Vladimir Putin’s tour of Central Asia and the Russian Far East revealed a qualitative shift in the pressure on the Kremlin: calls to stop the war now come systematically not only from the West but from partner countries as well, including India and Kazakhstan. Moscow’s answer has been rhetoric of pressing on with the war and of readiness to escalate, coupled with an ostentatiously inconsistent position on negotiations that plainly signals an unwillingness to take them seriously. Key topic:
The Tour and the Bilateral Meetings
The Rhetoric of Putin and Naryshkin: A Course of Continued War and Escalation
The Z Community: Overwhelming Support for Putin’s Course and Scattered Criticism
Executive Summary
Vladimir Putin’s tour over the past week, which spanned the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek and the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, was conceived as a demonstration of the durability of the “Pivot to the East,” but in practice it registered a qualitative shift in the pressure on the Kremlin:
the demand to end the war now comes not only from the Western coalition but systematically from partner countries that fear further escalation.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Putin directly that
“we need to move from an endless war to the end of the war” and expressed India’s support for “all peace efforts on the Ukraine track,”
while as early as July 25 Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had proposed to “freeze” the war and return to the “Istanbul formula 2.0.” Putin himself acknowledged this trend on September 1, telling a press conference in Bishkek that
“the position of our friends is that everyone is in favor of ending this conflict as quickly as possible, and preferably by peaceful means.”
In his reply to Modi, however, he confined himself to the line “we are moving along that [peaceful] path,” and fell back on the familiar narrative about removing “the root causes”:
“We want that too, but not to freeze it. We want to end the war and achieve a lasting and absolute peace in general, in Ukraine and in Europe alike.”
The bilateral track revealed the same constraints. At his meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Putin reaffirmed the “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Tehran and expressed solidarity “with the Iranian people” against the backdrop of renewed US strikes, yet he did not allow himself even a hint of criticism of the Trump administration, still betting on contacts with the White House and on the chance of forcing his own terms through in Washington
(“I hope contacts with the American Administration will continue; we are in favor of restoring relations with the United States in full format”).
At his first meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan since parliamentary elections in which his party held on to power despite a large-scale Kremlin interference operation, Putin again urged Armenia to hold a referendum on choosing between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), hoping to use it to keep Yerevan in Moscow’s orbit.
Moscow’s negotiating position turned 180 degrees and back again in the space of three days: on September 1 Putin ruled out any dialogue with Kyiv (“one does not negotiate with terrorists”), while on September 3, at the EEF, he was already saying that “it is Russia and Ukraine, above all, that must come to terms with each other.” This divergence reads not as vacillation but as an indication that the Kremlin does not take the renewed negotiations seriously, and other facts bear this out: on September 4 The Kyiv Independent reported that the trip by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and then Kyiv on September 5–6 might fall through, because “The Russians don’t want them to come here to Kyiv,” and Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov said the same day that Moscow would not ask Ukraine to halt its attacks for the duration of the American negotiators’ visit. In parallel, an escalatory track was taking shape toward Europe: on September 3 the Russian embassy in Germany declared Germany’s future long-range systems “legitimate military targets,” Putin called Ukraine’s allies “accomplices in international terrorism,” and, asked whether British defense plants were targets, he answered “that is a secret, a military secret.” The overarching frame was supplied on September 4 by Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergey Naryshkin, who called the risk of a large-scale conflict across the whole of Eurasia “entirely real” and laid the blame on Europe, which in his account “torpedoes any attempt at a peaceful settlement” yet is “too pampered and too perverted” for a real war.
The Z community for the most part supported this course, but limited criticism was also voiced. Volunteer fighter Alexey Zhivov contested Putin’s claim that “the SMO has no effect on the birth rate,” linking the demographic crisis directly to the war, while Anastasia Kashevarova, responding to Putin’s remark that mobilization is not needed “as of today,” demanded the rotation of the men mobilized in 2022 and warned of “a new social bomb,” a framing that continues the testing of the “fair rotation” narrative as cover for covert mobilization, described previously by EK Stratcom (1). The Kremlin’s logic was set out most clearly by the Svarshchiki, a channel close to the security bloc:
a freeze would drive Moscow “into the trap of a permanent problem on the western flank,” because “the main question of the war in Ukraine is not territorial but political,” and the bet is therefore placed “on intensifying the infrastructure war this coming fall and winter,” with any decision on further steps deferred until spring.
The Tour and the Bilateral Meetings
In late August and early September, over an intensive tour of Central Asia and the Russian Far East, Vladimir Putin consistently sought to demonstrate the durability of his strategic “Pivot to the East.” On the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council of Heads of State in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Putin met in succession with the leaders of China, India, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Armenia.
Most of the meetings took place in the usual bilateral format, with the customary rhetoric about deepening cooperation and partnership between the countries. Several episodes stand out, however, as evidence of the deterioration of the Kremlin’s position even in its contacts with close partners. The first was the call by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “we need to move from an endless war to the end of the war, to the cessation of hostilities,” and his statement of India’s support for “all peace efforts on the Ukraine track” (2). A similar message had been delivered earlier, on July 25, by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at a meeting with Putin, when he urged that the war be “frozen” and that the parties return to the “Istanbul formula 2.0” (3). This points to an emerging trend in which pressure on Putin comes not only from the Western coalition but also from partner countries that fear further escalation, and on September 1 Putin himself acknowledged it, telling a press conference in Bishkek that
“the position of our friends is that everyone is in favor of ending this conflict as quickly as possible, and preferably by peaceful means” (4).
He remains unmoved nonetheless. In reply to Modi, Putin said that “we are moving along that [peaceful] path,” effectively ignoring the appeal and thereby continuing to voice his familiar narrative that Russia is waging war for the sake of peace, in order to remove “the root causes of the conflict”:
“We want that too, but not to freeze it. We want to end the war and achieve a lasting and absolute peace in general, in Ukraine and in Europe alike” (5).
The second was the meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, at which Putin reaffirmed the “comprehensive strategic partnership” with the ayatollahs’ regime and expressed solidarity “with the Iranian people” against the backdrop of renewed US strikes on Iran (6). Once again, however, he declined to offer even a hint of criticism of the Trump administration, hoping to intensify contacts with the White House and to preserve the chance of forcing his own terms through in any eventual negotiations. He stated this position explicitly at the EEF plenary session:
“I hope contacts with the American Administration will continue; we are in favor of restoring relations with the United States in full format […] All of this is working. I hope that in the end it will produce a positive result” (7).
The third was Putin’s first meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan since the recent parliamentary elections, in which his Civil Contract party retained power despite the Kremlin’s concerted efforts to discredit and unseat it (8). At the bilateral meeting, Putin once again urged Armenia to hold a referendum on choosing between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in the hope of using it to keep Yerevan within Russia’s sphere of influence.
The Rhetoric of Putin and Naryshkin: A Course of Continued War and Escalation
All of Putin’s recent statements plainly show that he is holding firmly to his plans for continuing the war, and that he has conspicuously failed to settle on a single position on negotiations. This is a clear sign that the Kremlin regards the renewed negotiations as a sham and does not take them seriously, as Putin himself framed it:
“we would not want all of this to keep going round in circles to no purpose.”
On September 1, at his press conference in Bishkek, responding to Zelensky’s warnings about the lack of safety in Russian airspace, Putin made clear that he was not prepared to enter into dialogue with Kyiv:
“This is simply a bid for state terrorism. And I would point out that they are asking us to resume negotiations, asking for face-to-face meetings. One does not negotiate with terrorists, that is the first point […] And if it does come to that, we will see how to respond, we will find the instruments.”
Two days later, on September 3, at the EEF session, he was saying the opposite, with an emphasis on a bilateral negotiating format:
“It is Russia and Ukraine, above all, that must come to terms with each other, and all the other countries are ready to support and to help, and not only the United States but the countries present here as well,” though he stressed that Kyiv’s statements “complicate the possibilities for holding bilateral peace talks.”
Subsequent developments also point to a deliberate Russian effort to derail the talks: on September 4 The Kyiv Independent reported that the planned trip by Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner on September 5–6, first to Moscow and then to Kyiv, might fall through, because “The Russians don’t want them to come here to Kyiv, and Witkoff is always sensitive to Russian sentiment […] They’re being told there that it’s dangerous” (9). The same day, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that “the Russian side will not approach Ukraine with a demand to halt its attacks for the duration of the American negotiators’ visit,” evidently implying the reverse as well (10).
The European factor also loomed large in Putin’s remarks. Speaking of Berlin’s countermeasures over the attempted sabotage at Leipzig airport on August 4–5, Putin said that
“the actions of the German authorities are connected above all with the domestic political situation. The chancellor’s position is difficult domestically, he does not enjoy the trust of his own citizens […] the question arises of the political future of Germany’s ruling elite.”
He was thereby returning to his habitual framing of the sabotage as a provocation designed to pin the blame on Russia. Later, on September 3, the Russian embassy in Germany issued a statement declaring that “should the planned German long-range systems be deployed against Russia, their deployment sites will become legitimate military targets,” continuing the pattern of threats (11). Other statements by Putin were more escalatory: he hinted at possible strikes on Britain, answering the question “can facilities of Britain’s defense industry located on British territory become military targets?” with “that is a secret, a military secret.” In addition, he called Ukraine’s allies “accomplices in international terrorism,” continuing to describe Ukraine’s retaliatory strikes as “terrorist attacks.” Asked “how to prevent strikes,” meanwhile, he plainly signaled a course of continuing the war: “strengthen the air defense system” and “deliver retaliatory strikes, so that they think twice about harming us, that’s all there is to it.”
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergey Naryshkin set out a broader frame on September 4, saying that
“the risk of a large-scale conflict arising across the entire space of Eurasia is entirely real, and this gives rise to the very gravest concerns” (12).
He shifted responsibility for the continuation of the war against Ukraine and for the escalation onto Europe, accusing it of “torpedoing any attempt at a peaceful settlement”:
“European leaders believe in controlled escalation, in a strategy of brinkmanship,” yet at the same time “European society, a society of mass consumption and transhumanism, is objectively unprepared for a large-scale and conditioned war in the East. It is too pampered and too perverted.”
NATO, in his account, has every interest in prolonging the conflict as “the best way of limiting Russia’s military-technical and mobilization potential.”
The Z Community: Overwhelming Support for Putin’s Course and Scattered Criticism
Pro-war Z authors covered Putin’s statements mainly as news, without adding assessments of their own, while echoing the escalatory register of those statements.
Across this output, however, several items stand out as critical of specific remarks by Putin.
One such theme was demographic policy and the falling birth rate. Z volunteer fighter Alexey Zhivov offered a nationalist critique of Putin’s claim that “the SMO has no effect on the birth rate,” linking the war directly to the demographic crisis:
“because of the war, the deterioration of rights and freedoms, restrictions on access to information, economic problems, and military threats, ordinary people cannot forecast their own future even a couple of years ahead and are postponing having a child” (13).
Another episode was a surprising line of criticism aimed by Z blogger Anastasia Kashevarova at Putin’s words about mobilization not being needed “as of today.” In response, she called for the rotation of the men mobilized in 2022, stating that “if we do not start resolving this question with the mobilized men now, we will get a new social bomb,” on the grounds, she said, that “it is the mobilized men who are asking about a new wave, in the hope of rotation” (14). EK Stratcom has previously written in detail about the testing of the “fair rotation” narrative as cover for covert mobilization (15). Most other authors offered no comment of their own.
On September 3, the Telegram channel Svarshchiki, which is close to the security bloc, openly argued that the Kremlin must continue its escalatory course, reposting material by pro-government expert Alexey Pilko (16). The post contends that if Moscow now agrees to a “freeze of the conflict” under pressure and in response to the peacemaking efforts of the United States and other countries, then
“it will drive itself into the trap of a permanent problem on its western flank,” because “the main question of the war in Ukraine is not territorial but political.”
The Kremlin, according to the author of the post, understands this too, and is therefore placing its “bet on intensifying the infrastructure war this coming fall and winter.”
Not until “the spring of next year, depending on the results achieved by the military campaign by that time,” the post concludes, will Moscow determine what to do next in Ukraine.