St. Petersburg of the International Sovereigntist League “Paladins,” devoted virtually all of its publications (11), (12), (13) between August 31 and September 3 to Ceuta. Ahead of the September 2 demonstrations, Falange called (14) on Spaniards to mobilize and declared that if the army could not respond to the “permanent threat” from a foreign power, “we demand the right of the Spanish people to self-defense.” Other posts promoted (15) nationwide demonstrations under the slogan “CEUTA IS NOT FOR SALE, CEUTA IS DEFENDED!” and attacked King Felipe VI for failing to “defend your nation.”
Democracia Nacional, another Spanish far-right organization that participated in the founding of the Paladins network, further radicalized this framing following the September protests. It accused (16) the National Police of acting against Spaniards defending themselves from the “migratory invasion of Spain,” called for a “radical” response and greater mobilization, and described (17) Moroccan migrants already living in Spain as a potential “fifth column” of an enemy state.
The crisis continues to reinforce established anti-NATO and institutional-abandonment narratives. ESPIA del TELÓN contrasted (18) Spanish participation in NATO air policing with an allegedly undefended Ceuta, asking the Spanish Defense Staff:
“Ceuta has been invaded by Moroccans for more than 30 days [...] And which of you serves Spain?”
Líneas Invisibles amplified (19) the same framing around Spanish troops constructing defensive positions in Latvia, criticizing them for building fortifications there “instead of Ceuta, that is, Spain.” ESPIA del TELÓN also attacked (20) King Felipe VI for issuing a Ceuta Day message while allegedly failing to visit the city since its “invasion by Morocco,” while Los Sombreros Blancos portrayed (21) emergency government funding as Sánchez “reaching for the checkbook to cover up the border chaos.”
Together, these posts portray the government, monarchy, and military as institutions that serve external interests or manage the consequences of the crisis rather than defend Spanish sovereignty.
Ceuta-related criticism also appeared within a different part of the Kremlin-linked Spanish-language media ecosystem. Canal Red (22), the media project founded by former Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias and featuring (23) former RT en Español presenter Inna Afinogenova, promoted a discussion under the framing “The government is afraid of angering Morocco.”
Although distinct from the nationalist “invasion” rhetoric, the framing converges with the broader claim that Madrid is unwilling to confront Morocco over its possible role in the crisis.
The campaign is also spreading beyond Spanish-language audiences. Italian-language Rokot/Frastuono portrayed (24) Ceuta as experiencing “daily rapes” and migration chaos while Spanish police used pepper spray against protesters. English-language Lord Bebo and Friends presented (25) humanitarian assistance by the German non-governmental organization (NGO) Mission Lifeline as suspicious support enabling migrants to remain in Ceuta. RT correspondent Chay Bowes argued (26) that Sánchez blamed “Russia and Israel” rather than his own “open-border fantasy” and later claimed (27) that popular anger showed that “Sánchez is finished.” German-language Meine D-News added (28) a media-conspiracy narrative, claiming that “mainstream media” had concealed the continuation of the crisis and asserting that Ceuta had been “completely taken over” and that “80,000 Spaniards have just lost their home.”
The renewed campaign therefore represents a clear evolution of the initial Ceuta narratives rather than simply their repetition. Kremlin-aligned actors are using new questions about possible Moroccan involvement to turn Spanish accusations of Russian FIMI back against the Sánchez government, portraying them as a diversion from Moroccan responsibility and domestic political failure. At the same time, Ceuta is being used to depict anti-government protests as a national awakening, reinforce claims that NATO commitments leave Spain unable to defend its own territory, and mobilize nationalist actors linked to Kremlin-aligned transnational networks. The appearance of compatible narratives across Spain-targeting and Latin America-targeting Spanish-language channels, Russian-language networks operating inside Spain, and German-, Italian-, and English-language actors demonstrates how the crisis is being adapted for different audiences while reinforcing a common picture of Spain as politically divided, institutionally weak, and unable to defend its sovereignty.